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Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220309155859.239810747@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Fox Chen <foxhlchen@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Hulk Robot <hulkrobot@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@denx.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220310140812.869208747@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@denx.de> =
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Tested-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudip.mukherjee@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This reverts commit 48e413087de1bc688ad732839efc0a5627f38d34 which is
commit dc0075ba7f387fe4c48a8c674b11ab6f374a6acc upstream.
It's been reported to cause problems with a number of Fedora and Arch
Linux users, so drop it for now until that is resolved.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAJZ5v0gE52NT=4kN4MkhV3Gx=M5CeMGVHOF0jgTXDb5WwAMs_Q@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/31b9d1cd-6a67-218b-4ada-12f72e6f00dc@redhat.com
Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Cc: Justin Forbes <jmforbes@linuxtx.org>
Cc: Mark Pearson <markpearson@lenovo.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit 66e3531b33ee51dad17c463b4d9c9f52e341503d upstream.
When calling gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() the returned value must
be tested and the reaction to that value should be appropriate.
In case of failure in xennet_get_responses() the reaction should not be
to crash the system, but to disable the network device.
The calls in setup_netfront() can be replaced by calls of
gnttab_end_foreign_access(). While at it avoid double free of ring
pages and grant references via xennet_disconnect_backend() in this case.
This is CVE-2022-23042 / part of XSA-396.
Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit 42baefac638f06314298087394b982ead9ec444b upstream.
gnttab_end_foreign_access() is used to free a grant reference and
optionally to free the associated page. In case the grant is still in
use by the other side processing is being deferred. This leads to a
problem in case no page to be freed is specified by the caller: the
caller doesn't know that the page is still mapped by the other side
and thus should not be used for other purposes.
The correct way to handle this situation is to take an additional
reference to the granted page in case handling is being deferred and
to drop that reference when the grant reference could be freed
finally.
This requires that there are no users of gnttab_end_foreign_access()
left directly repurposing the granted page after the call, as this
might result in clobbered data or information leaks via the not yet
freed grant reference.
This is part of CVE-2022-23041 / XSA-396.
Reported-by: Simon Gaiser <simon@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit b0576cc9c6b843d99c6982888d59a56209341888 upstream.
Instead of __get_free_pages() and free_pages() use alloc_pages_exact()
and free_pages_exact(). This is in preparation of a change of
gnttab_end_foreign_access() which will prohibit use of high-order
pages.
This is part of CVE-2022-23041 / XSA-396.
Reported-by: Simon Gaiser <simon@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit 5cadd4bb1d7fc9ab201ac14620d1a478357e4ebd upstream.
Instead of __get_free_pages() and free_pages() use alloc_pages_exact()
and free_pages_exact(). This is in preparation of a change of
gnttab_end_foreign_access() which will prohibit use of high-order
pages.
By using the local variable "order" instead of ring->intf->ring_order
in the error path of xen_9pfs_front_alloc_dataring() another bug is
fixed, as the error path can be entered before ring->intf->ring_order
is being set.
By using alloc_pages_exact() the size in bytes is specified for the
allocation, which fixes another bug for the case of
order < (PAGE_SHIFT - XEN_PAGE_SHIFT).
This is part of CVE-2022-23041 / XSA-396.
Reported-by: Simon Gaiser <simon@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit 1dbd11ca75fe664d3e54607547771d021f531f59 upstream.
Remove gnttab_query_foreign_access(), as it is unused and unsafe to
use.
All previous use cases assumed a grant would not be in use after
gnttab_query_foreign_access() returned 0. This information is useless
in best case, as it only refers to a situation in the past, which could
have changed already.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit d3b6372c5881cb54925212abb62c521df8ba4809 upstream.
Using gnttab_query_foreign_access() is unsafe, as it is racy by design.
The use case in the gntalloc driver is not needed at all. While at it
replace the call of gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() with a call of
gnttab_end_foreign_access(), which is what is really wanted there. In
case the grant wasn't used due to an allocation failure, just free the
grant via gnttab_free_grant_reference().
This is CVE-2022-23039 / part of XSA-396.
Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit 33172ab50a53578a95691310f49567c9266968b0 upstream.
It isn't enough to check whether a grant is still being in use by
calling gnttab_query_foreign_access(), as a mapping could be realized
by the other side just after having called that function.
