Staging: add rt2860 wireless driver

This is the Ralink RT2860 driver from the company that does horrible
things like reading a config file from /etc.  However, the driver that
is currently under development from the wireless development community
is not working at all yet, so distros and users are using this version
instead (quite common hardware on a lot of netbook machines).

So here is this driver, for now, until the wireless developers get a
"clean" version into the main tree, or until this version is cleaned up
sufficiently to move out of the staging tree.

Ported to the Linux build system and cleaned up a bit already by me.

Cc: Linux wireless <linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

1 files changed, 1606 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/staging/rt2860/common/cmm_wpa.c b/drivers/staging/rt2860/common/cmm_wpa.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..81c332ac2524
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/staging/rt2860/common/cmm_wpa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1606 @@
+/*
+ *************************************************************************
+ * Ralink Tech Inc.
+ * 5F., No.36, Taiyuan St., Jhubei City,
+ * Hsinchu County 302,
+ * Taiwan, R.O.C.
+ *
+ * (c) Copyright 2002-2007, Ralink Technology, Inc.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify  *
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by  *
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or     *
+ * (at your option) any later version.                                   *
+ *                                                                       *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,       *
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of        *
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the         *
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.                          *
+ *                                                                       *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License     *
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the                         *
+ * Free Software Foundation, Inc.,                                       *
+ * 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307, USA.             *
+ *                                                                       *
+ *************************************************************************
+
+	Module Name:
+	wpa.c
+
+	Abstract:
+
+	Revision History:
+	Who			When			What
+	--------	----------		----------------------------------------------
+	Jan	Lee		03-07-22		Initial
+	Paul Lin	03-11-28		Modify for supplicant
+*/
+#include "../rt_config.h"
+// WPA OUI
+UCHAR		OUI_WPA_NONE_AKM[4]		= {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x00};
+UCHAR       OUI_WPA_VERSION[4]      = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x01};
+UCHAR       OUI_WPA_TKIP[4]     = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x02};
+UCHAR       OUI_WPA_CCMP[4]     = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x04};
+UCHAR       OUI_WPA_8021X_AKM[4]	= {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x01};
+UCHAR       OUI_WPA_PSK_AKM[4]      = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x02};
+// WPA2 OUI
+UCHAR       OUI_WPA2_WEP40[4]   = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x01};
+UCHAR       OUI_WPA2_TKIP[4]        = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x02};
+UCHAR       OUI_WPA2_CCMP[4]        = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x04};
+UCHAR       OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM[4]   = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x01};
+UCHAR       OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM[4]   	= {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x02};
+// MSA OUI
+UCHAR   	OUI_MSA_8021X_AKM[4]    = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x05};		// Not yet final - IEEE 802.11s-D1.06
+UCHAR   	OUI_MSA_PSK_AKM[4]   	= {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x06};		// Not yet final - IEEE 802.11s-D1.06
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		The pseudo-random function(PRF) that hashes various inputs to
+		derive a pseudo-random value. To add liveness to the pseudo-random
+		value, a nonce should be one of the inputs.
+
+		It is used to generate PTK, GTK or some specific random value.
+
+	Arguments:
+		UCHAR	*key,		-	the key material for HMAC_SHA1 use
+		INT		key_len		-	the length of key
+		UCHAR	*prefix		-	a prefix label
+		INT		prefix_len	-	the length of the label
+		UCHAR	*data		-	a specific data with variable length
+		INT		data_len	-	the length of a specific data
+		INT		len			-	the output lenght
+
+	Return Value:
+		UCHAR	*output		-	the calculated result
+
+	Note:
+		802.11i-2004	Annex H.3
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+VOID	PRF(
+	IN	UCHAR	*key,
+	IN	INT		key_len,
+	IN	UCHAR	*prefix,
+	IN	INT		prefix_len,
+	IN	UCHAR	*data,
+	IN	INT		data_len,
+	OUT	UCHAR	*output,
+	IN	INT		len)
+{
+	INT		i;
+    UCHAR   *input;
+	INT		currentindex = 0;
+	INT		total_len;
+
+	// Allocate memory for input
+	os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&input, 1024);
+
+    if (input == NULL)
+    {
+        DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!PRF: no memory!!!\n"));
+        return;
+    }
+
+	// Generate concatenation input
+	NdisMoveMemory(input, prefix, prefix_len);
+
+	// Concatenate a single octet containing 0
+	input[prefix_len] =	0;
+
+	// Concatenate specific data
+	NdisMoveMemory(&input[prefix_len + 1], data, data_len);
+	total_len =	prefix_len + 1 + data_len;
+
+	// Concatenate a single octet containing 0
+	// This octet shall be update later
+	input[total_len] = 0;
+	total_len++;
+
+	// Iterate to calculate the result by hmac-sha-1
+	// Then concatenate to last result
+	for	(i = 0;	i <	(len + 19) / 20; i++)
+	{
+		HMAC_SHA1(input, total_len,	key, key_len, &output[currentindex]);
+		currentindex +=	20;
+
+		// update the last octet
+		input[total_len - 1]++;
+	}
+    os_free_mem(NULL, input);
+}
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		It utilizes PRF-384 or PRF-512 to derive session-specific keys from a PMK.
+		It shall be called by 4-way handshake processing.
