Merge remote-tracking branch 'tip/x86/cc' into hyperv-next

28 files changed, 197 insertions, 106 deletions

diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index 8df1c7102643..d1e69d6e8498 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -1234,6 +1234,9 @@ config RELR
 config ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	bool
 
+config ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
+	bool
+
 config HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR
        bool
        help
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index ba9dab07c1be..2f26b8fc8d29 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -10,11 +10,6 @@
 
 #include <asm/svm.h>
 
-static inline bool mem_encrypt_active(void)
-{
-	return is_secure_guest();
-}
-
 static inline bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
 {
 	return is_secure_guest();
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
index 5e037df2a3a1..2e57391e0778 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ config PPC_SVM
 	select SWIOTLB
 	select ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
+	select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
 	help
 	 There are certain POWER platforms which support secure guests using
 	 the Protected Execution Facility, with the help of an Ultravisor
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Makefile
index 4cda0ef87be0..41d8aee98da4 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Makefile
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Makefile
@@ -31,3 +31,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_FA_DUMP)		+= rtas-fadump.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_SUSPEND)		+= suspend.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_VAS)		+= vas.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM)	+= cc_platform.o
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/cc_platform.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/cc_platform.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e8021af83a19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/cc_platform.c
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Confidential Computing Platform Capability checks
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+
+#include <asm/machdep.h>
+#include <asm/svm.h>
+
+bool cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
+{
+	switch (attr) {
+	case CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+		return is_secure_guest();
+
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cc_platform_has);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/svm.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/svm.c
index 87f001b4c4e4..c083ecbbae4d 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/svm.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/svm.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 #include <asm/machdep.h>
 #include <asm/svm.h>
 #include <asm/swiotlb.h>
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ void __init svm_swiotlb_init(void)
 
 int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
 {
-	if (!mem_encrypt_active())
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(addr))
@@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
 
 int set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
 {
-	if (!mem_encrypt_active())
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(addr))
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 2542cbf7e2d1..08a8b96606d7 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
-static inline bool mem_encrypt_active(void) { return false; }
-
 int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 int set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index bd70e8a39fbf..741a19a2fe38 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1518,6 +1518,7 @@ config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
 	select INSTRUCTION_DECODER
 	select ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS
+	select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
 	help
 	  Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory.
 	  This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
index 841a5d104afa..5c6a4af0b911 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
@@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ extern void arch_io_free_memtype_wc(resource_size_t start, resource_size_t size)
 #define arch_io_reserve_memtype_wc arch_io_reserve_memtype_wc
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 extern bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset,
 					unsigned long size,
 					unsigned long flags);
@@ -398,6 +399,13 @@ extern bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset,
 
 extern bool phys_mem_access_encrypted(unsigned long phys_addr,
 				      unsigned long size);
+#else
+static inline bool phys_mem_access_encrypted(unsigned long phys_addr,
+					     unsigned long size)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+#endif
 
 /**
  * iosubmit_cmds512 - copy data to single MMIO location, in 512-bit units
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
index 0a6e34b07017..11b7c06e2828 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ relocate_kernel(unsigned long indirection_page,
 		unsigned long page_list,
 		unsigned long start_address,
 		unsigned int preserve_context,
-		unsigned int sme_active);
+		unsigned int host_mem_enc_active);
 #endif
 
 #define ARCH_HAS_KIMAGE_ARCH
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 9c80c68d75b5..2d4f5c17d79c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
 #include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 
 #include <asm/bootparam.h>
 
@@ -50,9 +51,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
 void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
 
 void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
-bool sme_active(void);
-bool sev_active(void);
-bool sev_es_active(void);
 
 #define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")
 
@@ -75,9 +73,6 @@ static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }
 static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
 
 static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
-static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; }
-static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
-static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; }
 
 static inline int __init
 early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }
@@ -101,11 +96,6 @@ static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { }
 
 extern char __start_bss_decrypted[], __end_bss_decrypted[], __start_bss_decrypted_unused[];
 
-static inline bool mem_encrypt_active(void)
-{
-	return sme_me_mask;
-}
-
 static inline u64 sme_get_me_mask(void)
 {
 	return sme_me_mask;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 8f4e8fa6ed75..2ff3e600f426 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_ftrace.o = -pg
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_early_printk.o = -pg
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_head64.o = -pg
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_sev.o = -pg
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_cc_platform.o = -pg
 endif
 
 KASAN_SANITIZE_head$(BITS).o				:= n
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_dumpstack_$(BITS).o			:= n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_stacktrace.o				:= n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_paravirt.o				:= n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_sev.o					:= n
+KASAN_SANITIZE_cc_platform.o				:= n
 
