Merge remote-tracking branch 'net-next/master'

Conflicts:
	drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_msgdma.c
	drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_sgdma.c
	net/ipv6/xfrm6_output.c

3 files changed, 82 insertions, 15 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 47845c57eb19..81f5f49479da 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -424,6 +424,38 @@ static void kauditd_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
 }
 
 /*
+ * kauditd_send_multicast_skb - send the skb to multicast userspace listeners
+ *
+ * This function doesn't consume an skb as might be expected since it has to
+ * copy it anyways.
+ */
+static void kauditd_send_multicast_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct sk_buff		*copy;
+	struct audit_net	*aunet = net_generic(&init_net, audit_net_id);
+	struct sock		*sock = aunet->nlsk;
+
+	if (!netlink_has_listeners(sock, AUDIT_NLGRP_READLOG))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * The seemingly wasteful skb_copy() rather than bumping the refcount
+	 * using skb_get() is necessary because non-standard mods are made to
+	 * the skb by the original kaudit unicast socket send routine.  The
+	 * existing auditd daemon assumes this breakage.  Fixing this would
+	 * require co-ordinating a change in the established protocol between
+	 * the kaudit kernel subsystem and the auditd userspace code.  There is
+	 * no reason for new multicast clients to continue with this
+	 * non-compliance.
+	 */
+	copy = skb_copy(skb, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!copy)
+		return;
+
+	nlmsg_multicast(sock, copy, 0, AUDIT_NLGRP_READLOG, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+/*
  * flush_hold_queue - empty the hold queue if auditd appears
  *
  * If auditd just started, drain the queue of messages already
@@ -1076,10 +1108,22 @@ static void audit_receive(struct sk_buff  *skb)
 	mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
 }
 
+/* Run custom bind function on netlink socket group connect or bind requests. */
+static int audit_bind(int group)
+{
+	if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_READ))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int __net_init audit_net_init(struct net *net)
 {
 	struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = {
 		.input	= audit_receive,
+		.bind	= audit_bind,
+		.flags	= NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV,
+		.groups	= AUDIT_NLGRP_MAX,
 	};
 
 	struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
@@ -1901,10 +1945,10 @@ out:
  * audit_log_end - end one audit record
  * @ab: the audit_buffer
  *
- * The netlink_* functions cannot be called inside an irq context, so
- * the audit buffer is placed on a queue and a tasklet is scheduled to
- * remove them from the queue outside the irq context.  May be called in
- * any context.
+ * netlink_unicast() cannot be called inside an irq context because it blocks
+ * (last arg, flags, is not set to MSG_DONTWAIT), so the audit buffer is placed
+ * on a queue and a tasklet is scheduled to remove them from the queue outside
+ * the irq context.  May be called in any context.
  */
 void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 {
@@ -1914,6 +1958,18 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 		audit_log_lost("rate limit exceeded");
 	} else {
 		struct nlmsghdr *nlh = nlmsg_hdr(ab->skb);
+
+		kauditd_send_multicast_skb(ab->skb);
+
+		/*
+		 * The original kaudit unicast socket sends up messages with
+		 * nlmsg_len set to the payload length rather than the entire
+		 * message length.  This breaks the standard set by netlink.
+		 * The existing auditd daemon assumes this breakage.  Fixing
+		 * this would require co-ordinating a change in the established
+		 * protocol between the kaudit kernel subsystem and the auditd
+		 * userspace code.
+		 */
 		nlh->nlmsg_len = ab->skb->len - NLMSG_HDRLEN;
 
 		if (audit_pid) {
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index b35c21503a36..7e02d624cc50 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -54,8 +54,7 @@
 struct seccomp_filter {
 	atomic_t usage;
 	struct seccomp_filter *prev;
-	unsigned short len;  /* Instruction count */
-	struct sock_filter_int insnsi[];
+	struct sk_filter *prog;
 };
 
 /* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
@@ -189,7 +188,8 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
 	 * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
 	 */
 	for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) {
-		u32 cur_ret = sk_run_filter_int_seccomp(&sd, f->insnsi);
+		u32 cur_ret = SK_RUN_FILTER(f->prog, (void *)&sd);
+
 		if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
 			ret = cur_ret;
 	}
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	for (filter = current->seccomp.filter; filter; filter = filter->prev)
-		total_insns += filter->len + 4;  /* include a 4 instr penalty */
+		total_insns += filter->prog->len + 4;  /* include a 4 instr penalty */
 	if (total_insns > MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -256,19 +256,27 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
 
 	/* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
-	filter = kzalloc(sizeof(struct seccomp_filter) +
-			 sizeof(struct sock_filter_int) * new_len,
+	filter = kzalloc(sizeof(struct seccomp_filter),
 			 GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN);
 	if (!filter)
 		goto free_prog;
 
-	ret = sk_convert_filter(fp, fprog->len, filter->insnsi, &new_len);
-	if (ret)
+	filter->prog = kzalloc(sk_filter_size(new_len),
+			       GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN);
+	if (!filter->prog)
 		goto free_filter;
+
+	ret = sk_convert_filter(fp, fprog->len, filter->prog->insnsi, &new_len);
+	if (ret)
+		goto free_filter_prog;
 	kfree(fp);
 
 	atomic_set(&filter->usage, 1);
-	filter->len = new_len;
+	filter->prog->len = new_len;
+	filter->prog->bpf_func = (void *)sk_run_filter_int_seccomp;
+
+	/* JIT internal BPF into native HW instructions */
+	bpf_int_jit_compile(filter->prog);
 
 	/*
 	 * If there is an existing filter, make it the prev and don't drop its
@@ -278,6 +286,8 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
 	current->seccomp.filter = filter;
 	return 0;
 
+free_filter_prog:
+	kfree(filter->prog);
 free_filter:
 	kfree(filter);
 free_prog:
@@ -330,6 +340,7 @@ void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
 		struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
 		orig = orig->prev;
+		bpf_jit_free(freeme->prog);
 		kfree(freeme);
 	}
 }
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 74f5b580fe34..e36ae4b15726 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -2501,11 +2501,11 @@ int proc_do_large_bitmap(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 	bool first = 1;
 	size_t left = *lenp;
 	unsigned long bitmap_len = table->maxlen;
-	unsigned long *bitmap = (unsigned long *) table->data;
+	unsigned long *bitmap = *(unsigned long **) table->data;
 	unsigned long *tmp_bitmap = NULL;
 	char tr_a[] = { '-', ',', '\n' }, tr_b[] = { ',', '\n', 0 }, c;
 
-	if (!bitmap_len || !left || (*ppos && !write)) {
+	if (!bitmap || !bitmap_len || !left || (*ppos && !write)) {
 		*lenp = 0;
 		return 0;
 	}