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd 	-	pointer to our pAdapter context
+		PMK		-	pointer to PMK
+		ANonce	-	pointer to ANonce
+		AA		-	pointer to Authenticator Address
+		SNonce	-	pointer to SNonce
+		SA		-	pointer to Supplicant Address
+		len		-	indicate the length of PTK (octet)
+
+	Return Value:
+		Output		pointer to the PTK
+
+	Note:
+		Refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004 8.5.1.2
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WpaCountPTK(
+	IN	PRTMP_ADAPTER	pAd,
+	IN	UCHAR	*PMK,
+	IN	UCHAR	*ANonce,
+	IN	UCHAR	*AA,
+	IN	UCHAR	*SNonce,
+	IN	UCHAR	*SA,
+	OUT	UCHAR	*output,
+	IN	UINT	len)
+{
+	UCHAR	concatenation[76];
+	UINT	CurrPos = 0;
+	UCHAR	temp[32];
+	UCHAR	Prefix[] = {'P', 'a', 'i', 'r', 'w', 'i', 's', 'e', ' ', 'k', 'e', 'y', ' ',
+						'e', 'x', 'p', 'a', 'n', 's', 'i', 'o', 'n'};
+
+	// initiate the concatenation input
+	NdisZeroMemory(temp, sizeof(temp));
+	NdisZeroMemory(concatenation, 76);
+
+	// Get smaller address
+	if (RTMPCompareMemory(SA, AA, 6) == 1)
+		NdisMoveMemory(concatenation, AA, 6);
+	else
+		NdisMoveMemory(concatenation, SA, 6);
+	CurrPos += 6;
+
+	// Get larger address
+	if (RTMPCompareMemory(SA, AA, 6) == 1)
+		NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SA, 6);
+	else
+		NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], AA, 6);
+
+	// store the larger mac address for backward compatible of
+	// ralink proprietary STA-key issue
+	NdisMoveMemory(temp, &concatenation[CurrPos], MAC_ADDR_LEN);
+	CurrPos += 6;
+
+	// Get smaller Nonce
+	if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 0)
+		NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], temp, 32);	// patch for ralink proprietary STA-key issue
+	else if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 1)
+		NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SNonce, 32);
+	else
+		NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], ANonce, 32);
+	CurrPos += 32;
+
+	// Get larger Nonce
+	if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 0)
+		NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], temp, 32);	// patch for ralink proprietary STA-key issue
+	else if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 1)
+		NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], ANonce, 32);
+	else
+		NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SNonce, 32);
+	CurrPos += 32;
+
+	hex_dump("concatenation=", concatenation, 76);
+
+	// Use PRF to generate PTK
+	PRF(PMK, LEN_MASTER_KEY, Prefix, 22, concatenation, 76, output, len);
+
+}
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Generate random number by software.
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd		-	pointer to our pAdapter context
+		macAddr	-	pointer to local MAC address
+
+	Return Value:
+
+	Note:
+		802.1ii-2004  Annex H.5
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+VOID	GenRandom(
+	IN	PRTMP_ADAPTER	pAd,
+	IN	UCHAR			*macAddr,
+	OUT	UCHAR			*random)
+{
+	INT		i, curr;
+	UCHAR	local[80], KeyCounter[32];
+	UCHAR	result[80];
+	ULONG	CurrentTime;
+	UCHAR	prefix[] = {'I', 'n', 'i', 't', ' ', 'C', 'o', 'u', 'n', 't', 'e', 'r'};
+
+	// Zero the related information
+	NdisZeroMemory(result, 80);
+	NdisZeroMemory(local, 80);
+	NdisZeroMemory(KeyCounter, 32);
+
+	for	(i = 0;	i <	32;	i++)
+	{
+		// copy the local MAC address
+		COPY_MAC_ADDR(local, macAddr);
+		curr =	MAC_ADDR_LEN;
+
+		// concatenate the current time
+		NdisGetSystemUpTime(&CurrentTime);
+		NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr],  &CurrentTime,	sizeof(CurrentTime));
+		curr +=	sizeof(CurrentTime);
+
+		// concatenate the last result
+		NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr],  result, 32);
+		curr +=	32;
+
+		// concatenate a variable
+		NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr],  &i,  2);
+		curr +=	2;
+
+		// calculate the result
+		PRF(KeyCounter, 32, prefix,12, local, curr, result, 32);
+	}
+
+	NdisMoveMemory(random, result,	32);
+}
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Build cipher suite in RSN-IE.
+		It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE.
