diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/array.c | 28 |
2 files changed, 30 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst index e5fa972d4c76..2fa69f710e2a 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst @@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ read the file /proc/PID/status:: NoNewPrivs: 0 Seccomp: 0 Speculation_Store_Bypass: thread vulnerable + SpeculationIndirectBranch: conditional enabled voluntary_ctxt_switches: 0 nonvoluntary_ctxt_switches: 1 @@ -292,6 +293,7 @@ It's slow but very precise. NoNewPrivs no_new_privs, like prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIV, ...) Seccomp seccomp mode, like prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, ...) Speculation_Store_Bypass speculative store bypass mitigation status + SpeculationIndirectBranch indirect branch speculation mode Cpus_allowed mask of CPUs on which this process may run Cpus_allowed_list Same as previous, but in "list format" Mems_allowed mask of memory nodes allowed to this process diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index a23c3e220a5f..bb87e4d89cd8 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -369,6 +369,34 @@ static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) seq_puts(m, "vulnerable"); break; } + + seq_puts(m, "\nSpeculationIndirectBranch:\t"); + switch (arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(p, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH)) { + case -EINVAL: + seq_puts(m, "unsupported"); + break; + case PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED: + seq_puts(m, "not affected"); + break; + case PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE: + seq_puts(m, "conditional force disabled"); + break; + case PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE: + seq_puts(m, "conditional disabled"); + break; + case PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE: + seq_puts(m, "conditional enabled"); + break; + case PR_SPEC_ENABLE: + seq_puts(m, "always enabled"); + break; + case PR_SPEC_DISABLE: + seq_puts(m, "always disabled"); + break; + default: + seq_puts(m, "unknown"); + break; + } seq_putc(m, '\n'); } |