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-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig3
-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig.hardening14
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c8
-rw-r--r--security/security.c35
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c13
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c243
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c7
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netport.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.c4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c176
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c91
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_netfilter.c26
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c11
16 files changed, 334 insertions, 308 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 0ced7fd33e4d..fe6c0395fa02 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -191,6 +191,9 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
config FORTIFY_SOURCE
bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
+ # https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=50322
+ # https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41459
+ depends on !CC_IS_CLANG
help
Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index 90cbaff86e13..d051f8ceefdd 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -23,13 +23,16 @@ config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern)
config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
+ # GCC ignores the -enable flag, so we can test for the feature with
+ # a single invocation using the flag, but drop it as appropriate in
+ # the Makefile, depending on the presence of Clang.
def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero -enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang)
choice
prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS
default INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
- default INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO if CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
+ default INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO if CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
default INIT_STACK_NONE
help
This option enables initialization of stack variables at
@@ -53,7 +56,8 @@ choice
config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_USER
bool "zero-init structs marked for userspace (weak)"
- depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+ # Plugin can be removed once the kernel only supports GCC 12+
+ depends on GCC_PLUGINS && !CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
help
Zero-initialize any structures on the stack containing
@@ -64,7 +68,8 @@ choice
config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
bool "zero-init structs passed by reference (strong)"
- depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+ # Plugin can be removed once the kernel only supports GCC 12+
+ depends on GCC_PLUGINS && !CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK)
select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
help
@@ -82,7 +87,8 @@ choice
config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
bool "zero-init everything passed by reference (very strong)"
- depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+ # Plugin can be removed once the kernel only supports GCC 12+
+ depends on GCC_PLUGINS && !CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK)
select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
help
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index e3d79a7b6db6..b5d5333ab330 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -918,6 +918,13 @@ void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)
return;
}
+ /* If get_ucounts fails more bits are needed in the refcount */
+ if (unlikely(!get_ucounts(old->ucounts))) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "In %s get_ucounts failed\n", __func__);
+ put_cred(new);
+ return;
+ }
+
new-> uid = old-> uid;
new-> euid = old-> euid;
new-> suid = old-> suid;
@@ -927,6 +934,7 @@ void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)
new-> sgid = old-> sgid;
new->fsgid = old->fsgid;
new->user = get_uid(old->user);
+ new->ucounts = old->ucounts;
new->user_ns = get_user_ns(old->user_ns);
new->group_info = get_group_info(old->group_info);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 9ffa9e9c5c55..95e30fadba78 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
#define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default)
#define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME)
#define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \
- static const int LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT);
+ static const int __maybe_unused LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT);
#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME)
@@ -747,25 +747,25 @@ static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
/* Security operations */
-int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
+int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
{
return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
}
-int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to)
+int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to)
{
return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
}
-int security_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to)
+int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to)
{
return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to);
}
-int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to, struct file *file)
+int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to, struct file *file)
{
return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file);
}
@@ -1052,11 +1052,12 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
}
int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
- const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
- u32 *ctxlen)
+ const struct qstr *name,
+ const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
+ u32 *ctxlen)
{
return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
- name, ctx, ctxlen);
+ name, xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
@@ -2625,3 +2626,15 @@ int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, 0, new);
+}
+
+int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 97f4c944a20f..abcd9740d10f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -547,6 +547,7 @@ static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
/**
* avc_lookup - Look up an AVC entry.
+ * @avc: the access vector cache
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
@@ -597,6 +598,7 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(struct selinux_avc *avc,
/**
* avc_insert - Insert an AVC entry.
+ * @avc: the access vector cache
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
@@ -825,9 +827,14 @@ out:
/**
* avc_update_node - Update an AVC entry
+ * @avc: the access vector cache
* @event : Updating event
* @perms : Permission mask bits
- * @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
+ * @driver: xperm driver information
+ * @xperm: xperm permissions
+ * @ssid: AVC entry source sid
+ * @tsid: AVC entry target sid
+ * @tclass : AVC entry target object class
* @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
* @xpd: extended_perms_decision to be added to the node
* @flags: the AVC_* flags, e.g. AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, or 0.