In case the call was done in preparation of revoking a grant it is
better to do so via gnttab_try_end_foreign_access() and check the
success of that operation instead.
This is CVE-2022-23038 / part of XSA-396.
Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit 31185df7e2b1d2fa1de4900247a12d7b9c7087eb upstream.
It isn't enough to check whether a grant is still being in use by
calling gnttab_query_foreign_access(), as a mapping could be realized
by the other side just after having called that function.
In case the call was done in preparation of revoking a grant it is
better to do so via gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() and check the
success of that operation instead.
This is CVE-2022-23037 / part of XSA-396.
Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit abf1fd5919d6238ee3bc5eb4a9b6c3947caa6638 upstream.
It isn't enough to check whether a grant is still being in use by
calling gnttab_query_foreign_access(), as a mapping could be realized
by the other side just after having called that function.
In case the call was done in preparation of revoking a grant it is
better to do so via gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() and check the
success of that operation instead.
For the ring allocation use alloc_pages_exact() in order to avoid
high order pages in case of a multi-page ring.
If a grant wasn't unmapped by the backend without persistent grants
being used, set the device state to "error".
This is CVE-2022-23036 / part of XSA-396.
Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit 6b1775f26a2da2b05a6dc8ec2b5d14e9a4701a1a upstream.
Add a new grant table function gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(), which
will remove and free a grant if it is not in use.
Its main use case is to either free a grant if it is no longer in use,
or to take some other action if it is still in use. This other action
can be an error exit, or (e.g. in the case of blkfront persistent grant
feature) some special handling.
This is CVE-2022-23036, CVE-2022-23038 / part of XSA-396.
Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit 3777ea7bac3113005b7180e6b9dadf16d19a5827 upstream.
Letting xenbus_grant_ring() tear down grants in the error case is
problematic, as the other side could already have used these grants.
Calling gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() without checking success is
resulting in an unclear situation for any caller of xenbus_grant_ring()
as in the error case the memory pages of the ring page might be
partially mapped. Freeing them would risk unwanted foreign access to
them, while not freeing them would leak memory.
In order to remove the need to undo any gnttab_grant_foreign_access()
calls, use gnttab_alloc_grant_references() to make sure no further
error can occur in the loop granting access to the ring pages.
It should be noted that this way of handling removes leaking of
grant entries in the error case, too.
This is CVE-2022-23040 / part of XSA-396.
Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b1a384d2cbccb1eb3f84765020d25e2c1929706e upstream.
The kernel test robot discovered that building without
HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR issues a warning due to a missing
argument to pr_info().
Add the missing argument.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: 9dd78194a372 ("ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs")
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 36168e387fa7d0f1fe0cd5cf76c8cea7aee714fa upstream.
ld.lld does not support the NOCROSSREFS directive at the moment, which
breaks the build after commit b9baf5c8c5c3 ("ARM: Spectre-BHB
workaround"):
ld.lld: error: ./arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds:34: AT expected, but got NOCROSSREFS
Support for this directive will eventually be implemented, at which
point a version check can be added. To avoid breaking the build in the
meantime, just define NOCROSSREFS to nothing when using ld.lld, with a
link to the issue for tracking.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b9baf5c8c5c3 ("ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround")
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1609
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 33970b031dc4653cc9dc80f2886976706c4c8ef1 upstream.
In the recent Spectre BHB patches, there was a typo that is only
exposed in certain configurations: mcr p15,0,XX,c7,r5,4 should have
been mcr p15,0,XX,c7,c5,4
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: b9baf5c8c5c3 ("ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround")
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 330f4c53d3c2d8b11d86ec03a964b86dc81452f5 upstream.
It was missing a semicolon.
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Gil Peyrot <linkmauve@linkmauve.fr>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Fixes: 25875aa71dfe ("ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting").
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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mitigation reporting
commit 58c9a5060cb7cd529d49c93954cdafe81c1d642a upstream.
The mitigations for Spectre-BHB are only applied when an exception is
taken from user-space. The mitigation status is reported via the spectre_v2
sysfs vulnerabilities file.
When unprivileged eBPF is enabled the mitigation in the exception vectors
can be avoided by an eBPF program.
