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authorRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>2021-05-14 17:27:47 +0200
committerMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>2021-05-21 12:48:39 -0400
commitcdef685be5b4ae55c3959289e72d520402839c29 (patch)
tree9fafacdad2075d1f7e0da5cac4fa9b6c144230b5 /security
parent4a804b8a4572dfc81c3a59709d49ae206e4370ba (diff)
evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures
If files with portable signatures are copied from one location to another or are extracted from an archive, verification can temporarily fail until all xattrs/attrs are set in the destination. Only portable signatures may be moved or copied from one file to another, as they don't depend on system-specific information such as the inode generation. Instead portable signatures must include security.ima. Unlike other security.evm types, EVM portable signatures are also immutable. Thus, it wouldn't be a problem to allow xattr/attr operations when verification fails, as portable signatures will never be replaced with the HMAC on possibly corrupted xattrs/attrs. This patch first introduces a new integrity status called INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE, that allows callers of evm_verify_current_integrity() to detect that a portable signature didn't pass verification and then adds an exception in evm_protect_xattr() and evm_inode_setattr() for this status and returns 0 instead of -EPERM. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c33
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c2
2 files changed, 29 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 4206c7e492ae..333524e879b5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
int evm_initialized;
static const char * const integrity_status_msg[] = {
- "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown"
+ "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "fail_immutable", "no_label",
+ "no_xattrs", "unknown"
};
int evm_hmac_attrs;
@@ -155,7 +156,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
struct evm_digest digest;
struct inode *inode;
- int rc, xattr_len;
+ int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0;
if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ||
iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE))
@@ -200,8 +201,10 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
if (rc)
rc = -EINVAL;
break;
- case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG:
+ evm_immutable = 1;
+ fallthrough;
+ case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
/* accept xattr with non-empty signature field */
if (xattr_len <= sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) {
evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
@@ -238,9 +241,14 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
break;
}
- if (rc)
- evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA) ?
- INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ if (rc) {
+ if (rc == -ENODATA)
+ evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS;
+ else if (evm_immutable)
+ evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE;
+ else
+ evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ }
out:
if (iint)
iint->evm_status = evm_status;
@@ -380,6 +388,14 @@ out:
if (evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL ||
evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN))
return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Writing other xattrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable
+ * signatures are immutable and can never be updated.
+ */
+ if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE)
+ return 0;
+
if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
@@ -553,8 +569,13 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)))
return 0;
evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+ /*
+ * Writing attrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable signatures
+ * are immutable and can never be updated.
+ */
if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
(evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) ||
+ (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) ||
(evm_hmac_disabled() && (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL ||
evm_status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)))
return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 03894769dffa..9bb351b933fb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -416,6 +416,8 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: /* No security.evm xattr. */
cause = "missing-HMAC";
goto out;
+ case INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE:
+ fallthrough;
case INTEGRITY_FAIL: /* Invalid HMAC/signature. */
cause = "invalid-HMAC";
goto out;