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commit d70cef0d46729808dc53f145372c02b145c92604 upstream.
When a qstripe is required an extra page is allocated and mapped. There
were 3 problems:
1) There is no corresponding call of kunmap() for the qstripe page.
2) There is no reason to map the qstripe page more than once if the
number of bits set in rbio->dbitmap is greater than one.
3) There is no reason to map the parity page and unmap it each time
through the loop.
The page memory can continue to be reused with a single mapping on each
iteration by raid6_call.gen_syndrome() without remapping. So map the
page for the duration of the loop.
Similarly, improve the algorithm by mapping the parity page just 1 time.
Fixes: 5a6ac9eacb49 ("Btrfs, raid56: support parity scrub on raid56")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4.x: c17af96554a8: btrfs: raid56: simplify tracking of Q stripe presence
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4.x
Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c17af96554a8a8777cbb0fd53b8497250e548b43 upstream.
There are temporary variables tracking the index of P and Q stripes, but
none of them is really used as such, merely for determining if the Q
stripe is present. This leads to compiler warnings with
-Wunused-but-set-variable and has been reported several times.
fs/btrfs/raid56.c: In function ‘finish_rmw’:
fs/btrfs/raid56.c:1199:6: warning: variable ‘p_stripe’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
1199 | int p_stripe = -1;
| ^~~~~~~~
fs/btrfs/raid56.c: In function ‘finish_parity_scrub’:
fs/btrfs/raid56.c:2356:6: warning: variable ‘p_stripe’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
2356 | int p_stripe = -1;
| ^~~~~~~~
Replace the two variables with one that has a clear meaning and also get
rid of the warnings. The logic that verifies that there are only 2
valid cases is unchanged.
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2efc459d06f1630001e3984854848a5647086232 upstream.
Output defects can exist in sysfs content using sprintf and snprintf.
sprintf does not know the PAGE_SIZE maximum of the temporary buffer
used for outputting sysfs content and it's possible to overrun the
PAGE_SIZE buffer length.
Add a generic sysfs_emit function that knows that the size of the
temporary buffer and ensures that no overrun is done.
Add a generic sysfs_emit_at function that can be used in multiple
call situations that also ensures that no overrun is done.
Validate the output buffer argument to be page aligned.
Validate the offset len argument to be within the PAGE_SIZE buf.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/884235202216d464d61ee975f7465332c86f76b2.1600285923.git.joe@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 88a9e03beef22cc5fabea344f54b9a0dfe63de08 upstream.
An assert failure is triggered by syzkaller test due to
ATTR_KILL_PRIV is not cleared before xfs_setattr_size.
As ATTR_KILL_PRIV is not checked/used by xfs_setattr_size,
just remove it from the assert.
Signed-off-by: Yumei Huang <yuhuang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3bef198f1b17d1bb89260bad947ef084c0a2d1a6 upstream.
syzbot is feeding invalid superblock data to JFS for mount testing.
JFS does not check several of the fields -- just assumes that they
are good since the JFS_MAGIC and version fields are good.
In this case (syzbot reproducer), we have s_l2bsize == 0xda0c,
pad == 0xf045, and s_state == 0x50, all of which are invalid IMO.
Having s_l2bsize == 0xda0c causes this UBSAN warning:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in fs/jfs/jfs_mount.c:373:25
shift exponent -9716 is negative
s_l2bsize can be tested for correctness. pad can be tested for non-0
and punted. s_state can be tested for its valid values and punted.
Do those 3 tests and if any of them fails, report the superblock as
invalid/corrupt and let fsck handle it.
With this patch, chkSuper() says this when JFS_DEBUG is enabled:
jfs_mount: Mount Failure: superblock is corrupt!
Mount JFS Failure: -22
jfs_mount failed w/return code = -22
The obvious problem with this method is that next week there could
be another syzbot test that uses different fields for invalid values,
this making this like a game of whack-a-mole.
syzkaller link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=36315852ece4132ec193
Reported-by: syzbot+36315852ece4132ec193@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # v2
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Cc: jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 78178ca844f0eb88f21f31c7fde969384be4c901 upstream.
Patch fb6791d100d1 was designed to allow gfs2 to unmount quicker by
skipping the step where it tells dlm to unlock glocks in EX with lvbs.
This was done because when gfs2 unmounts a file system, it destroys the
dlm lockspace shortly after it destroys the glocks so it doesn't need to
unlock them all: the unlock is implied when the lockspace is destroyed
by dlm.
