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author | Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> | 2019-04-12 17:50:58 -0400 |
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committer | Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> | 2019-05-22 23:15:25 +0100 |
commit | 1c9da0c8644e7aa7efc1ca04e345b3e0f53db61c (patch) | |
tree | 7ff2eb786d800ab0d6c2bf2ab768ea7a094be226 /kernel | |
parent | a96dbd772cb6d33dc3adaa0e8e41904ffd851675 (diff) |
x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off
commit e2c3c94788b08891dcf3dbe608f9880523ecd71b upstream.
This code is only for CPUs which are affected by MSBDS, but are *not*
affected by the other two MDS issues.
For such CPUs, enabling the mds_idle_clear mitigation is enough to
mitigate SMT.
However if user boots with 'mds=off' and still has SMT enabled, we should
not report that SMT is mitigated:
$cat /sys//devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
Vulnerable; SMT mitigated
But rather:
Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412215118.294906495@localhost.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions