diff options
| author | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2021-04-26 18:13:45 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2021-07-14 16:56:04 +0200 |
| commit | 912d16a2d730b98b8c9099a2d934dfc691a0a9c2 (patch) | |
| tree | 04b0fb3ec754f19cec056ae18b4c9d395d292693 /security/integrity | |
| parent | 403577f75d5c433d056a67e61a042cb5ca86c730 (diff) | |
evm: fix writing <securityfs>/evm overflow
[ Upstream commit 49219d9b8785ba712575c40e48ce0f7461254626 ]
EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is defined as 0x80000000, which is larger than INT_MAX.
The "-fno-strict-overflow" compiler option properly prevents signaling
EVM that the EVM policy setup is complete. Define and read an unsigned
int.
Fixes: f00d79750712 ("EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index a7042ae90b9e..bc10c945f3ed 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -66,12 +66,13 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - int i, ret; + unsigned int i; + int ret; if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE)) return -EPERM; - ret = kstrtoint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i); + ret = kstrtouint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i); if (ret) return ret; |