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authorGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>2018-12-19 18:00:15 -0600
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2018-12-29 13:39:11 +0100
commitd04e6ea0cec9e7d6cba806508f657d2d0dc6cacf (patch)
treeaecfc9223407a18a55fb37506b028abef91491e3 /Makefile
parent5cebd962c97f3ee64555718169cc00c8fe7a228a (diff)
drm/ioctl: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
commit 505b5240329b922f21f91d5b5d1e535c805eca6d upstream. nr is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:805 drm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->driver->ioctls' [r] drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:810 drm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'drm_ioctls' [r] (local cap) drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:892 drm_ioctl_flags() warn: potential spectre issue 'drm_ioctls' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing nr before using it to index dev->driver->ioctls and drm_ioctls. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20181220000015.GA18973@embeddedor Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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