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd			-	pointer to our pAdapter context
+    	ElementID	-	indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
+    	WepStatus	-	indicate the encryption type
+		bMixCipher	-	a boolean to indicate the pairwise cipher and group
+						cipher are the same or not
+
+	Return Value:
+
+	Note:
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(
+	IN  PRTMP_ADAPTER   pAd,
+	IN	UCHAR			ElementID,
+	IN	UINT			WepStatus,
+	IN	BOOLEAN			bMixCipher,
+	IN	UCHAR			FlexibleCipher,
+	OUT	PUCHAR			pRsnIe,
+	OUT	UCHAR			*rsn_len)
+{
+	UCHAR	PairwiseCnt;
+
+	*rsn_len = 0;
+
+	// decide WPA2 or WPA1
+	if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie)
+	{
+		RSNIE2	*pRsnie_cipher = (RSNIE2*)pRsnIe;
+
+		// Assign the verson as 1
+		pRsnie_cipher->version = 1;
+
+        switch (WepStatus)
+        {
+        	// TKIP mode
+            case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled:
+                NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+                pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
+                NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+                *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2);
+                break;
+
+			// AES mode
+            case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled:
+				if (bMixCipher)
+					NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+				else
+					NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+                pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
+                NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+                *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2);
+                break;
+
+			// TKIP-AES mix mode
+            case Ndis802_11Encryption4Enabled:
+                NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+
+				PairwiseCnt = 1;
+				// Insert WPA2 TKIP as the first pairwise cipher
+				if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher))
+				{
+                	NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+					// Insert WPA2 AES as the secondary pairwise cipher
+					if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher))
+					{
+                		NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui + 4, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+						PairwiseCnt = 2;
+					}
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					// Insert WPA2 AES as the first pairwise cipher
+					NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+				}
+
+                pRsnie_cipher->ucount = PairwiseCnt;
+                *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2) + (4 * (PairwiseCnt - 1));
+                break;
+        }
+
+		// swap for big-endian platform
+		pRsnie_cipher->version = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->version);
+	    pRsnie_cipher->ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->ucount);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		RSNIE	*pRsnie_cipher = (RSNIE*)pRsnIe;
+
+		// Assign OUI and version
+		NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->oui, OUI_WPA_VERSION, 4);
+        pRsnie_cipher->version = 1;
+
+		switch (WepStatus)
+		{
+			// TKIP mode
+            case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled:
+                NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+                pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
+                NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+                *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE);
+                break;
+
+			// AES mode
+            case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled:
+				if (bMixCipher)
+					NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+				else
+					NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+                pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
+                NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+                *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE);
+                break;
+
+			// TKIP-AES mix mode
+            case Ndis802_11Encryption4Enabled:
+                NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+
+				PairwiseCnt = 1;
+				// Insert WPA TKIP as the first pairwise cipher
+				if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher))
+				{
+                	NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+					// Insert WPA AES as the secondary pairwise cipher
+					if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher))
+					{
+                		NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui + 4, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+						PairwiseCnt = 2;
+					}
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					// Insert WPA AES as the first pairwise cipher
+					NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+				}
+
+                pRsnie_cipher->ucount = PairwiseCnt;
+                *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE) + (4 * (PairwiseCnt - 1));
+                break;
+        }
+
+		// swap for big-endian platform
+		pRsnie_cipher->version = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->version);
+	    pRsnie_cipher->ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->ucount);
+	}
+
+}
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Build AKM suite in RSN-IE.
+		It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE.
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd			-	pointer to our pAdapter context
+    	ElementID	-	indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
+    	AuthMode	-	indicate the authentication mode
+		apidx		-	indicate the interface index
+
+	Return Value:
+
+	Note:
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(
+	IN  PRTMP_ADAPTER   pAd,
+	IN	UCHAR			ElementID,
+	IN	UINT			AuthMode,
+	IN	UCHAR			apidx,
+	OUT	PUCHAR			pRsnIe,
+	OUT	UCHAR			*rsn_len)
+{
+	RSNIE_AUTH		*pRsnie_auth;
+
+	pRsnie_auth = (RSNIE_AUTH*)(pRsnIe + (*rsn_len));
+
+	// decide WPA2 or WPA1
+	if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie)
+	{
+		switch (AuthMode)
+        {
+            case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2:
+            case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2:
+                pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
+                	NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM, 4);
+                break;
+
+            case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK:
+            case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK:
+                pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
+                	NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM, 4);
+                break;
+        }
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		switch (AuthMode)
+        {
+            case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA:
+            case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2:
+                pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
+                NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_8021X_AKM, 4);
+                break;
+
+            case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK:
+            case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK:
+                pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
+                NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_PSK_AKM, 4);
+                break;
+
+			case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone:
+                pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
+                NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_NONE_AKM, 4);
+                break;
+        }
+	}
+
+	pRsnie_auth->acount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_auth->acount);
+
+	(*rsn_len) += sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH);	// update current RSNIE length
+
+}
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Build capability in RSN-IE.
+		It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE.
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd			-	pointer to our pAdapter context
+    	ElementID	-	indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
+		apidx		-	indicate the interface index
+
+	Return Value:
+
+	Note:
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCap(
+	IN  PRTMP_ADAPTER   pAd,
+	IN	UCHAR			ElementID,
+	IN	UCHAR			apidx,
+	OUT	PUCHAR			pRsnIe,
+	OUT	UCHAR			*rsn_len)
+{
+	RSN_CAPABILITIES    *pRSN_Cap;
+
+	// it could be ignored in WPA1 mode
+	if (ElementID == WpaIe)
+		return;
+
+	pRSN_Cap = (RSN_CAPABILITIES*)(pRsnIe + (*rsn_len));
+
+
+	pRSN_Cap->word = cpu2le16(pRSN_Cap->word);
+
+	(*rsn_len) += sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES);	// update current RSNIE length
+
+}
+
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Build RSN IE context. It is not included element-ID and length.