When unprivileged eBPF is enabled, print a warning and report vulnerable
via the sysfs vulnerabilities file.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 228a26b912287934789023b4132ba76065d9491c upstream.
Future CPUs may implement a clearbhb instruction that is sufficient
to mitigate SpectreBHB. CPUs that implement this instruction, but
not CSV2.3 must be affected by Spectre-BHB.
Add support to use this instruction as the BHB mitigation on CPUs
that support it. The instruction is in the hint space, so it will
be treated by a NOP as older CPUs.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
[ modified for stable: Use a KVM vector template instead of alternatives,
removed bitmap of mitigations ]
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a5905d6af492ee6a4a2205f0d550b3f931b03d03 upstream.
KVM allows the guest to discover whether the ARCH_WORKAROUND SMCCC are
implemented, and to preserve that state during migration through its
firmware register interface.
Add the necessary boiler plate for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 558c303c9734af5a813739cd284879227f7297d2 upstream.
Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can
make use of branch history to influence future speculation.
When taking an exception from user-space, a sequence of branches
or a firmware call overwrites or invalidates the branch history.
The sequence of branches is added to the vectors, and should appear
before the first indirect branch. For systems using KPTI the sequence
is added to the kpti trampoline where it has a free register as the exit
from the trampoline is via a 'ret'. For systems not using KPTI, the same
register tricks are used to free up a register in the vectors.
For the firmware call, arch-workaround-3 clobbers 4 registers, so
there is no choice but to save them to the EL1 stack. This only happens
for entry from EL0, so if we take an exception due to the stack access,
it will not become re-entrant.
For KVM, the existing branch-predictor-hardening vectors are used.
When a spectre version of these vectors is in use, the firmware call
is sufficient to mitigate against Spectre-BHB. For the non-spectre
versions, the sequence of branches is added to the indirect vector.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
[ modified for stable, removed bitmap of mitigations, use kvm template
infrastructure ]
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5bdf3437603d4af87f9c7f424b0c8aeed2420745 upstream.
CPUs vulnerable to Spectre-BHB either need to make an SMC-CC firmware
call from the vectors, or run a sequence of branches. This gets added
to the hyp vectors. If there is no support for arch-workaround-1 in
firmware, the indirect vector will be used.
kvm_init_vector_slots() only initialises the two indirect slots if
the platform is vulnerable to Spectre-v3a. pKVM's hyp_map_vectors()
only initialises __hyp_bp_vect_base if the platform is vulnerable to
Spectre-v3a.
As there are about to more users of the indirect vectors, ensure
their entries in hyp_spectre_vector_selector[] are always initialised,
and __hyp_bp_vect_base defaults to the regular VA mapping.
The Spectre-v3a check is moved to a helper
kvm_system_needs_idmapped_vectors(), and merged with the code
that creates the hyp mappings.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit dee435be76f4117410bbd90573a881fd33488f37 upstream.
Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can
make use of branch history to influence future speculation as part of
a spectre-v2 attack. This is not mitigated by CSV2, meaning CPUs that
previously reported 'Not affected' are now moderately mitigated by CSV2.
Update the value in /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
to also show the state of the BHB mitigation.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bd09128d16fac3c34b80bd6a29088ac632e8ce09 upstream.
The Spectre-BHB workaround adds a firmware call to the vectors. This
is needed on some CPUs, but not others. To avoid the unaffected CPU in
a big/little pair from making the firmware call, create per cpu vectors.
The per-cpu vectors only apply when returning from EL0.
Systems using KPTI can use the canonical 'full-fat' vectors directly at
EL1, the trampoline exit code will switch to this_cpu_vector on exit to
EL0. Systems not using KPTI should always use this_cpu_vector.
this_cpu_vector will point at a vector in tramp_vecs or
__bp_harden_el1_vectors, depending on whether KPTI is in use.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b28a8eebe81c186fdb1a0078263b30576c8e1f42 upstream.
The trampoline code needs to use the address of symbols in the wider
kernel, e.g. vectors. PC-relative addressing wouldn't work as the
trampoline code doesn't run at the address the linker expected.
tramp_ventry uses a literal pool, unless CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is
set, in which case it uses the data page as a literal pool because
the data page can be unmapped when running in user-space, which is
required for CPUs vulnerable to meltdown.
