summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/net/bluetooth
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorRuihan Li <lrh2000@pku.edu.cn>2023-04-16 16:14:04 +0800
committerLuiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>2023-04-23 22:05:39 -0700
commit25c150ac103a4ebeed0319994c742a90634ddf18 (patch)
treed16ff2c490e74720b8f4bf34b285cce4c9629f43 /net/bluetooth
parent25e97f7b1866e6b8503be349eeea44bb52d661ce (diff)
bluetooth: Perform careful capability checks in hci_sock_ioctl()
Previously, capability was checked using capable(), which verified that the caller of the ioctl system call had the required capability. In addition, the result of the check would be stored in the HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED flag, making it persistent for the socket. However, malicious programs can abuse this approach by deliberately sharing an HCI socket with a privileged task. The HCI socket will be marked as trusted when the privileged task occasionally makes an ioctl call. This problem can be solved by using sk_capable() to check capability, which ensures that not only the current task but also the socket opener has the specified capability, thus reducing the risk of privilege escalation through the previously identified vulnerability. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f81f5b2db869 ("Bluetooth: Send control open and close messages for HCI raw sockets") Signed-off-by: Ruihan Li <lrh2000@pku.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth')
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c9
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
index 8d8950101cee..1d249d839819 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
@@ -1031,7 +1031,14 @@ static int hci_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd,
if (hci_sock_gen_cookie(sk)) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
- if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ /* Perform careful checks before setting the HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED
+ * flag. Make sure that not only the current task but also
+ * the socket opener has the required capability, since
+ * privileged programs can be tricked into making ioctl calls
+ * on HCI sockets, and the socket should not be marked as
+ * trusted simply because the ioctl caller is privileged.
+ */
+ if (sk_capable(sk, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
hci_sock_set_flag(sk, HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED);
/* Send event to monitor */