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd			-	pointer to our pAdapter context
+    	AuthMode	-	indicate the authentication mode
+    	WepStatus	-	indicate the encryption type
+		apidx		-	indicate the interface index
+
+	Return Value:
+
+	Note:
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+VOID RTMPMakeRSNIE(
+    IN  PRTMP_ADAPTER   pAd,
+    IN  UINT            AuthMode,
+    IN  UINT            WepStatus,
+	IN	UCHAR			apidx)
+{
+	PUCHAR		pRsnIe = NULL;			// primary RSNIE
+	UCHAR 		*rsnielen_cur_p = 0;	// the length of the primary RSNIE
+	UCHAR		*rsnielen_ex_cur_p = 0;	// the length of the secondary RSNIE
+	UCHAR		PrimaryRsnie;
+	BOOLEAN		bMixCipher = FALSE;	// indicate the pairwise and group cipher are different
+	UCHAR		p_offset;
+	WPA_MIX_PAIR_CIPHER		FlexibleCipher = MIX_CIPHER_NOTUSE;	// it provide the more flexible cipher combination in WPA-WPA2 and TKIPAES mode
+
+	rsnielen_cur_p = NULL;
+	rsnielen_ex_cur_p = NULL;
+
+	{
+#ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT
+		IF_DEV_CONFIG_OPMODE_ON_STA(pAd)
+		{
+#ifdef WPA_SUPPLICANT_SUPPORT
+			if (pAd->StaCfg.WpaSupplicantUP != WPA_SUPPLICANT_DISABLE)
+			{
+				if (AuthMode < Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA)
+					return;
+			}
+			else
+#endif // WPA_SUPPLICANT_SUPPORT //
+			{
+				// Support WPAPSK or WPA2PSK in STA-Infra mode
+				// Support WPANone in STA-Adhoc mode
+				if ((AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) &&
+					(AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) &&
+					(AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone)
+					)
+					return;
+			}
+
+			DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("==> RTMPMakeRSNIE(STA)\n"));
+
+			// Zero RSNIE context
+			pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len = 0;
+			NdisZeroMemory(pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE, MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE);
+
+			// Pointer to RSNIE
+			rsnielen_cur_p = &pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len;
+			pRsnIe = pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE;
+
+			bMixCipher = pAd->StaCfg.bMixCipher;
+		}
+#endif // CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT //
+	}
+
+	// indicate primary RSNIE as WPA or WPA2
+	if ((AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA) ||
+		(AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) ||
+		(AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone) ||
+		(AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2) ||
+		(AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK))
+		PrimaryRsnie = WpaIe;
+	else
+		PrimaryRsnie = Wpa2Ie;
+
+	{
+		// Build the primary RSNIE
+		// 1. insert cipher suite
+		RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, WepStatus, bMixCipher, FlexibleCipher, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+
+		// 2. insert AKM
+		RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, AuthMode, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+
+		// 3. insert capability
+		RTMPInsertRsnIeCap(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+	}
+
+	// 4. update the RSNIE length
+	*rsnielen_cur_p = p_offset;
+
+	hex_dump("The primary RSNIE", pRsnIe, (*rsnielen_cur_p));
+
+
+}
+
+/*
+    ==========================================================================
+    Description:
+		Check whether the received frame is EAP frame.
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd				-	pointer to our pAdapter context
+		pEntry			-	pointer to active entry
+		pData			-	the received frame
+		DataByteCount 	-	the received frame's length
+		FromWhichBSSID	-	indicate the interface index
+
+    Return:
+         TRUE 			-	This frame is EAP frame
+         FALSE 			-	otherwise
+    ==========================================================================
+*/
+BOOLEAN RTMPCheckWPAframe(
+    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER    pAd,
+    IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY	pEntry,
+    IN PUCHAR           pData,
+    IN ULONG            DataByteCount,
+	IN UCHAR			FromWhichBSSID)
+{
+	ULONG	Body_len;
+	BOOLEAN Cancelled;
+
+
+    if(DataByteCount < (LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H))
+        return FALSE;
+
+
+	// Skip LLC header
+    if (NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_802_1H, pData, 6) ||
+        // Cisco 1200 AP may send packet with SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL
+        NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL, pData, 6))
+    {
+        pData += 6;
+    }
+	// Skip 2-bytes EAPoL type
+    if (NdisEqualMemory(EAPOL, pData, 2))
+    {
+        pData += 2;
+    }
+    else
+        return FALSE;
+
+    switch (*(pData+1))
+    {
+        case EAPPacket:
+			Body_len = (*(pData+2)<<8) | (*(pData+3));
+            DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAP-Packet frame, TYPE = 0, Length = %ld\n", Body_len));
+            break;
+        case EAPOLStart:
+            DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Start frame, TYPE = 1 \n"));
+			if (pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning != EAPOL_START_DISABLE)
+            {
+            	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Cancel the EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning \n"));
+                RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->EnqueueStartForPSKTimer, &Cancelled);
+                pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning = EAPOL_START_DISABLE;
+            }
+            break;
+        case EAPOLLogoff:
+            DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOLLogoff frame, TYPE = 2 \n"));
+            break;
+        case EAPOLKey:
+			Body_len = (*(pData+2)<<8) | (*(pData+3));
+            DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Key frame, TYPE = 3, Length = %ld\n", Body_len));
+            break;
+        case EAPOLASFAlert:
+            DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOLASFAlert frame, TYPE = 4 \n"));
+            break;
+        default:
+            return FALSE;
+
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+
+/*
+    ==========================================================================
+    Description:
+        ENCRYPT AES GTK before sending in EAPOL frame.
+        AES GTK length = 128 bit,  so fix blocks for aes-key-wrap as 2 in this function.
+        This function references to RFC 3394 for aes key wrap algorithm.
+    Return:
+    ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID AES_GTK_KEY_WRAP(
+    IN UCHAR    *key,
+    IN UCHAR    *plaintext,
+    IN UCHAR    p_len,
+    OUT UCHAR   *ciphertext)
+{
+    UCHAR       A[8], BIN[16], BOUT[16];
+    UCHAR       R[512];
+    INT         num_blocks = p_len/8;   // unit:64bits
+    INT         i, j;
+    aes_context aesctx;
+    UCHAR       xor;
+
+    rtmp_aes_set_key(&aesctx, key, 128);
+
+    // Init IA
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+        A[i] = 0xa6;
+
+    //Input plaintext
+    for (i = 0; i < num_blocks; i++)
+    {
+        for (j = 0 ; j < 8; j++)
+            R[8 * (i + 1) + j] = plaintext[8 * i + j];
+    }
+
+    // Key Mix
+    for (j = 0; j < 6; j++)
+    {
+        for(i = 1; i <= num_blocks; i++)
+        {
+            //phase 1
+            NdisMoveMemory(BIN, A, 8);
+            NdisMoveMemory(&BIN[8], &R[8 * i], 8);
+            rtmp_aes_encrypt(&aesctx, BIN, BOUT);
+
+            NdisMoveMemory(A, &BOUT[0], 8);
+            xor = num_blocks * j + i;
+            A[7] = BOUT[7] ^ xor;
+            NdisMoveMemory(&R[8 * i], &BOUT[8], 8);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Output ciphertext
+    NdisMoveMemory(ciphertext, A, 8);
+
+    for (i = 1; i <= num_blocks; i++)
+    {
+        for (j = 0 ; j < 8; j++)
+            ciphertext[8 * i + j] = R[8 * i + j];
+    }
+}
+
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Misc function to decrypt AES body
+
+	Arguments:
+
+	Return Value:
+
+	Note:
+		This function references to	RFC	3394 for aes key unwrap algorithm.