 # With some compiler versions the generated code results in boot hangs, caused
 # by several compilation units. To be safe, disable all instrumentation.
@@ -47,6 +49,7 @@ endif
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT		:= n
 
 CFLAGS_head$(BITS).o	+= -fno-stack-protector
+CFLAGS_cc_platform.o	+= -fno-stack-protector
 
 CFLAGS_irq.o := -I $(srctree)/$(src)/../include/asm/trace
 
@@ -147,6 +150,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER)	+= unwind_frame.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS)		+= unwind_guess.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)		+= sev.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM)	+= cc_platform.o
+
 ###
 # 64 bit specific files
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..03bb2f343ddb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Confidential Computing Platform Capability checks
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+
+static bool __maybe_unused intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
+	return false;
+#else
+	return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are
+ * times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The
+ * cc_platform_has() function is used for this.  When a distinction isn't
+ * needed, the CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT attribute can be used.
+ *
+ * The trampoline code is a good example for this requirement.  Before
+ * paging is activated, SME will access all memory as decrypted, but SEV
+ * will access all memory as encrypted.  So, when APs are being brought
+ * up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV
+ * the trampoline area must be encrypted.
+ */
+static bool amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	switch (attr) {
+	case CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+		return sme_me_mask;
+
+	case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+		return sme_me_mask && !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED);
+
+	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+		return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
+
+	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT:
+		return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED;
+
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+#else
+	return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+
+bool cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
+{
+	if (sme_me_mask)
+		return amd_cc_platform_has(attr);
+
+	return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cc_platform_has);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c
index 045e82e8945b..a7f617a3981d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/crash_dump.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 
 static ssize_t __copy_oldmem_page(unsigned long pfn, char *buf, size_t csize,
 				  unsigned long offset, int userbuf,
@@ -73,5 +74,6 @@ ssize_t copy_oldmem_page_encrypted(unsigned long pfn, char *buf, size_t csize,
 
 ssize_t elfcorehdr_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos)
 {
-	return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, sev_active());
+	return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0,
+				cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT));
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index de01903c3735..fc5371a7e9d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/start_kernel.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 #include <linux/pgtable.h>
 
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -284,8 +284,13 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,
 	 * The bss section will be memset to zero later in the initialization so
 	 * there is no need to zero it after changing the memory encryption
 	 * attribute.
+	 *
+	 * This is early code, use an open coded check for SME instead of
+	 * using cc_platform_has(). This eliminates worries about removing
+	 * instrumentation or checking boot_cpu_data in the cc_platform_has()
+	 * function.
 	 */
-	if (mem_encrypt_active()) {
+	if (sme_get_me_mask()) {
 		vaddr = (unsigned long)__start_bss_decrypted;
 		vaddr_end = (unsigned long)__end_bss_decrypted;
 		for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr += PMD_SIZE) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
index b656456c3a94..8863d1941f1b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/nmi.h>
 #include <linux/swait.h>
 #include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 #include <asm/timer.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/traps.h>
@@ -418,7 +419,7 @@ static void __init sev_map_percpu_data(void)
 {
 	int cpu;
 
-	if (!sev_active())
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return;
 
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
index 73c74b961d0f..462dd8e9b03d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 
 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
-#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
 #include <asm/x86_init.h>
 #include <asm/kvmclock.h>
 
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static void __init kvmclock_init_mem(void)
 	 * hvclock is shared between the guest and the hypervisor, must
 	 * be mapped decrypted.
 	 */
-	if (sev_active()) {
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
 		r = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long) hvclock_mem,
 					 1UL << order);
 		if (r) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
index 131f30fdcfbd..f5da4a18070a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/suspend.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 
 #include <asm/init.h>
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
@@ -166,7 +167,7 @@ static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd)
 	}
 	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
 
-	if (sev_active())
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
 
 	set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, prot));
@@ -206,7 +207,7 @@ static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable)
 	level4p = (pgd_t *)__va(start_pgtable);
 	clear_page(level4p);
 
-	if (sev_active()) {
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
 		info.page_flag   |= _PAGE_ENC;
 		info.kernpg_flag |= _PAGE_ENC;
 	}
@@ -358,7 +359,7 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
 				       (unsigned long)page_list,
 				       image->start,
 				       image->preserve_context,
-				       sme_active());
+				       cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT));
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP
 	if (image->preserve_context)
@@ -569,12 +570,12 @@ void arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void)
  */
 int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	if (sev_active())
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
-	 * If SME is active we need to be sure that kexec pages are
-	 * not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the
+	 * If host memory encryption is active we need to be sure that kexec
+	 * pages are not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the
 	 * pages won't be accessed encrypted (initially).
 	 */
 	return set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
@@ -582,12 +583,12 @@ int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp)
 
 void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages)
 {
-	if (sev_active())
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return;
 