Pull this logic out as a macro, instead of adding a third copy
of it.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ba2689234be92024e5635d30fe744f4853ad97db upstream.
Some CPUs affected by Spectre-BHB need a sequence of branches, or a
firmware call to be run before any indirect branch. This needs to go
in the vectors. No CPU needs both.
While this can be patched in, it would run on all CPUs as there is a
single set of vectors. If only one part of a big/little combination is
affected, the unaffected CPUs have to run the mitigation too.
Create extra vectors that include the sequence. Subsequent patches will
allow affected CPUs to select this set of vectors. Later patches will
modify the loop count to match what the CPU requires.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit aff65393fa1401e034656e349abd655cfe272de0 upstream.
kpti is an optional feature, for systems not using kpti a set of
vectors for the spectre-bhb mitigations is needed.
Add another set of vectors, __bp_harden_el1_vectors, that will be
used if a mitigation is needed and kpti is not in use.
The EL1 ventries are repeated verbatim as there is no additional
work needed for entry from EL1.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a9c406e6462ff14956d690de7bbe5131a5677dc9 upstream.
Adding a second set of vectors to .entry.tramp.text will make it
larger than a single 4K page.
Allow the trampoline text to occupy up to three pages by adding two
more fixmap slots. Previous changes to tramp_valias allowed it to reach
beyond a single page.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c47e4d04ba0f1ea17353d85d45f611277507e07a upstream.
Spectre-BHB needs to add sequences to the vectors. Having one global
set of vectors is a problem for big/little systems where the sequence
is costly on cpus that are not vulnerable.
Making the vectors per-cpu in the style of KVM's bh_harden_hyp_vecs
requires the vectors to be generated by macros.
Make the kpti re-mapping of the kernel optional, so the macros can be
used without kpti.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 13d7a08352a83ef2252aeb464a5e08dfc06b5dfd upstream.
The macros for building the kpti trampoline are all behind
CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0, and in a region that outputs to the
.entry.tramp.text section.
Move the macros out so they can be used to generate other kinds of
trampoline. Only the symbols need to be guarded by
CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 and appear in the .entry.tramp.text section.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ed50da7764535f1e24432ded289974f2bf2b0c5a upstream.
The tramp_ventry macro uses tramp_vectors as the address of the vectors
when calculating which ventry in the 'full fat' vectors to branch to.
While there is one set of tramp_vectors, this will be true.
Adding multiple sets of vectors will break this assumption.
Move the generation of the vectors to a macro, and pass the start
of the vectors as an argument to tramp_ventry.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6c5bf79b69f911560fbf82214c0971af6e58e682 upstream.
Systems using kpti enter and exit the kernel through a trampoline mapping
that is always mapped, even when the kernel is not. tramp_valias is a macro
to find the address of a symbol in the trampoline mapping.
Adding extra sets of vectors will expand the size of the entry.tramp.text
section to beyond 4K. tramp_valias will be unable to generate addresses
for symbols beyond 4K as it uses the 12 bit immediate of the add
instruction.
As there are now two registers available when tramp_alias is called,
use the extra register to avoid the 4K limit of the 12 bit immediate.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c091fb6ae059cda563b2a4d93fdbc548ef34e1d6 upstream.
The trampoline code has a data page that holds the address of the vectors,
which is unmapped when running in user-space. This ensures that with
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE, the randomised address of the kernel can't be
discovered until after the kernel has been mapped.
If the trampoline text page is extended to include multiple sets of
vectors, it will be larger than a single page, making it tricky to
find the data page without knowing the size of the trampoline text
pages, which will vary with PAGE_SIZE.
Move the data page to appear before the text page. This allows the
data page to be found without knowing the size of the trampoline text
pages. 'tramp_vectors' is used to refer to the beginning of the
.entry.tramp.text section, do that explicitly.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 03aff3a77a58b5b52a77e00537a42090ad57b80b upstream.
Kpti stashes x30 in far_el1 while it uses x30 for all its work.
Making the vectors a per-cpu data structure will require a second
register.
Allow tramp_exit two registers before it unmaps the kernel, by
leaving x30 on the stack, and stashing x29 in far_el1.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d739da1694a0eaef0358a42b76904b611539b77b upstream.
Subsequent patches will add additional sets of vectors that use
the same tricks as the kpti vectors to reach the full-fat vectors.
