1 files changed, 23 insertions, 23 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index f02e609460e2..cf24c5255583 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 	/* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
 
 	/* first need to know the sig type */
-	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
 				(char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (rc <= 0) {
 		evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
 
 /*
  * evm_xattr_change - check if passed xattr value differs from current value
- * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
  * @xattr_name: requested xattr
  * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
@@ -446,14 +446,14 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
  *
  * Returns 1 if passed xattr value differs from current value, 0 otherwise.
  */
-static int evm_xattr_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+static int evm_xattr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			    struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 			    const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
 {
 	char *xattr_data = NULL;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, xattr_name, &xattr_data,
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, xattr_name, &xattr_data,
 				0, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (rc < 0) {
 		rc = 1;
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ out:
  * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently
  * doesn't exist, to be updated unless the EVM signature is immutable.
  */
-static int evm_protect_xattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			     struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
 {
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ out:
 		return 0;
 
 	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE &&
-	    !evm_xattr_change(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+	    !evm_xattr_change(idmap, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
 			      xattr_value_len))
 		return 0;
 
@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ out:
 
 /**
  * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
- * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
  * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
  * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ out:
  * userspace from writing HMAC value.  Writing 'security.evm' requires
  * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
  */
-int evm_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
+int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 		       const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
 		       size_t xattr_value_len)
 {
@@ -584,20 +584,20 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
 		    xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
 			return -EPERM;
 	}
-	return evm_protect_xattr(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+	return evm_protect_xattr(idmap, dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
 				 xattr_value_len);
 }
 
 /**
  * evm_inode_removexattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
- * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
  * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
  *
  * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
  * the current value is valid.
  */
-int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			  struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 {
 	/* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
@@ -606,11 +606,11 @@ int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
 		return 0;
 
-	return evm_protect_xattr(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
+	return evm_protect_xattr(idmap, dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
-static int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+static int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 				    struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 				    struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
@@ -622,14 +622,14 @@ static int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	if (!kacl)
 		return 1;
 
-	rc = posix_acl_update_mode(mnt_userns, inode, &mode, &kacl);
+	rc = posix_acl_update_mode(idmap, inode, &mode, &kacl);
 	if (rc || (inode->i_mode != mode))
 		return 1;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 #else
-static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 					   struct dentry *dentry,
 					   const char *name,
 					   struct posix_acl *kacl)
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 
 /**
  * evm_inode_set_acl - protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
- * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the idmapped mount
+ * @idmap: idmap of the idmapped mount
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
  * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
  * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
  * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
  * valid.
  */
-int evm_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
+int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 		      const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
 	enum integrity_status evm_status;
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ int evm_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
 		return 0;
 
 	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE &&
-	    !evm_inode_set_acl_change(mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name, kacl))
+	    !evm_inode_set_acl_change(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)
@@ -779,14 +779,14 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
 }
 
-static int evm_attr_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			   struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
 
-	if (!i_uid_needs_update(mnt_userns, attr, inode) &&
-	    !i_gid_needs_update(mnt_userns, attr, inode) &&
+	if (!i_uid_needs_update(idmap, attr, inode) &&
+	    !i_gid_needs_update(idmap, attr, inode) &&
 	    (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) || attr->ia_mode == inode->i_mode))
 		return 0;
 
@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ static int evm_attr_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
  * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
  * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
  */
-int evm_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
+int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 		      struct iattr *attr)
 {
 	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
 		return 0;
 
 	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE &&
-	    !evm_attr_change(mnt_userns, dentry, attr))
+	    !evm_attr_change(idmap, dentry, attr))
 		return 0;
 
 	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),