 	/*
-	 * If SME is active we need to reset the pages back to being
-	 * an encrypted mapping before freeing them.
+	 * If host memory encryption is active we need to reset the pages back
+	 * to being an encrypted mapping before freeing them.
 	 */
 	set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
index c2cfa5e7c152..814ab46a0dad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/swiotlb.h>
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
 #include <linux/dma-direct.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 
 #include <asm/iommu.h>
 #include <asm/swiotlb.h>
@@ -45,11 +45,10 @@ int __init pci_swiotlb_detect_4gb(void)
 		swiotlb = 1;
 
 	/*
-	 * If SME is active then swiotlb will be set to 1 so that bounce
-	 * buffers are allocated and used for devices that do not support
-	 * the addressing range required for the encryption mask.
+	 * Set swiotlb to 1 so that bounce buffers are allocated and used for
+	 * devices that can't support DMA to encrypted memory.
 	 */
-	if (sme_active())
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		swiotlb = 1;
 
 	return swiotlb;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
index c53271aebb64..c8fe74a28143 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(relocate_kernel)
 	 * %rsi page_list
 	 * %rdx start address
 	 * %rcx preserve_context
-	 * %r8  sme_active
+	 * %r8  host_mem_enc_active
 	 */
 
 	/* Save the CPU context, used for jumping back */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index 113d3ae51297..3946e77e622b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/sched/debug.h>	/* For show_regs() */
 #include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 #include <linux/printk.h>
 #include <linux/mm_types.h>
 #include <linux/set_memory.h>
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd)
 	int cpu;
 	u64 pfn;
 
-	if (!sev_es_active())
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT))
 		return 0;
 
 	pflags = _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_RW;
@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void)
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sev_es_runtime_data, ghcb_page) % PAGE_SIZE);
 
-	if (!sev_es_active())
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT))
 		return;
 
 	if (!sev_es_check_cpu_features())
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 989685098b3e..aa4828274557 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <asm/perf_event.h>
@@ -455,7 +456,7 @@ static int has_svm(void)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (sev_active()) {
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
 		pr_info("KVM is unsupported when running as an SEV guest\n");
 		return 0;
 	}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 60ade7dd71bd..026031b3b782 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/mmiotrace.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 #include <linux/efi.h>
 #include <linux/pgtable.h>
 
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_ram(struct resource *res)
  */
 static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res)
 {
-	if (!sev_active())
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return 0;
 
 	switch (res->desc) {
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res)
  */
 static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *desc)
 {
-	if (!sev_active())
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return;
 
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI))
@@ -508,6 +508,7 @@ void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
 	memunmap((void *)((unsigned long)addr & PAGE_MASK));
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 /*
  * Examine the physical address to determine if it is an area of memory
  * that should be mapped decrypted.  If the memory is not part of the
@@ -555,7 +556,7 @@ static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
 	case E820_TYPE_NVS:
 	case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
 		/* For SEV, these areas are encrypted */
-		if (sev_active())
+		if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 			break;
 		fallthrough;
 
@@ -693,7 +694,7 @@ static bool __init early_memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
 bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
 				 unsigned long flags)
 {
-	if (!mem_encrypt_active())
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return true;
 
 	if (flags & MEMREMAP_ENC)
@@ -702,7 +703,7 @@ bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
 	if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC)
 		return false;
 
-	if (sme_active()) {
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
 		if (memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
 		    memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size))
 			return false;
@@ -723,12 +724,12 @@ pgprot_t __init early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(resource_size_t phys_addr,
 {
 	bool encrypted_prot;
 
-	if (!mem_encrypt_active())
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return prot;
 
 	encrypted_prot = true;
 
-	if (sme_active()) {
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
 		if (early_memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
 		    memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size))
 			encrypted_prot = false;
@@ -746,7 +747,6 @@ bool phys_mem_access_encrypted(unsigned long phys_addr, unsigned long size)
 	return arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(phys_addr, size, 0);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 /* Remap memory with encryption */
 void __init *early_memremap_encrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
 				      unsigned long size)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index ff08dc463634..23d54b810f08 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
 #include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
 #include <linux/virtio_config.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/fixmap.h>
@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
 	struct boot_params *boot_data;
 	unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
 
-	if (!sme_active())
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return;
 
 	/* Get the command line address before unmapping the real_mode_data */
@@ -163,7 +164,7 @@ void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
 	struct boot_params *boot_data;
 	unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
 
-	if (!sme_active())
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return;
 
 	__sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), true);
@@ -193,7 +194,7 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(protection_map); i++)
 		protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]);
 
-	if (sev_active())
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		swiotlb_force = SWIOTLB_FORCE;
 }
 