@@ -928,6 +935,7 @@ out:
/**
* avc_flush - Flush the cache
+ * @avc: the access vector cache
*/
static void avc_flush(struct selinux_avc *avc)
{
@@ -956,6 +964,7 @@ static void avc_flush(struct selinux_avc *avc)
/**
* avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
+ * @avc: the access vector cache
* @seqno: policy sequence number
*/
int avc_ss_reset(struct selinux_avc *avc, u32 seqno)
@@ -1105,6 +1114,7 @@ decision:
/**
* avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
+ * @state: SELinux state
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
@@ -1156,6 +1166,7 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(struct selinux_state *state,
/**
* avc_has_perm - Check permissions and perform any appropriate auditing.
+ * @state: SELinux state
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6517f221d52c..ea7b2876a5ae 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -255,29 +255,6 @@ static inline u32 task_sid_obj(const struct task_struct *task)
return sid;
}
-/*
- * get the security ID of a task for use with binder
- */
-static inline u32 task_sid_binder(const struct task_struct *task)
-{
- /*
- * In many case where this function is used we should be using the
- * task's subjective SID, but we can't reliably access the subjective
- * creds of a task other than our own so we must use the objective
- * creds/SID, which are safe to access. The downside is that if a task
- * is temporarily overriding it's creds it will not be reflected here;
- * however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that case well
- * anyway.
- *
- * If this ever changes and we can safely reference the subjective
- * creds/SID of another task, this function will make it easier to
- * identify the various places where we make use of the task SIDs in
- * the binder code. It is also likely that we will need to adjust
- * the main drivers/android binder code as well.
- */
- return task_sid_obj(task);
-}
-
static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
/*
@@ -760,7 +737,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
- !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs"))
sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
@@ -2066,18 +2044,19 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
/* Hook functions begin here. */
-static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
+static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
{
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- current_sid(), task_sid_binder(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
+ current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
}
-static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to)
+static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to)
{
u32 mysid = current_sid();
- u32 fromsid = task_sid_binder(from);
+ u32 fromsid = cred_sid(from);
+ u32 tosid = cred_sid(to);
int rc;
if (mysid != fromsid) {
@@ -2088,24 +2067,24 @@ static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
return rc;
}
- return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, task_sid_binder(to),
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, tosid,
SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
}
-static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to)
+static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to)
{
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- task_sid_binder(from), task_sid_binder(to),
+ cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to),
SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
NULL);
}
-static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to,
+static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to,
struct file *file)
{
- u32 sid = task_sid_binder(to);
+ u32 sid = cred_sid(to);
struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
@@ -2157,7 +2136,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- task_sid_subj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
+ task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
}
@@ -2948,7 +2927,8 @@ static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
}
static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
- const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
+ const struct qstr *name,
+ const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
u32 *ctxlen)
{
u32 newsid;
@@ -2961,6 +2941,9 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
if (rc)
return rc;
+ if (xattr_name)
+ *xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX;
+
return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
ctxlen);
}
@@ -5688,40 +5671,41 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
-static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct net_device *indev,
- u16 family)
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
{
- int err;
+ int ifindex;
+ u16 family;
char *addrp;
u32 peer_sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
- u8 secmark_active;
- u8 netlbl_active;
- u8 peerlbl_active;
+ int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
return NF_ACCEPT;
secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
- netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
return NF_ACCEPT;
+ family = state->pf;
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
return NF_DROP;
+ ifindex = state->in->ifindex;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
- ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
+ ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
ad.u.net->family = family;
if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
return NF_DROP;
if (peerlbl_active) {
- err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
+ int err;
+
+ err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(state->net, ifindex,
addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
if (err) {
selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
@@ -5735,7 +5719,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
return NF_DROP;
- if (netlbl_active)
+ if (netlbl_enabled())
/* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
* path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
* labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
@@ -5746,24 +5730,8 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
-static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct nf_hook_state *state)
-{
- return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
-}
-
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
-static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct nf_hook_state *state)
-{
- return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
-}
-#endif /* IPV6 */
-
-static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
- u16 family)
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
{
struct sock *sk;
u32 sid;
@@ -5798,48 +5766,32 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
sid = sksec->sid;
} else
sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
- if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
+ if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, state->pf, sid) != 0)
return NF_DROP;
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
-static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct nf_hook_state *state)
-{
- return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
-}
-
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
-static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct nf_hook_state *state)
-{
- return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
-}
-#endif /* IPV6 */
static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
- int ifindex,
- u16 family)
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
{
- struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+ struct sock *sk;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
- char *addrp;
u8 proto;
+ sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
sksec = sk->sk_security;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
- ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
- ad.u.net->family = family;
- if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
+ ad.u.net->netif = state->out->ifindex;
+ ad.u.net->family = state->pf;
+ if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto))
return NF_DROP;
if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
@@ -5854,26 +5806,26 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
-static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct net_device *outdev,
- u16 family)
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
{
+ u16 family;
u32 secmark_perm;
u32 peer_sid;
- int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
+ int ifindex;
struct sock *sk;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
char *addrp;
- u8 secmark_active;
- u8 peerlbl_active;
+ int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
/* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
* to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
* special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
* as fast and as clean as possible. */
if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
- return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
+ return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, state);
secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
@@ -5899,6 +5851,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
#endif
+ family = state->pf;
if (sk == NULL) {
/* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
* from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
@@ -5959,6 +5912,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
}
+ ifindex = state->out->ifindex;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
@@ -5976,7 +5930,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 if_sid;
u32 node_sid;
- if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
+ if (sel_netif_sid(state->net, ifindex, &if_sid))
return NF_DROP;
if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
peer_sid, if_sid,
@@ -5993,23 +5947,6 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
-
-static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct nf_hook_state *state)
-{
- return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
-}
-
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
-static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct nf_hook_state *state)
-{
- return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
-}
-#endif /* IPV6 */
-
#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -6222,7 +6159,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct msg_security_struct *msec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
- u32 sid = task_sid_subj(target);
+ u32 sid = task_sid_obj(target);
int rc;
isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
@@ -7013,34 +6950,6 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
}
#endif
-static int selinux_lockdown(enum lockdown_reason what)
-{
- struct common_audit_data ad;
- u32 sid = current_sid();
- int invalid_reason = (what <= LOCKDOWN_NONE) ||
- (what == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) ||
- (what >= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
-
- if (WARN(invalid_reason, "Invalid lockdown reason")) {
- audit_log(audit_context(),
- GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
- "lockdown_reason=invalid");
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_LOCKDOWN;
- ad.u.reason = what;
-
- if (what <= LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX)
- return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
- LOCKDOWN__INTEGRITY, &ad);
- else
- return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
- LOCKDOWN__CONFIDENTIALITY, &ad);
-}
-
struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
@@ -7111,6 +7020,35 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
+ * @new: the target creds
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
+ * to service an io_uring operation.
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), cred_sid(new),
+ SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
+ * kernel polling thread.
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
+{
+ int sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid,
+ SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
/*
* IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
* 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
@@ -7349,7 +7287,10 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
#endif
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, selinux_lockdown),
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
+#endif
/*
* PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
@@ -7470,38 +7411,38 @@ DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
{
- .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
+ .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
.hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
.priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
},
{
- .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
+ .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
.hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
.priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
},
{
- .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
+ .hook = selinux_ip_output,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
.hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
.priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
},
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
{
- .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
+ .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
.hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
.priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
},
{
- .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
+ .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
.hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
.priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
},
{
- .hook = selinux_ipv6_output,
+ .hook = selinux_ip_output,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
.hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
.priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 084757ff4390..35aac62a662e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -250,10 +250,10 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "perf_event",
{ "open", "cpu", "kernel", "tracepoint", "read", "write", NULL } },
- { "lockdown",
- { "integrity", "confidentiality", NULL } },
{ "anon_inode",
{ COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "io_uring",
+ { "override_creds", "sqpoll", NULL } },
{ NULL }
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index abaab7683840..29b88e81869b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached - Cache a SID lookup
* @skb: the packet
+ * @family: the packet's address family
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
* @sid: the SID
*
@@ -128,6 +129,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
/**
* selinux_netlbl_err - Handle a NetLabel packet error
* @skb: the packet
+ * @family: the packet's address family
* @error: the error code
* @gateway: true if host is acting as a gateway, false otherwise
*
@@ -160,7 +162,6 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset - Reset the NetLabel fields
* @sksec: the sk_security_struct
- * @family: the socket family
*
* Description:
* Called when the NetLabel state of a sk_security_struct needs to be reset.
