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authorAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>2018-08-24 10:03:50 -0700
committerBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>2018-12-16 22:08:54 +0000
commite496526dcaf26efb254308c7d14abf05d6830a5c (patch)
treefaf7577c142b71643c65db012763c188dbd53c95 /arch/x86
parentc28ecf0e4ad89314fa0e4fdfdb58e4fa91296987 (diff)
x86/speculation/l1tf: Increase l1tf memory limit for Nehalem+
commit cc51e5428ea54f575d49cfcede1d4cb3a72b4ec4 upstream. On Nehalem and newer core CPUs the CPU cache internally uses 44 bits physical address space. The L1TF workaround is limited by this internal cache address width, and needs to have one bit free there for the mitigation to work. Older client systems report only 36bit physical address space so the range check decides that L1TF is not mitigated for a 36bit phys/32GB system with some memory holes. But since these actually have the larger internal cache width this warning is bogus because it would only really be needed if the system had more than 43bits of memory. Add a new internal x86_cache_bits field. Normally it is the same as the physical bits field reported by CPUID, but for Nehalem and newerforce it to be at least 44bits. Change the L1TF memory size warning to use the new cache_bits field to avoid bogus warnings and remove the bogus comment about memory size. Fixes: 17dbca119312 ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf") Reported-by: George Anchev <studio@anchev.net> Reported-by: Christopher Snowhill <kode54@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Michael Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: vbabka@suse.cz Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180824170351.34874-1-andi@firstfloor.org [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c46
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c1
3 files changed, 45 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 280bfa055fc2..935d0c063a50 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 {
/* Index into per_cpu list: */
u16 cpu_index;
u32 microcode;
+ /* Address space bits used by the cache internally */
+ u8 x86_cache_bits;
} __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES)));
#define X86_VENDOR_INTEL 0
@@ -167,7 +169,7 @@ extern void fpu_detect(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
static inline unsigned long long l1tf_pfn_limit(void)
{
- return BIT_ULL(boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits - 1 - PAGE_SHIFT);
+ return BIT_ULL(boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits - 1 - PAGE_SHIFT);
}
extern void early_cpu_init(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 497657df6616..4364dd458ad6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -696,6 +696,45 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "L1TF: " fmt
+/*
+ * These CPUs all support 44bits physical address space internally in the
+ * cache but CPUID can report a smaller number of physical address bits.
+ *
+ * The L1TF mitigation uses the top most address bit for the inversion of
+ * non present PTEs. When the installed memory reaches into the top most
+ * address bit due to memory holes, which has been observed on machines
+ * which report 36bits physical address bits and have 32G RAM installed,
+ * then the mitigation range check in l1tf_select_mitigation() triggers.
+ * This is a false positive because the mitigation is still possible due to
+ * the fact that the cache uses 44bit internally. Use the cache bits
+ * instead of the reported physical bits and adjust them on the affected
+ * machines to 44bit if the reported bits are less than 44.
+ */
+static void override_cache_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (c->x86 != 6)
+ return;
+
+ switch (c->x86_model) {
+ case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+ if (c->x86_cache_bits < 44)
+ c->x86_cache_bits = 44;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
{
u64 half_pa;
@@ -703,16 +742,13 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
return;
+ override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
+
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && !defined(CONFIG_X86_PAE)
pr_warn("Kernel not compiled for PAE. No mitigation for L1TF\n");
return;
#endif
- /*
- * This is extremely unlikely to happen because almost all
- * systems have far more MAX_PA/2 than RAM can be fit into
- * DIMM slots.
- */
half_pa = (u64)l1tf_pfn_limit() << PAGE_SHIFT;
if (e820_any_mapped(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_RAM)) {
pr_warn("System has more than MAX_PA/2 memory. L1TF mitigation not effective.\n");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 2068a648f893..e8ecf617ca4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -772,6 +772,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
else if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PAE) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PSE36))
c->x86_phys_bits = 36;
#endif
+ c->x86_cache_bits = c->x86_phys_bits;
if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000007)
c->x86_power = cpuid_edx(0x80000007);