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authorJulien Tinnes <jt@cr0.org>2009-06-26 20:27:40 +0200
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>2009-07-19 20:44:59 -0700
commit92e7e4cf8ce653e532aa3cb9857df8316a6b2731 (patch)
tree35756da18269a5810f5f3169d26f5ce73cab650a /kernel
parent0e7b110967831c56510ca05ebc521c634818cd25 (diff)
personality: fix PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID (CVE-2009-1895)
commit f9fabcb58a6d26d6efde842d1703ac7cfa9427b6 upstream. We have found that the current PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID mask on Linux doesn't include neither ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT, nor MMAP_PAGE_ZERO. The current mask is READ_IMPLIES_EXEC|ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE. We believe it is important to add MMAP_PAGE_ZERO, because by using this personality it is possible to have the first page mapped inside a process running as setuid root. This could be used in those scenarios: - Exploiting a NULL pointer dereference issue in a setuid root binary - Bypassing the mmap_min_addr restrictions of the Linux kernel: by running a setuid binary that would drop privileges before giving us control back (for instance by loading a user-supplied library), we could get the first page mapped in a process we control. By further using mremap and mprotect on this mapping, we can then completely bypass the mmap_min_addr restrictions. Less importantly, we believe ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT should also be added since on x86 32bits it will in practice disable most of the address space layout randomization (only the stack will remain randomized). Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jt@cr0.org> Signed-off-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@sdf.lonestar.org> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Eugene Teo <eugene@redhat.com> [ Shortened lines and fixed whitespace as per Christophs' suggestion ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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