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+VOID	AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP(
+	IN	UCHAR	*key,
+	OUT	UCHAR	*plaintext,
+	IN	UCHAR    c_len,
+	IN	UCHAR	*ciphertext)
+
+{
+	UCHAR       A[8], BIN[16], BOUT[16];
+	UCHAR       xor;
+	INT         i, j;
+	aes_context aesctx;
+	UCHAR       *R;
+	INT         num_blocks = c_len/8;	// unit:64bits
+
+
+	os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&R, 512);
+
+	if (R == NULL)
+    {
+        DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP: no memory!!!\n"));
+        return;
+    } /* End of if */
+
+	// Initialize
+	NdisMoveMemory(A, ciphertext, 8);
+	//Input plaintext
+	for(i = 0; i < (c_len-8); i++)
+	{
+		R[ i] = ciphertext[i + 8];
+	}
+
+	rtmp_aes_set_key(&aesctx, key, 128);
+
+	for(j = 5; j >= 0; j--)
+	{
+		for(i = (num_blocks-1); i > 0; i--)
+		{
+			xor = (num_blocks -1 )* j + i;
+			NdisMoveMemory(BIN, A, 8);
+			BIN[7] = A[7] ^ xor;
+			NdisMoveMemory(&BIN[8], &R[(i-1)*8], 8);
+			rtmp_aes_decrypt(&aesctx, BIN, BOUT);
+			NdisMoveMemory(A, &BOUT[0], 8);
+			NdisMoveMemory(&R[(i-1)*8], &BOUT[8], 8);
+		}
+	}
+
+	// OUTPUT
+	for(i = 0; i < c_len; i++)
+	{
+		plaintext[i] = R[i];
+	}
+
+
+	os_free_mem(NULL, R);
+}
+
+/*
+    ==========================================================================
+    Description:
+		Report the EAP message type
+
+	Arguments:
+		msg		-	EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1
+					EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2
+					EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3
+					EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4
+					EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1
+					EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2
+
+    Return:
+         message type string
+
+    ==========================================================================
+*/
+CHAR *GetEapolMsgType(CHAR msg)
+{
+    if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
+        return "Pairwise Message 1";
+    else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2)
+        return "Pairwise Message 2";
+	else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+        return "Pairwise Message 3";
+	else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4)
+        return "Pairwise Message 4";
+	else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+        return "Group Message 1";
+	else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
+        return "Group Message 2";
+    else
+    	return "Invalid Message";
+}
+
+
+/*
+    ========================================================================
+
+    Routine Description:
+    Check Sanity RSN IE of EAPoL message
+
+    Arguments:
+
+    Return Value:
+
+
+    ========================================================================
+*/
+BOOLEAN RTMPCheckRSNIE(
+	IN  PRTMP_ADAPTER   pAd,
+	IN  PUCHAR          pData,
+	IN  UCHAR           DataLen,
+	IN  MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
+	OUT	UCHAR			*Offset)
+{
+	PUCHAR              pVIE;
+	UCHAR               len;
+	PEID_STRUCT         pEid;
+	BOOLEAN				result = FALSE;
+
+	pVIE = pData;
+	len	 = DataLen;
+	*Offset = 0;
+
+	while (len > sizeof(RSNIE2))
+	{
+		pEid = (PEID_STRUCT) pVIE;
+		// WPA RSN IE
+		if ((pEid->Eid == IE_WPA) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet, WPA_OUI, 4)))
+		{
+			if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) &&
+				(NdisEqualMemory(pVIE, pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len)) &&
+				(pEntry->RSNIE_Len == (pEid->Len + 2)))
+			{
+					result = TRUE;
+			}
+
+			*Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
+		}
+		// WPA2 RSN IE
+		else if ((pEid->Eid == IE_RSN) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet + 2, RSN_OUI, 3)))
+		{
+			if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2 || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) &&
+				(NdisEqualMemory(pVIE, pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len)) &&
+				(pEntry->RSNIE_Len == (pEid->Len + 2))/* ToDo-AlbertY for mesh*/)
+			{
+					result = TRUE;
+			}
+
+			*Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			break;
+		}
+
+		pVIE += (pEid->Len + 2);
+		len  -= (pEid->Len + 2);
+	}
+
+
+	return result;
+
+}
+
+
+/*
+    ========================================================================
+
+    Routine Description:
+    Parse KEYDATA field.  KEYDATA[] May contain 2 RSN IE and optionally GTK.