@@ -313,6 +314,7 @@ assoc_request_return:
/**
* selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Label an incoming stream connection
* @req: incoming connection request socket
+ * @family: the request socket's address family
*
* Description:
* A new incoming connection request is represented by @req, we need to label
@@ -343,6 +345,7 @@ inet_conn_request_return:
/**
* selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone - Initialize the newly created sock
* @sk: the new sock
+ * @family: the sock's address family
*
* Description:
* A new connection has been established using @sk, we've already labeled the
@@ -378,7 +381,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
/**
* selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
- * @sock: the socket to label
+ * @sk: the sock to label
* @family: protocol family
*
* Description:
diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c
index b8bc3897891d..9ba09d11c0f5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netport.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netport.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static unsigned int sel_netport_hashfn(u16 pnum)
/**
* sel_netport_find - Search for a port record
* @protocol: protocol
- * @port: pnum
+ * @pnum: port
*
* Description:
* Search the network port table and return the matching record. If an entry
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index d59276f48d4f..94ea2a8b2bb7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] =
{ XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ XFRM_MSG_MAPPING, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { XFRM_MSG_SETDEFAULT, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_GETDEFAULT, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
};
static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
@@ -189,7 +191,7 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm)
* structures at the top of this file with the new mappings
* before updating the BUILD_BUG_ON() macro!
*/
- BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRM_MSG_MAX != XFRM_MSG_MAPPING);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRM_MSG_MAX != XFRM_MSG_GETDEFAULT);
err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_xfrm_perms,
sizeof(nlmsg_xfrm_perms));
break;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index b8f6b3e0a921..727c3b484bd3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include "hashtab.h"
+#include "security.h"
static struct kmem_cache *hashtab_node_cachep __ro_after_init;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index d338962fb0c4..3f5fd124342c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -553,6 +553,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
/**
* mls_export_netlbl_lvl - Export the MLS sensitivity levels to NetLabel
+ * @p: the policy
* @context: the security context
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
*
@@ -574,6 +575,7 @@ void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
/**
* mls_import_netlbl_lvl - Import the NetLabel MLS sensitivity levels
+ * @p: the policy
* @context: the security context
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
*
@@ -595,6 +597,7 @@ void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
/**
* mls_export_netlbl_cat - Export the MLS categories to NetLabel
+ * @p: the policy
* @context: the security context
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
*
@@ -622,6 +625,7 @@ int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
/**
* mls_import_netlbl_cat - Import the MLS categories from NetLabel
+ * @p: the policy
* @context: the security context
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
*
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index e5f1b2757a83..8e92af7dd284 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ allow:
* @state: SELinux state
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
- * @tclass: target security class
+ * @orig_tclass: target security class
* @avd: access vector decisions
* @xperms: extended permissions
*
@@ -1626,6 +1626,7 @@ int security_context_str_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
* @scontext_len: length in bytes
* @sid: security identifier, SID
* @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
+ * @gfp_flags: the allocator get-free-page (GFP) flags
*
* Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
* has the string representation specified by @scontext.
@@ -1919,6 +1920,7 @@ out:
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
+ * @qstr: object name
* @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
*
* Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
@@ -1947,6 +1949,7 @@ int security_transition_sid_user(struct selinux_state *state,
/**
* security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
+ * @state: SELinux state
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
@@ -2273,6 +2276,7 @@ void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state,
* @state: SELinux state
* @data: binary policy data
* @len: length of data in bytes
+ * @load_state: policy load state
*
* Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
* validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
@@ -2377,6 +2381,43 @@ err_policy:
}
/**
+ * ocontext_to_sid - Helper to safely get sid for an ocontext
+ * @sidtab: SID table
+ * @c: ocontext structure
+ * @index: index of the context entry (0 or 1)
+ * @out_sid: pointer to the resulting SID value
+ *
+ * For all ocontexts except OCON_ISID the SID fields are populated
+ * on-demand when needed. Since updating the SID value is an SMP-sensitive
+ * operation, this helper must be used to do that safely.
+ *
+ * WARNING: This function may return -ESTALE, indicating that the caller
+ * must retry the operation after re-acquiring the policy pointer!
+ */
+static int ocontext_to_sid(struct sidtab *sidtab, struct ocontext *c,
+ size_t index, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ /* Ensure the associated sidtab entry is visible to this thread. */
+ sid = smp_load_acquire(&c->sid[index]);
+ if (!sid) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[index], &sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure the new sidtab entry is visible to other threads
+ * when they see the SID.
