diff options
| author | Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> | 2016-03-22 18:02:49 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> | 2016-04-21 13:11:55 +0200 |
| commit | 099f87c4f3dae7c3816feb32a754fd9cf8cd4298 (patch) | |
| tree | f7e84eb0769973c91748d011f4f6356ee20b582e /net/ipv6/netfilter | |
| parent | 2a032e307d35402306c6464537b8bc6a0a3ac91d (diff) | |
netfilter: x_tables: validate e->target_offset early
commit bdf533de6968e9686df777dc178486f600c6e617 upstream.
We should check that e->target_offset is sane before
mark_source_chains gets called since it will fetch the target entry
for loop detection.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6/netfilter')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index 89a4e4ddd8bb..597f539f3d33 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -570,14 +570,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net) } static int -check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e, const char *name) +check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e) { const struct xt_entry_target *t; - if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6)) { - duprintf("ip_tables: ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name); + if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6)) return -EINVAL; - } if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) > e->next_offset) @@ -668,10 +666,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name, struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar; struct xt_entry_match *ematch; - ret = check_entry(e, name); - if (ret) - return ret; - j = 0; mtpar.net = net; mtpar.table = name; @@ -735,6 +729,7 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e, unsigned int valid_hooks) { unsigned int h; + int err; if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 || (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) { @@ -749,6 +744,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e, return -EINVAL; } + err = check_entry(e); + if (err) + return err; + /* Check hooks & underflows */ for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) { if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h))) @@ -1510,7 +1509,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e, } /* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */ - ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e, name); + ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e); if (ret) return ret; |