+    GTK  is encaptulated in KDE format at  p.83 802.11i D10
+
+    Arguments:
+
+    Return Value:
+
+    Note:
+        802.11i D10
+
+    ========================================================================
+*/
+BOOLEAN RTMPParseEapolKeyData(
+	IN  PRTMP_ADAPTER   pAd,
+	IN  PUCHAR          pKeyData,
+	IN  UCHAR           KeyDataLen,
+	IN	UCHAR			GroupKeyIndex,
+	IN	UCHAR			MsgType,
+	IN	BOOLEAN			bWPA2,
+	IN  MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry)
+{
+    PKDE_ENCAP          pKDE = NULL;
+    PUCHAR              pMyKeyData = pKeyData;
+    UCHAR               KeyDataLength = KeyDataLen;
+    UCHAR               GTKLEN = 0;
+	UCHAR				DefaultIdx = 0;
+	UCHAR				skip_offset;
+
+	// Verify The RSN IE contained in pairewise_msg_2 && pairewise_msg_3 and skip it
+	if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+    {
+		// Check RSN IE whether it is WPA2/WPA2PSK
+		if (!RTMPCheckRSNIE(pAd, pKeyData, KeyDataLen, pEntry, &skip_offset))
+		{
+			// send wireless event - for RSN IE different
+			if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
+				RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_RSNIE_DIFF_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
+
+        	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("RSN_IE Different in msg %d of 4-way handshake!\n", MsgType));
+			hex_dump("Receive RSN_IE ", pKeyData, KeyDataLen);
+			hex_dump("Desired RSN_IE ", pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len);
+
+			return FALSE;
+    	}
+    	else
+		{
+			if (bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+			{
+				// skip RSN IE
+				pMyKeyData += skip_offset;
+				KeyDataLength -= skip_offset;
+				DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> WPA2/WPA2PSK RSN IE matched in Msg 3, Length(%d) \n", skip_offset));
+			}
+			else
+				return TRUE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> KeyDataLength %d without RSN_IE \n", KeyDataLength));
+
+	// Parse EKD format in pairwise_msg_3_WPA2 && group_msg_1_WPA2
+	if (bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+	{
+		if (KeyDataLength >= 8)	// KDE format exclude GTK length
+    	{
+        	pKDE = (PKDE_ENCAP) pMyKeyData;
+
+
+			DefaultIdx = pKDE->GTKEncap.Kid;
+
+			// Sanity check - KED length
+			if (KeyDataLength < (pKDE->Len + 2))
+    		{
+        		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: The len from KDE is too short \n"));
+        		return FALSE;
+    		}
+
+			// Get GTK length - refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004 p.82
+			GTKLEN = pKDE->Len -6;
+			if (GTKLEN < LEN_AES_KEY)
+			{
+				DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key length is too short (%d) \n", GTKLEN));
+        		return FALSE;
+			}
+
+    	}
+		else
+    	{
+			DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: KDE format length is too short \n"));
+	        return FALSE;
+    	}
+
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("GTK in KDE format ,DefaultKeyID=%d, KeyLen=%d \n", DefaultIdx, GTKLEN));
+		// skip it
+		pMyKeyData += 8;
+		KeyDataLength -= 8;
+
+	}
+	else if (!bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+	{
+		DefaultIdx = GroupKeyIndex;
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("GTK DefaultKeyID=%d \n", DefaultIdx));
+	}
+
+	// Sanity check - shared key index must be 1 ~ 3
+	if (DefaultIdx < 1 || DefaultIdx > 3)
+    {
+     	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key index(%d) is invalid in %s %s \n", DefaultIdx, ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType)));
+        return FALSE;
+    }
+
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT
+	// Todo
+#endif // CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT //
+
+	return TRUE;
+
+}
+
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Construct EAPoL message for WPA handshaking
+		Its format is below,
+
+		+--------------------+
+		| Protocol Version	 |  1 octet
+		+--------------------+
+		| Protocol Type		 |	1 octet
+		+--------------------+
+		| Body Length		 |  2 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Descriptor Type	 |	1 octet
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key Information    |	2 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key Length	     |  1 octet
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key Repaly Counter |	8 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key Nonce		     |  32 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key IV			 |  16 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key RSC			 |  8 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key ID or Reserved |	8 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key MIC			 |	16 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key Data Length	 |	2 octets
+		+--------------------+
+		| Key Data			 |	n octets
+		+--------------------+
+
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd			Pointer	to our adapter
+
+	Return Value:
+		None
+
+	Note:
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+VOID	ConstructEapolMsg(
+	IN 	PRTMP_ADAPTER    	pAd,
+    IN 	UCHAR				AuthMode,
+    IN 	UCHAR				WepStatus,
+    IN 	UCHAR				GroupKeyWepStatus,
+    IN 	UCHAR				MsgType,
+    IN	UCHAR				DefaultKeyIdx,
+    IN 	UCHAR				*ReplayCounter,
+	IN 	UCHAR				*KeyNonce,
+	IN	UCHAR				*TxRSC,
+	IN	UCHAR				*PTK,
+	IN	UCHAR				*GTK,
+	IN	UCHAR				*RSNIE,
+	IN	UCHAR				RSNIE_Len,
+    OUT PEAPOL_PACKET       pMsg)
+{
+	BOOLEAN	bWPA2 = FALSE;
+
+	// Choose WPA2 or not
+	if ((AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) || (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK))
+		bWPA2 = TRUE;
+
+    // Init Packet and Fill header
+    pMsg->ProVer = EAPOL_VER;
+    pMsg->ProType = EAPOLKey;
+
+	// Default 95 bytes, the EAPoL-Key descriptor exclude Key-data field
+	pMsg->Body_Len[1] = LEN_EAPOL_KEY_MSG;
+
+	// Fill in EAPoL descriptor
+	if (bWPA2)
+		pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA2_KEY_DESC;
+	else
+		pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA1_KEY_DESC;
+
+	// Fill in Key information, refer to IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 page 78
+	// When either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES, the DESC_TYPE_AES(2) shall be used.