However, that patch introduced a use-after-free in dlm: as part of its
normal dlm_recoverd process, it can call ls_recovery to recover dead
locks. In so doing, it can call recover_rsbs which calls recover_lvb for
any mastered rsbs. Func recover_lvb runs through the list of lkbs queued
to the given rsb (if the glock is cached but unlocked, it will still be
queued to the lkb, but in NL--Unlocked--mode) and if it has an lvb,
copies it to the rsb, thus trying to preserve the lkb. However, when
gfs2 skips the dlm unlock step, it frees the glock and its lvb, which
means dlm's function recover_lvb references the now freed lvb pointer,
copying the freed lvb memory to the rsb.
This patch changes the check in gdlm_put_lock so that it calls
dlm_unlock for all glocks that contain an lvb pointer.
Fixes: fb6791d100d1 ("GFS2: skip dlm_unlock calls in unmount")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.8+
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2562515f0ad7342bde6456602c491b64c63fe950 upstream.
__setattr_copy() was copied from setattr_copy() in fs/attr.c, there is
two missing patches doesn't cover this inner function, fix it.
Commit 7fa294c8991c ("userns: Allow chown and setgid preservation")
Commit 23adbe12ef7d ("fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid")
Fixes: fbfa2cc58d53 ("f2fs: add file operations")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 72c9925f87c8b74f36f8e75a4cd93d964538d3ca upstream.
At btrfs_copy_root(), if the call to btrfs_inc_ref() fails we end up
returning without unlocking and releasing our reference on the extent
buffer named "cow" we previously allocated with btrfs_alloc_tree_block().
So fix that by unlocking the extent buffer and dropping our reference on
it before returning.
Fixes: be20aa9dbadc8c ("Btrfs: Add mount option to turn off data cow")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c78a10aebb275c38d0cfccae129a803fe622e305 upstream.
When recovering a relocation, if we run into a reloc root that has 0
refs we simply add it to the reloc_control->reloc_roots list, and then
clean it up later. The problem with this is __del_reloc_root() doesn't
do anything if the root isn't in the radix tree, which in this case it
won't be because we never call __add_reloc_root() on the reloc_root.
This exit condition simply isn't correct really. During normal
operation we can remove ourselves from the rb tree and then we're meant
to clean up later at merge_reloc_roots() time, and this happens
correctly. During recovery we're depending on free_reloc_roots() to
drop our references, but we're short-circuiting.
Fix this by continuing to check if we're on the list and dropping
ourselves from the reloc_control root list and dropping our reference
appropriately. Change the corresponding BUG_ON() to an ASSERT() that
does the correct thing if we aren't in the rb tree.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 867ed321f90d06aaba84e2c91de51cd3038825ef upstream.
While testing my error handling patches, I added a error injection site
at btrfs_inc_extent_ref, to validate the error handling I added was
doing the correct thing. However I hit a pretty ugly corruption while
doing this check, with the following error injection stack trace:
btrfs_inc_extent_ref
btrfs_copy_root
create_reloc_root
btrfs_init_reloc_root
btrfs_record_root_in_trans
btrfs_start_transaction
btrfs_update_inode
btrfs_update_time
touch_atime
file_accessed
btrfs_file_mmap
This is because we do not catch the error from btrfs_inc_extent_ref,
which in practice would be ENOMEM, which means we lose the extent
references for a root that has already been allocated and inserted,
which is the problem. Fix this by aborting the transaction if we fail
to do the reference modification.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c57d117f2b2f2a19b570c36f2819ef8d8210af20 ]
The error handling in this function frees "reg" but it is still on the
"o2hb_all_regions" list so it will lead to a use after freew. Joseph Qi
points out that we need to clear the bit in the "o2hb_region_bitmap" as
well
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YBk4M6HUG8jB/jc7@mwanda
Fixes: 1cf257f51191 ("ocfs2: fix memory leak")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0a6dc67a6aa45f19bd4ff89b4f468fc50c4b8daa ]
Release the buffer_head before returning error code in
do_isofs_readdir() and isofs_find_entry().
Fixes: 2deb1acc653c ("isofs: fix access to unallocated memory when reading corrupted filesystem")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210118120455.118955-1-bianpan2016@163.com
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 19646447ad3a680d2ab08c097585b7d96a66126b ]
clang static analysis reports this problem
fs/jffs2/summary.c:794:31: warning: Use of memory after it is freed
c->summary->sum_list_head = temp->u.next;
^~~~~~~~~~~~
In jffs2_sum_write_data(), in a loop summary data is handles a node at
a time. When it has written out the node it is removed the summary list,
and the node is deleted. In the corner case when a
JFFS2_FEATURE_RWCOMPAT_COPY is seen, a call is made to
jffs2_sum_disable_collecting(). jffs2_sum_disable_collecting() deletes
the whole list which conflicts with the loop's deleting the list by parts.
