diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 106 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 31 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 1 |
5 files changed, 144 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 01ec126c5969..492889d92146 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -312,6 +312,7 @@ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL (18*32+ 9) /* "" SRBDS mitigation MSR available */ #define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR (18*32+10) /* VERW clears CPU buffers */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ @@ -343,5 +344,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_SWAPGS X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */ #define X86_BUG_TAA X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */ #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */ +#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 854a20efa771..4ee65ec8c29c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -91,6 +91,10 @@ #define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE BIT(0) /* Disable RTM feature */ #define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR BIT(1) /* Disable TSX enumeration */ +/* SRBDS support */ +#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123 +#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0) + #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP 0x00000176 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 950e6bb21955..1a0ab4af93b7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void); static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; @@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) l1tf_select_mitigation(); mds_select_mitigation(); taa_select_mitigation(); + srbds_select_mitigation(); /* * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS @@ -369,6 +371,97 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str) early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline); #undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SRBDS: " fmt + +enum srbds_mitigations { + SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF, + SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED, + SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL, + SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF, + SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR, +}; + +static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL; + +static const char * const srbds_strings[] = { + [SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable", + [SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode", + [SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode", + [SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF] = "Mitigation: TSX disabled", + [SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status", +}; + +static bool srbds_off; + +void update_srbds_msr(void) +{ + u64 mcu_ctrl; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS)) + return; + + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) + return; + + if (srbds_mitigation == SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED) + return; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); + + switch (srbds_mitigation) { + case SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF: + case SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF: + mcu_ctrl |= RNGDS_MITG_DIS; + break; + case SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL: + mcu_ctrl &= ~RNGDS_MITG_DIS; + break; + default: + break; + } + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); +} + +static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void) +{ + u64 ia32_cap; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS)) + return; + + /* + * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting + * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled. + */ + ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); + if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) + srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF; + else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) + srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR; + else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL)) + srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; + else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || srbds_off) + srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF; + + update_srbds_msr(); + pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]); +} + +static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS)) + return 0; + + srbds_off = !strcmp(str, "off"); + return 0; +} +early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline); + +#undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt enum spectre_v1_mitigation { @@ -1377,6 +1470,11 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void) return ""; } +static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) +{ + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]); +} + static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf, unsigned int bug) { @@ -1418,6 +1516,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT: return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf); + case X86_BUG_SRBDS: + return srbds_show_state(buf); + default: break; } @@ -1464,4 +1565,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr { return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT); } + +ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS); +} #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 5c1274beaf7a..32567a5bb8d3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -912,6 +912,27 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { {} }; +#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues) \ + X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \ + INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \ + X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues) + +#define SRBDS BIT(0) + +static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_ULT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_GT3E, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_GT3E, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC), SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD), SRBDS), + {} +}; + static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which) { const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table); @@ -977,6 +998,15 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA); + /* + * SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed + * in the vulnerability blacklist. + */ + if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) && + cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; @@ -1330,6 +1360,7 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) #endif mtrr_ap_init(); x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(); + update_srbds_msr(); } struct msr_range { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h index c42cc1acd668..f2eca5632f7d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void); +extern void update_srbds_msr(void); extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void); |