+	pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyDescVer =
+        	(((WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) || (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)) ? (DESC_TYPE_AES) : (DESC_TYPE_TKIP));
+
+	// Specify Key Type as Group(0) or Pairwise(1)
+	if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+		pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = GROUPKEY;
+	else
+		pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = PAIRWISEKEY;
+
+	// Specify Key Index, only group_msg1_WPA1
+	if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+		pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyIndex = DefaultKeyIdx;
+
+	if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+		pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Install = 1;
+
+	if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+		pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyAck = 1;
+
+	if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
+		pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyMic = 1;
+
+	if ((bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)) || (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
+    {
+       	pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Secure = 1;
+    }
+
+	if (bWPA2 && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
+    {
+        pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.EKD_DL = 1;
+    }
+
+	// key Information element has done.
+	*(USHORT *)(&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo) = cpu2le16(*(USHORT *)(&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo));
+
+	// Fill in Key Length
+	{
+		if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+		{
+			// the length of group key cipher
+			pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? TKIP_GTK_LENGTH : LEN_AES_KEY);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			// the length of pairwise key cipher
+			pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? LEN_TKIP_KEY : LEN_AES_KEY);
+		}
+	}
+
+ 	// Fill in replay counter
+    NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
+
+	// Fill Key Nonce field
+	// ANonce : pairwise_msg1 & pairwise_msg3
+	// SNonce : pairwise_msg2
+	// GNonce : group_msg1_wpa1
+	if ((MsgType <= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || ((!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))))
+    	NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE);
+
+	// Fill key IV - WPA2 as 0, WPA1 as random
+	if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+	{
+		// Suggest IV be random number plus some number,
+		NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, &KeyNonce[16], LEN_KEY_DESC_IV);
+        pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv[15] += 2;
+	}
+
+    // Fill Key RSC field
+    // It contains the RSC for the GTK being installed.
+	if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+	{
+        NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyRsc, TxRSC, 6);
+	}
+
+	// Clear Key MIC field for MIC calculation later
+    NdisZeroMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
+
+	ConstructEapolKeyData(pAd,
+						  AuthMode,
+						  WepStatus,
+						  GroupKeyWepStatus,
+						  MsgType,
+						  DefaultKeyIdx,
+						  bWPA2,
+						  PTK,
+						  GTK,
+						  RSNIE,
+						  RSNIE_Len,
+						  pMsg);
+
+	// Calculate MIC and fill in KeyMic Field except Pairwise Msg 1.
+	if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
+	{
+		CalculateMIC(pAd, WepStatus, PTK, pMsg);
+	}
+
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> ConstructEapolMsg for %s %s\n", ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType)));
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("	     Body length = %d \n", pMsg->Body_Len[1]));
+	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("	     Key length  = %d \n", pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1]));
+
+
+}
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Construct the Key Data field of EAPoL message
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd			Pointer	to our adapter
+		Elem		Message body
+
+	Return Value:
+		None
+
+	Note:
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+VOID	ConstructEapolKeyData(
+	IN	PRTMP_ADAPTER	pAd,
+	IN	UCHAR			AuthMode,
+	IN	UCHAR			WepStatus,
+	IN	UCHAR			GroupKeyWepStatus,
+	IN 	UCHAR			MsgType,
+	IN	UCHAR			DefaultKeyIdx,
+	IN	BOOLEAN			bWPA2Capable,
+	IN	UCHAR			*PTK,
+	IN	UCHAR			*GTK,
+	IN	UCHAR			*RSNIE,
+	IN	UCHAR			RSNIE_LEN,
+	OUT PEAPOL_PACKET   pMsg)
+{
+	UCHAR		*mpool, *Key_Data, *Rc4GTK;
+	UCHAR       ekey[(LEN_KEY_DESC_IV+LEN_EAP_EK)];
+	UCHAR		data_offset;
+
+
+	if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
+		return;
+
+	// allocate memory pool
+	os_alloc_mem(pAd, (PUCHAR *)&mpool, 1500);
+
+    if (mpool == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/* Rc4GTK Len = 512 */
+	Rc4GTK = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(mpool, 4);
+	/* Key_Data Len = 512 */
+	Key_Data = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(Rc4GTK + 512, 4);
+
+	NdisZeroMemory(Key_Data, 512);
+	pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1] = 0;
+	data_offset = 0;
+
+	// Encapsulate RSNIE in pairwise_msg2 & pairwise_msg3
+	if (RSNIE_LEN && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)))
+	{
+		if (bWPA2Capable)
+			Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = IE_WPA2;
+		else
+			Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = IE_WPA;
+
+        Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = RSNIE_LEN;
+		NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset + 2], RSNIE, RSNIE_LEN);
+		data_offset += (2 + RSNIE_LEN);
+	}
+
+	// Encapsulate KDE format in pairwise_msg3_WPA2 & group_msg1_WPA2
+	if (bWPA2Capable && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
+	{
+		// Key Data Encapsulation (KDE) format - 802.11i-2004  Figure-43w and Table-20h
+        Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
+
+		if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+		{
+			Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x16;// 4+2+16(OUI+DataType+DataField)
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x26;// 4+2+32(OUI+DataType+DataField)
+		}
+
+        Key_Data[data_offset + 2] = 0x00;
+        Key_Data[data_offset + 3] = 0x0F;
+        Key_Data[data_offset + 4] = 0xAC;
+        Key_Data[data_offset + 5] = 0x01;
+
+		// GTK KDE format - 802.11i-2004  Figure-43x
+        Key_Data[data_offset + 6] = (DefaultKeyIdx & 0x03);
+        Key_Data[data_offset + 7] = 0x00;	// Reserved Byte
+
+		data_offset += 8;
+	}
+
+
+	// Encapsulate GTK and encrypt the key-data field with KEK.
