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authorKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>2019-04-12 17:50:58 -0400
committerBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>2019-05-22 23:15:25 +0100
commit1c9da0c8644e7aa7efc1ca04e345b3e0f53db61c (patch)
tree7ff2eb786d800ab0d6c2bf2ab768ea7a094be226 /kernel
parenta96dbd772cb6d33dc3adaa0e8e41904ffd851675 (diff)
x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off
commit e2c3c94788b08891dcf3dbe608f9880523ecd71b upstream. This code is only for CPUs which are affected by MSBDS, but are *not* affected by the other two MDS issues. For such CPUs, enabling the mds_idle_clear mitigation is enough to mitigate SMT. However if user boots with 'mds=off' and still has SMT enabled, we should not report that SMT is mitigated: $cat /sys//devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds Vulnerable; SMT mitigated But rather: Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412215118.294906495@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
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