@@ -202,7 +203,7 @@ void __init sev_setup_arch(void)
 	phys_addr_t total_mem = memblock_phys_mem_size();
 	unsigned long size;
 
-	if (!sev_active())
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return;
 
 	/*
@@ -360,42 +361,13 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
 	return early_set_memory_enc_dec(vaddr, size, true);
 }
 
-/*
- * SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are
- * times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The
- * sme_active() and sev_active() functions are used for this.  When a
- * distinction isn't needed, the mem_encrypt_active() function can be used.
- *
- * The trampoline code is a good example for this requirement.  Before
- * paging is activated, SME will access all memory as decrypted, but SEV
- * will access all memory as encrypted.  So, when APs are being brought
- * up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV
- * the trampoline area must be encrypted.
- */
-bool sev_active(void)
-{
-	return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
-}
-
-bool sme_active(void)
-{
-	return sme_me_mask && !sev_active();
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active);
-
-/* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */
-bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)
-{
-	return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED;
-}
-
 /* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
 bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
 {
 	/*
 	 * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses.
 	 */
-	if (sev_active())
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return true;
 
 	/*
@@ -403,7 +375,7 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
 	 * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the
 	 * encryption mask.
 	 */
-	if (sme_active()) {
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
 		u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask));
 		u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask,
 						dev->bus_dma_limit);
@@ -428,7 +400,7 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void)
 	 * The unused memory range was mapped decrypted, change the encryption
 	 * attribute from decrypted to encrypted before freeing it.
 	 */
-	if (mem_encrypt_active()) {
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
 		r = set_memory_encrypted(vaddr, npages);
 		if (r) {
 			pr_warn("failed to free unused decrypted pages\n");
@@ -444,7 +416,7 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
 	pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:");
 
 	/* Secure Memory Encryption */
-	if (sme_active()) {
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
 		/*
 		 * SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV
 		 * features below.
@@ -454,11 +426,11 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
 	}
 
 	/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
-	if (sev_active())
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		pr_cont(" SEV");
 
 	/* Encrypted Register State */
-	if (sev_es_active())
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT))
 		pr_cont(" SEV-ES");
 
 	pr_cont("\n");
@@ -477,7 +449,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
 	 * With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions,
 	 * but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler.
 	 */
-	if (sev_active() && !sev_es_active())
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) &&
+	    !cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT))
 		static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key);
 
 	print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
@@ -485,6 +458,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
 
 int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void)
 {
-	return sev_active();
+	return cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index 700ce8fdea87..3f0abb403340 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
@@ -296,7 +297,13 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
 	unsigned long pgtable_area_len;
 	unsigned long decrypted_base;
 
-	if (!sme_active())
+	/*
+	 * This is early code, use an open coded check for SME instead of
+	 * using cc_platform_has(). This eliminates worries about removing
+	 * instrumentation or checking boot_cpu_data in the cc_platform_has()
+	 * function.
+	 */
+	if (!sme_get_me_mask() || sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)
 		return;
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index ad8a5c586a35..527957586f3c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/libnvdimm.h>
 #include <linux/vmstat.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 
 #include <asm/e820/api.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -1986,7 +1987,7 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
 	int ret;
 
 	/* Nothing to do if memory encryption is not active */
-	if (!mem_encrypt_active())
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Should not be working on unaligned addresses */
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index 7515e78ef898..1f3675453a57 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
 #include <linux/reboot.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/ucs2_string.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
 
 #include <asm/setup.h>
@@ -284,7 +284,8 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
 	if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
 		flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
 
-	if (sev_active() && md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) &&
+	    md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
 		flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
 
 	pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -390,7 +391,7 @@ static int __init efi_update_mem_attr(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *m
 	if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO))
 		pf |= _PAGE_RW;
 
-	if (sev_active())
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
 
 	return efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
@@ -438,7 +439,7 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
 			(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE))
 			pf |= _PAGE_RW;
 
-		if (sev_active())
+		if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 			pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
 
 		efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
index 31b5856010cb..4a3da7592b99 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 #include <linux/pgtable.h>
 
 #include <asm/set_memory.h>
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ void __init reserve_real_mode(void)
 static void sme_sev_setup_real_mode(struct trampoline_header *th)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
-	if (sme_active())
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		th->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE;
 
-	if (sev_es_active()) {
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) {
 		/*
 		 * Skip the call to verify_cpu() in secondary_startup_64 as it
 		 * will cause #VC exceptions when the AP can't handle them yet.
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static void __init setup_real_mode(void)
 	 * decrypted memory in order to bring up other processors
 	 * successfully. This is not needed for SEV.
 	 */
-	if (sme_active())
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)base, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
 
 	memcpy(base, real_mode_blob, size);