+ */
+ smp_store_release(&c->sid[index], sid);
+ }
+ *out_sid = sid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
* security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
* @state: SELinux state
* @protocol: protocol number
@@ -2414,17 +2455,13 @@ retry:
}
if (c) {
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc == -ESTALE) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- goto retry;
- }
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
}
- *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else {
*out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
}
@@ -2473,18 +2510,13 @@ retry:
}
if (c) {
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
- &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc == -ESTALE) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- goto retry;
- }
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
}
- *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else
*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
@@ -2497,7 +2529,7 @@ out:
* security_ib_endport_sid - Obtain the SID for a subnet management interface.
* @state: SELinux state
* @dev_name: device name
- * @port: port number
+ * @port_num: port number
* @out_sid: security identifier
*/
int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
@@ -2533,17 +2565,13 @@ retry:
}
if (c) {
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc == -ESTALE) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- goto retry;
- }
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
}
- *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else
*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
@@ -2587,25 +2615,13 @@ retry:
}
if (c) {
- if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc == -ESTALE) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- goto retry;
- }
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[1],
- &c->sid[1]);
- if (rc == -ESTALE) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- goto retry;
- }
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, if_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
}
- *if_sid = c->sid[0];
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else
*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
@@ -2697,18 +2713,13 @@ retry:
}
if (c) {
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
- &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc == -ESTALE) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- goto retry;
- }
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
}
- *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else {
*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
}
@@ -2849,9 +2860,10 @@ out_unlock:
/**
* __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @policy: policy
* @fstype: filesystem type
* @path: path from root of mount
- * @sclass: file security class
+ * @orig_sclass: file security class
* @sid: SID for path
*
* Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
@@ -2873,7 +2885,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
u16 sclass;
struct genfs *genfs;
struct ocontext *c;
- int rc, cmp = 0;
+ int cmp = 0;
while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
path++;
@@ -2887,9 +2899,8 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
break;
}
- rc = -ENOENT;
if (!genfs || cmp)
- goto out;
+ return -ENOENT;
for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
len = strlen(c->u.name);
@@ -2898,20 +2909,10 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
break;
}
- rc = -ENOENT;
if (!c)
- goto out;
-
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- }
+ return -ENOENT;
- *sid = c->sid[0];
- rc = 0;
-out:
- return rc;
+ return ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, sid);
}
/**
@@ -2919,7 +2920,7 @@ out:
* @state: SELinux state
* @fstype: filesystem type
* @path: path from root of mount
- * @sclass: file security class
+ * @orig_sclass: file security class
* @sid: SID for path
*
* Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
@@ -2996,17 +2997,13 @@ retry:
if (c) {
sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc == -ESTALE) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- goto retry;
- }
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, &sbsec->sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
}
- sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else {
rc = __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, "/",
SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid);
@@ -3305,6 +3302,7 @@ out_unlock:
* @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
* @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
* @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
+ * @peer_sid: network peer sid
*
* Description:
* Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index cacbe7518519..efd35b07c7f8 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -51,8 +51,10 @@
#define SMK_RECEIVING 1
#define SMK_SENDING 2
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ipv6_lock);
static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
+#endif
struct kmem_cache *smack_rule_cache;
int smack_enabled __initdata;
@@ -389,7 +391,7 @@ static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
/**
* smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
- * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
+ * @mode: input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
*
* Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
*/
@@ -1213,6 +1215,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
/**
* smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
+ * @mnt_userns: active user namespace
* @dentry: the object
* @name: name of the attribute
* @value: value of the attribute
@@ -1339,6 +1342,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
/**
* smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
+ * @mnt_userns: active user namespace
* @dentry: the object
* @name: name of the attribute
*
@@ -1398,6 +1402,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
/**
* smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
+ * @mnt_userns: active user namespace
* @inode: the object
* @name: attribute name
* @buffer: where to put the result
@@ -1619,13 +1624,14 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
}
/**
- * smack_mmap_file :
- * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
- * if mapping anonymous memory.
- * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
- * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
- * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
- * @flags contains the operational flags.
+ * smack_mmap_file - Check permissions for a mmap operation.
+ * @file: contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
+ * @reqprot: contains the protection requested by the application.
+ * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @flags: contains the operational flags.
+ *
+ * The @file may be NULL, e.g. if mapping anonymous memory.