The full-fat vectors contain some cleanup for kpti that is patched
in by alternatives when kpti is in use. Once there are additional
vectors, the cleanup will be needed in more cases.
But on big/little systems, the cleanup would be harmful if no
trampoline vector were in use. Instead of forcing CPUs that don't
need a trampoline vector to use one, make the trampoline cleanup
optional.
Entry at the top of the vectors will skip the cleanup. The trampoline
vectors can then skip the first instruction, triggering the cleanup
to run.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1b33d4860deaecf1d8eec3061b7e7ed7ab0bae8d upstream.
The spectre-v4 sequence includes an SMC from the assembly entry code.
spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit is the patching callback that
generates an HVC or SMC depending on the SMCCC conduit type.
As this isn't specific to spectre-v4, rename it
smccc_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit so it can be re-used.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4330e2c5c04c27bebf89d34e0bc14e6943413067 upstream.
Subsequent patches add even more code to the ventry slots.
Ensure kernels that overflow a ventry slot don't get built.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1175011a7d0030d49dc9c10bde36f08f26d0a8ee upstream.
Add a new HWCAP to detect the Increased precision of Reciprocal Estimate
and Reciprocal Square Root Estimate feature (FEAT_RPRES), introduced in Armv8.7.
Also expose this to userspace in the ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 feature register.
Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210165432.8106-4-joey.gouly@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5c13f042e73200b50573ace63e1a6b94e2917616 upstream.
Add a new HWCAP to detect the Alternate Floating-point Behaviour
feature (FEAT_AFP), introduced in Armv8.7.
Also expose this to userspace in the ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1 feature register.
Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210165432.8106-2-joey.gouly@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9e45365f1469ef2b934f9d035975dbc9ad352116 upstream.
This is a new ID register, introduced in 8.7.
Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Cc: Reiji Watanabe <reijiw@google.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210165432.8106-3-joey.gouly@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fee29f008aa3f2aff01117f28b57b1145d92cb9b upstream.
Since userspace can make use of the CNTVSS_EL0 instruction, expose
it via a HWCAP.
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211017124225.3018098-18-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 53960faf2b731dd2f9ed6e1334634b8ba6286850 upstream.
Add the CPU Partnumbers for the new Arm designs.
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Suzuki Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1643120437-14352-2-git-send-email-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 72bb9dcb6c33cfac80282713c2b4f2b254cd24d1 upstream.
Add the CPU Partnumbers for the new Arm designs.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Suzuki Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1642994138-25887-2-git-send-email-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2d0d656700d67239a57afaf617439143d8dac9be upstream.
Add the CPU Partnumbers for the new Arm designs.
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211019163153.3692640-2-suzuki.poulose@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 11ecdad722daafcac09c4859dddf31b3d46449bc upstream.
The implementor will be used to condition the FIQ support quirk.
The specific CPU types are not used at the moment, but let's add them
for documentation purposes.
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Hector Martin <marcan@marcan.st>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 25875aa71dfefd1959f07e626c4d285b88b27ac2 upstream.
The mitigations for Spectre-BHB are only applied when an exception
is taken, but when unprivileged BPF is enabled, userspace can
load BPF programs that can be used to exploit the problem.
When unprivileged BPF is enabled, report the vulnerable status via
the spectre_v2 sysfs file.
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b9baf5c8c5c356757f4f9d8180b5e9d234065bc3 upstream.
Workaround the Spectre BHB issues for Cortex-A15, Cortex-A57,
Cortex-A72, Cortex-A73 and Cortex-A75. We also include Brahma B15 as
well to be safe, which is affected by Spectre V2 in the same ways as
Cortex-A15.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
[changes due to lack of SYSTEM_FREEING_INITMEM - gregkh]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8d9d651ff2270a632e9dc497b142db31e8911315 upstream.
Use the linker's LOADADDR() macro to get the load address of the
sections, and provide a macro to set the start and end symbols.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 04e91b7324760a377a725e218b5ee783826d30f5 upstream.
Provide a couple of helpers to copy the vectors and stubs, and also
to flush the copied vectors and stubs.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9dd78194a3722fa6712192cdd4f7032d45112a9a upstream.
As per other architectures, add support for reporting the Spectre
vulnerability status via sysfs CPU.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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