diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 47 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/dev-mcelog.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umwait.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/zhaoxin.c | 1 |
17 files changed, 77 insertions, 51 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile index dba6a83bc349..93792b457b81 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile @@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_perf_event.o := n KCSAN_SANITIZE_common.o := n # Make sure load_percpu_segment has no stackprotector -nostackp := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector) -CFLAGS_common.o := $(nostackp) +CFLAGS_common.o := -fno-stack-protector obj-y := cacheinfo.o scattered.o topology.o obj-y += common.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index d4806eac9325..dcc3d943c68f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <asm/cpu.h> #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h> #include <asm/smp.h> +#include <asm/numa.h> #include <asm/pci-direct.h> #include <asm/delay.h> #include <asm/debugreg.h> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 0b71970d2d3d..f0b743a2fe9c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -543,14 +543,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void) * If FSGSBASE is enabled, the user can put a kernel address in * GS, in which case SMAP provides no protection. * - * [ NOTE: Don't check for X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE until the - * FSGSBASE enablement patches have been merged. ] - * * If FSGSBASE is disabled, the user can only put a user space * address in GS. That makes an attack harder, but still * possible if there's no SMAP protection. */ - if (!smap_works_speculatively()) { + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE) || + !smap_works_speculatively()) { /* * Mitigation can be provided from SWAPGS itself or * PTI as the CR3 write in the Meltdown mitigation @@ -763,10 +761,12 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) } /* - * If enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not + * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not * required. */ - if (!smt_possible || spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || + !smt_possible || + spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) return; /* @@ -778,12 +778,6 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON)) mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED; - /* - * If STIBP is not available, clear the STIBP mode. - */ - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) - mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; - spectre_v2_user_stibp = mode; set_mode: @@ -1270,7 +1264,6 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict * mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled * by a previous prctl call. - */ if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c index 426792565d86..c5cf336e5077 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/sched/clock.h> +#include <asm/cpu.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/e820/api.h> #include <asm/mtrr.h> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 043d93cdcaad..c5d6f17d9b9d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ #include <asm/mtrr.h> #include <asm/hwcap2.h> #include <linux/numa.h> +#include <asm/numa.h> #include <asm/asm.h> #include <asm/bugs.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> @@ -347,6 +348,9 @@ out: cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP); } +/* These bits should not change their value after CPU init is finished. */ +static const unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask = + X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_UMIP | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE; static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(cr_pinning); static unsigned long cr4_pinned_bits __ro_after_init; @@ -371,20 +375,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(native_write_cr0); void native_write_cr4(unsigned long val) { - unsigned long bits_missing = 0; + unsigned long bits_changed = 0; set_register: asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr4": "+r" (val), "+m" (cr4_pinned_bits)); if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning)) { - if (unlikely((val & cr4_pinned_bits) != cr4_pinned_bits)) { - bits_missing = ~val & cr4_pinned_bits; - val |= bits_missing; + if (unlikely((val & cr4_pinned_mask) != cr4_pinned_bits)) { + bits_changed = (val & cr4_pinned_mask) ^ cr4_pinned_bits; + val = (val & ~cr4_pinned_mask) | cr4_pinned_bits; goto set_register; } - /* Warn after we've set the missing bits. */ - WARN_ONCE(bits_missing, "CR4 bits went missing: %lx!?\n", - bits_missing); + /* Warn after we've corrected the changed bits. */ + WARN_ONCE(bits_changed, "pinned CR4 bits changed: 0x%lx!?\n", + bits_changed); } } #if IS_MODULE(CONFIG_LKDTM) @@ -419,7 +423,7 @@ void cr4_init(void) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID)) cr4 |= X86_CR4_PCIDE; if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning)) - cr4 |= cr4_pinned_bits; + cr4 = (cr4 & ~cr4_pinned_mask) | cr4_pinned_bits; __write_cr4(cr4); @@ -434,13 +438,26 @@ void cr4_init(void) */ static void __init setup_cr_pinning(void) { - unsigned long mask; - - mask = (X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_UMIP); - cr4_pinned_bits = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4) & mask; + cr4_pinned_bits = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4) & cr4_pinned_mask; static_key_enable(&cr_pinning.key); } +static __init int x86_nofsgsbase_setup(char *arg) +{ + /* Require an exact match without trailing characters. */ + if (strlen(arg)) + return 0; + + /* Do not emit a message if the feature is not present. */ + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) + return 1; + + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE); + pr_info("FSGSBASE disabled via kernel command line\n"); + return 1; +} +__setup("nofsgsbase", x86_nofsgsbase_setup); + /* * Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode. */ @@ -1495,6 +1512,12 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_smap(c); setup_umip(c); + /* Enable FSGSBASE instructions if available. */ + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) { + cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE); + elf_hwcap2 |= HWCAP2_FSGSBASE; + } + /* * The vendor-specific functions might have changed features. * Now we do "generic changes." diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h index fb538fccd24c..9d033693519a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h @@ -81,8 +81,4 @@ extern void update_srbds_msr(void); extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void); -#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_FEAT_CTL -void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); -#endif - #endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c index 4e28c1fc8749..ac6c30e5801d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <asm/cpu.h> #include <asm/smp.h> +#include <asm/numa.h> #include <asm/cacheinfo.h> #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h> #include <asm/delay.h> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c index c25a67a34bd3..59a1e3ce3f14 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include <asm/cmdline.h> #include <asm/traps.h> #include <asm/resctrl.h> +#include <asm/numa.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #include <linux/topology.h> @@ -50,6 +51,13 @@ static enum split_lock_detect_state sld_state __ro_after_init = sld_off; static u64 msr_test_ctrl_cache __ro_after_init; /* + * With a name like MSR_TEST_CTL it should go without saying, but don't touch + * MSR_TEST_CTL unless the CPU is one of the whitelisted models. Writing it + * on CPUs that do not support SLD can cause fireworks, even when writing '0'. + */ +static bool cpu_model_supports_sld __ro_after_init; + +/* * Processors which have self-snooping capability can handle conflicting * memory type across CPUs by snooping its own cache. However, there exists * CPU models in which having conflicting memory types still leads to @@ -1071,7 +1079,8 @@ static void sld_update_msr(bool on) static void split_lock_init(void) { - split_lock_verify_msr(sld_state != sld_off); + if (cpu_model_supports_sld) + split_lock_verify_msr(sld_state != sld_off); } static void split_lock_warn(unsigned long ip) @@ -1148,6 +1157,8 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id split_lock_cpu_ids[] __initconst = { X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ATOM_TREMONT_L, 1), X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(TIGERLAKE_L, 1), X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(TIGERLAKE, 1), + X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X, 1), + X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ALDERLAKE, 1), {} }; @@ -1177,5 +1188,6 @@ void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) return; } + cpu_model_supports_sld = true; split_lock_setup(); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c index ce9120c4f740..f43a78bde670 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/set_memory.h> +#include <linux/sync_core.h> #include <linux/task_work.h> #include <linux/hardirq.h> @@ -244,6 +245,8 @@ static void __print_mce(struct mce *m) pr_cont("ADDR %llx ", m->addr); if (m->misc) pr_cont("MISC %llx ", m->misc); + if (m->ppin) + pr_cont("PPIN %llx ", m->ppin); if (mce_flags.smca) { if (m->synd) @@ -1083,7 +1086,7 @@ static noinstr bool mce_check_crashing_cpu(void) { unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id(); - if (cpu_is_offline(cpu) || + if (arch_cpu_is_offline(cpu) || (crashing_cpu != -1 && crashing_cpu != cpu)) { u64 mcgstatus; @@ -1212,7 +1215,7 @@ static void kill_me_maybe(struct callback_head *cb) * backing the user stack, tracing that reads the user stack will cause * potentially infinite recursion. */ -void noinstr do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs) +noinstr void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs) { DECLARE_BITMAP(valid_banks, MAX_NR_BANKS); DECLARE_BITMAP(toclear, MAX_NR_BANKS); @@ -1901,6 +1904,8 @@ void (*machine_check_vector)(struct pt_regs *) = unexpected_machine_check; static __always_inline void exc_machine_check_kernel(struct pt_regs *regs) { + WARN_ON_ONCE(user_mode(regs)); + /* * Only required when from kernel mode. See * mce_check_crashing_cpu() for details. @@ -1925,11 +1930,11 @@ static __always_inline void exc_machine_check_kernel(struct pt_regs *regs) static __always_inline void exc_machine_check_user(struct pt_regs *regs) { - idtentry_enter_user(regs); + irqentry_enter_from_user_mode(regs); instrumentation_begin(); machine_check_vector(regs); instrumentation_end(); - idtentry_exit_user(regs); + irqentry_exit_to_user_mode(regs); } #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 @@ -1954,7 +1959,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_MCE_USER(exc_machine_check) } #else /* 32bit unified entry point */ -DEFINE_IDTENTRY_MCE(exc_machine_check) +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_machine_check) { unsigned long dr7; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/dev-mcelog.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/dev-mcelog.c index 43c466020ed5..03e51053592a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/dev-mcelog.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/dev-mcelog.c @@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static __init int dev_mcelog_init_device(void) int err; mce_log_len = max(MCE_LOG_MIN_LEN, num_online_cpus()); - mcelog = kzalloc(sizeof(*mcelog) + mce_log_len * sizeof(struct mce), GFP_KERNEL); + mcelog = kzalloc(struct_size(mcelog, entry, mce_log_len), GFP_KERNEL); if (!mcelog) return -ENOMEM; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c index 0593b192eb8f..7843ab3fde09 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c @@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ static void do_inject(void) */ if (inj_type == DFR_INT_INJ) { i_mce.status |= MCI_STATUS_DEFERRED; - i_mce.status |= (i_mce.status & ~MCI_STATUS_UC); + i_mce.status &= ~MCI_STATUS_UC; } /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c index baec68b7e010..ec6f0415bc6d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c @@ -145,7 +145,6 @@ extern struct builtin_fw __end_builtin_fw[]; bool get_builtin_firmware(struct cpio_data *cd, const char *name) { -#ifdef CONFIG_FW_LOADER struct builtin_fw *b_fw; for (b_fw = __start_builtin_fw; b_fw != __end_builtin_fw; b_fw++) { @@ -155,7 +154,6 @@ bool get_builtin_firmware(struct cpio_data *cd, const char *name) return true; } } -#endif return false; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c index 12f967c6b603..6a9df71c1b9e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c @@ -981,10 +981,10 @@ void resctrl_cpu_detect(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86_cache_max_rmid = ecx; c->x86_cache_occ_scale = ebx; - if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) - c->x86_cache_mbm_width_offset = eax & 0xff; - else - c->x86_cache_mbm_width_offset = -1; + c->x86_cache_mbm_width_offset = eax & 0xff; + + if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD && !c->x86_cache_mbm_width_offset) + c->x86_cache_mbm_width_offset = MBM_CNTR_WIDTH_OFFSET_AMD; } } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h index f20a47d120b1..5ffa32256b3b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #define MBA_IS_LINEAR 0x4 #define MBA_MAX_MBPS U32_MAX #define MAX_MBA_BW_AMD 0x800 +#define MBM_CNTR_WIDTH_OFFSET_AMD 20 #define RMID_VAL_ERROR BIT_ULL(63) #define RMID_VAL_UNAVAIL BIT_ULL(62) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c index 23b4b61319d3..3f844f14fc0a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c @@ -1117,6 +1117,7 @@ static int rdt_cdp_peer_get(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d, _d_cdp = rdt_find_domain(_r_cdp, d->id, NULL); if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR_OR_NULL(_d_cdp))) { _r_cdp = NULL; + _d_cdp = NULL; ret = -EINVAL; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umwait.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umwait.c index 300e3fd5ade3..ec8064c0ae03 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umwait.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umwait.c @@ -18,12 +18,6 @@ */ static u32 umwait_control_cached = UMWAIT_CTRL_VAL(100000, UMWAIT_C02_ENABLE); -u32 get_umwait_control_msr(void) -{ - return umwait_control_cached; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_umwait_control_msr); - /* * Cache the original IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL MSR value which is configured by * hardware or BIOS before kernel boot. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/zhaoxin.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/zhaoxin.c index df1358ba622b..05fa4ef63490 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/zhaoxin.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/zhaoxin.c @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/sched/clock.h> +#include <asm/cpu.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include "cpu.h" |