+ *
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*/
static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
@@ -2016,7 +2022,7 @@ static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
const char *caller)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_subj(p);
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
int rc;
smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
@@ -2603,7 +2609,6 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
mutex_unlock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
return;
}
-#endif
/**
* smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
@@ -2666,6 +2671,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
}
+#endif
/**
* smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
@@ -2852,8 +2858,9 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
SMK_CONNECTING);
}
- if (__is_defined(SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING))
- rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+ rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
+#endif
return rc;
}
@@ -3051,7 +3058,7 @@ static int smack_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int semflg)
}
/**
- * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
+ * smack_sem_semctl - Smack access check for sem
* @isp: the object
* @cmd: what it wants to do
*
@@ -3197,7 +3204,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg
}
/**
- * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgrcv - Smack access check for msg_queue
* @isp: the object
* @msg: unused
* @target: unused
@@ -3206,8 +3213,10 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg
*
* Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
*/
-static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg,
- struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp,
+ struct msg_msg *msg,
+ struct task_struct *target, long type,
+ int mode)
{
return smk_curacc_msq(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
}
@@ -3480,7 +3489,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
*/
static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_subj(p);
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
char *cp;
int slen;
@@ -4634,7 +4643,7 @@ static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new)
/*
* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid
*/
- isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry->d_parent));
+ isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry));
skp = isp->smk_inode;
tsp->smk_task = skp;
*new = new_creds;
@@ -4691,6 +4700,48 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+/**
+ * smack_uring_override_creds - Is io_uring cred override allowed?
+ * @new: the target creds
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
+ * to service an io_uring operation.
+ */
+static int smack_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+ struct task_smack *nsp = smack_cred(new);
+
+ /*
+ * Allow the degenerate case where the new Smack value is
+ * the same as the current Smack value.
+ */
+ if (tsp->smk_task == nsp->smk_task)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, current_cred()))
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
+ * kernel polling thread.
+ */
+static int smack_uring_sqpoll(void)
+{
+ if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_ADMIN, current_cred()))
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
@@ -4843,6 +4894,10 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, smack_inode_copy_up),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, smack_inode_copy_up_xattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, smack_dentry_create_files_as),
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, smack_uring_override_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, smack_uring_sqpoll),
+#endif
};
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index fc7399b45373..b945c1d3a743 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -18,27 +18,7 @@
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include "smack.h"
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
-
-static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct nf_hook_state *state)
-{
- struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
- struct socket_smack *ssp;
- struct smack_known *skp;
-
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
- skp = ssp->smk_out;
- skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
- }
-
- return NF_ACCEPT;
-}
-#endif /* IPV6 */
-
-static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,
+static unsigned int smack_ip_output(void *priv,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_hook_state *state)
{
@@ -57,14 +37,14 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,
static const struct nf_hook_ops smack_nf_ops[] = {
{
- .hook = smack_ipv4_output,
+ .hook = smack_ip_output,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
.hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
.priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
},
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
{
- .hook = smack_ipv6_output,
+ .hook = smack_ip_output,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
.hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
.priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 3a75d2a8f517..658eab05599e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -693,9 +693,7 @@ static void smk_cipso_doi(void)
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d remove rc = %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, rc);
- doip = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cipso_v4_doi), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (doip == NULL)
- panic("smack: Failed to initialize cipso DOI.\n");
+ doip = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cipso_v4_doi), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL);
doip->map.std = NULL;
doip->doi = smk_cipso_doi_value;
doip->type = CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS;
@@ -714,7 +712,7 @@ static void smk_cipso_doi(void)
if (rc != 0) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d map add rc = %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, rc);
- kfree(doip);
+ netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del(doip->doi, &nai);
return;
}
}
@@ -831,6 +829,7 @@ static int smk_open_cipso(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int format)
{
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *old_cat;
struct smack_known *skp;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr ncats;
char mapcatset[SMK_CIPSOLEN];
@@ -920,9 +919,11 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
rc = smk_netlbl_mls(maplevel, mapcatset, &ncats, SMK_CIPSOLEN);
if (rc >= 0) {
- netlbl_catmap_free(skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat);
+ old_cat = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat;
skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat = ncats.attr.mls.cat;
skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl = ncats.attr.mls.lvl;
+ synchronize_rcu();
+ netlbl_catmap_free(old_cat);
rc = count;
/*
* This mapping may have been cached, so clear the cache.