+	// Only for pairwise_msg3_WPA2 and group_msg1
+	if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2Capable) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+	{
+		// Fill in GTK
+		if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+		{
+			NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK, LEN_AES_KEY);
+			data_offset += LEN_AES_KEY;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK, TKIP_GTK_LENGTH);
+			data_offset += TKIP_GTK_LENGTH;
+		}
+
+		// Still dont know why, but if not append will occur "GTK not include in MSG3"
+		// Patch for compatibility between zero config and funk
+		if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2Capable)
+		{
+			if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+			{
+				Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
+				Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0;
+				data_offset += 2;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
+				Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0;
+				Key_Data[data_offset + 2] = 0;
+				Key_Data[data_offset + 3] = 0;
+				Key_Data[data_offset + 4] = 0;
+				Key_Data[data_offset + 5] = 0;
+				data_offset += 6;
+			}
+		}
+
+		// Encrypt the data material in key data field
+		if (WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+		{
+			AES_GTK_KEY_WRAP(&PTK[16], Key_Data, data_offset, Rc4GTK);
+            // AES wrap function will grow 8 bytes in length
+            data_offset += 8;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			// PREPARE Encrypted  "Key DATA" field.  (Encrypt GTK with RC4, usinf PTK[16]->[31] as Key, IV-field as IV)
+			// put TxTsc in Key RSC field
+			pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32 = PPPINITFCS32;   //Init crc32.
+
+			// ekey is the contanetion of IV-field, and PTK[16]->PTK[31]
+			NdisMoveMemory(ekey, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, LEN_KEY_DESC_IV);
+			NdisMoveMemory(&ekey[LEN_KEY_DESC_IV], &PTK[16], LEN_EAP_EK);
+			ARCFOUR_INIT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, ekey, sizeof(ekey));  //INIT SBOX, KEYLEN+3(IV)
+			pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32 = RTMP_CALC_FCS32(pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32, Key_Data, data_offset);
+			WPAARCFOUR_ENCRYPT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, Rc4GTK, Key_Data, data_offset);
+		}
+
+		NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Rc4GTK, data_offset);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Key_Data, data_offset);
+	}
+
+	// set key data length field and total length
+	pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1] = data_offset;
+    pMsg->Body_Len[1] += data_offset;
+
+	os_free_mem(pAd, mpool);
+
+}
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Calcaulate MIC. It is used during 4-ways handsharking.
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd				-	pointer to our pAdapter context
+    	PeerWepStatus	-	indicate the encryption type
+
+	Return Value:
+
+	Note:
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+VOID	CalculateMIC(
+	IN	PRTMP_ADAPTER	pAd,
+	IN	UCHAR			PeerWepStatus,
+	IN	UCHAR			*PTK,
+	OUT PEAPOL_PACKET   pMsg)
+{
+    UCHAR   *OutBuffer;
+	ULONG	FrameLen = 0;
+	UCHAR	mic[LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC];
+	UCHAR	digest[80];
+
+	// allocate memory for MIC calculation
+	os_alloc_mem(pAd, (PUCHAR *)&OutBuffer, 512);
+
+    if (OutBuffer == NULL)
+    {
+		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!CalculateMIC: no memory!!!\n"));
+		return;
+    }
+
+	// make a frame for calculating MIC.
+    MakeOutgoingFrame(OutBuffer,            	&FrameLen,
+                      pMsg->Body_Len[1] + 4,  	pMsg,
+                      END_OF_ARGS);
+
+	NdisZeroMemory(mic, sizeof(mic));
+
+	// Calculate MIC
+    if (PeerWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ 	{
+		HMAC_SHA1(OutBuffer,  FrameLen, PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, digest);
+		NdisMoveMemory(mic, digest, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		hmac_md5(PTK,  LEN_EAP_MICK, OutBuffer, FrameLen, mic);
+	}
+
+	// store the calculated MIC
+	NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
+
+	os_free_mem(pAd, OutBuffer);
+}
+
+/*
+	========================================================================
+
+	Routine Description:
+		Some received frames can't decrypt by Asic, so decrypt them by software.
+
+	Arguments:
+		pAd				-	pointer to our pAdapter context
+    	PeerWepStatus	-	indicate the encryption type
+
+	Return Value:
+		NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS		-	decryption successful
+		NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE		-	decryption failure
+
+	========================================================================
+*/
+NDIS_STATUS	RTMPSoftDecryptBroadCastData(
+	IN	PRTMP_ADAPTER					pAd,
+	IN	RX_BLK							*pRxBlk,
+	IN  NDIS_802_11_ENCRYPTION_STATUS 	GroupCipher,
+	IN  PCIPHER_KEY						pShard_key)
+{
+	PRXWI_STRUC			pRxWI = pRxBlk->pRxWI;
+
+
+
+	// handle WEP decryption
+	if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption1Enabled)
+    {
+		if (RTMPSoftDecryptWEP(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount, pShard_key))
+		{
+
+			//Minus IV[4] & ICV[4]
+			pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 8;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : Software decrypt WEP data fails.\n"));
+			// give up this frame
+			return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+		}
+	}
+	// handle TKIP decryption
+	else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
+	{
+		if (RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount, 0, pShard_key))
+		{
+
+			//Minus 8 bytes MIC, 8 bytes IV/EIV, 4 bytes ICV
+			pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 20;
+		}
+        else
+		{
+			DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP Failed\n"));
+			// give up this frame
+			return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+        }
+	}
+	// handle AES decryption
+	else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+	{
+		if (RTMPSoftDecryptAES(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount , pShard_key))
+		{
+
+			//8 bytes MIC, 8 bytes IV/EIV (CCMP Header)
+			pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 16;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : RTMPSoftDecryptAES Failed\n"));
+			// give up this frame
+			return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+		}
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		// give up this frame
+		return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	return NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+
+}
+