To preserve the old behavior of stopping the write midway, bail out of
the loop after disabling summary collection.
Fixes: 6171586a7ae5 ("[JFFS2] Correct handling of JFFS2_FEATURE_RWCOMPAT_COPY nodes.")
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4208c398aae4c2290864ba15c3dab7111f32bec1 ]
The left shift of int 32 bit integer constant 1 is evaluated using 32 bit
arithmetic and then assigned to a signed 64 bit integer. In the case where
l2nb is 32 or more this can lead to an overflow. Avoid this by shifting
the value 1LL instead.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Uninitentional integer overflow")
Fixes: b40c2e665cd5 ("fs/jfs: TRIM support for JFS Filesystem")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3cc64e7ebfb0d7faaba2438334c43466955a96e8 ]
Return value in __load_free_space_cache is not properly set after
(unlikely) memory allocation failures and 0 is returned instead.
This is not a problem for the caller load_free_space_cache because only
value 1 is considered as 'cache loaded' but for clarity it's better
to set the errors accordingly.
Fixes: a67509c30079 ("Btrfs: add a io_ctl struct and helpers for dealing with the space cache")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a738c93fb1c17e386a09304b517b1c6b2a6a5a8b ]
While debugging another issue today, Steve and I noticed that if a
subdir for a file share is already mounted on the client, any new
mount of any other subdir (or the file share root) of the same share
results in sharing the cifs superblock, which e.g. can result in
incorrect device name.
While setting prefix path for the root of a cifs_sb,
CIFS_MOUNT_USE_PREFIX_PATH flag should also be set.
Without it, prepath is not even considered in some places,
and output of "mount" and various /proc/<>/*mount* related
options can be missing part of the device name.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 4dfe6bd94959222e18d512bdf15f6bf9edb9c27c upstream.
Mounting a corrupted filesystem with NTFS resulted in a kernel crash.
We should check for valid STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute offset and length
before trying to access it
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210217155930.1506815-1-rkovhaev@gmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c584225dabdea2f71969
Signed-off-by: Rustam Kovhaev <rkovhaev@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+c584225dabdea2f71969@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+c584225dabdea2f71969@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 03fedf93593c82538b18476d8c4f0e8f8435ea70 ]
When inode has no listxattr op of its own (e.g. squashfs) vfs_listxattr
calls the LSM inode_listsecurity hooks to list the xattrs that LSMs will
intercept in inode_getxattr hooks.
When selinux LSM is installed but not initialized, it will list the
security.selinux xattr in inode_listsecurity, but will not intercept it
in inode_getxattr. This results in -ENODATA for a getxattr call for an
xattr returned by listxattr.
This situation was manifested as overlayfs failure to copy up lower
files from squashfs when selinux is built-in but not initialized,
because ovl_copy_xattr() iterates the lower inode xattrs by
vfs_listxattr() and vfs_getxattr().
ovl_copy_xattr() skips copy up of security labels that are indentified by
inode_copy_up_xattr LSM hooks, but it does that after vfs_getxattr().
Since we are not going to copy them, skip vfs_getxattr() of the security
labels.
Reported-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/2nv9d47zt7.fsf@aldarion.sourceruckus.org/
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 506220d2ba21791314af569211ffd8870b8208fa upstream.
Sysbot has reported a warning where a kmalloc() attempt exceeds the
maximum limit. This has been identified as corruption of the xattr_ids
count when reading the xattr id lookup table.
This patch adds a number of additional sanity checks to detect this
corruption and others.
1. It checks for a corrupted xattr index read from the inode. This could
be because the metadata block is uncompressed, or because the
"compression" bit has been corrupted (turning a compressed block
into an uncompressed block). This would cause an out of bounds read.
2. It checks against corruption of the xattr_ids count. This can either
lead to the above kmalloc failure, or a smaller than expected
table to be read.
3. It checks the contents of the index table for corruption.
[phillip@squashfs.org.uk: fix checkpatch issue]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/270245655.754655.1612770082682@webmail.123-reg.co.uk
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210204130249.4495-5-phillip@squashfs.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Reported-by: syzbot+2ccea6339d368360800d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit eabac19e40c095543def79cb6ffeb3a8588aaff4 upstream.
Sysbot has reported an "slab-out-of-bounds read" error which has been
identified as being caused by a corrupted "ino_num" value read from the
inode. This could be because the metadata block is uncompressed, or
because the "compression" bit has been corrupted (turning a compressed
block into an uncompressed block).
This patch adds additional sanity checks to detect this, and the
following corruption.
1. It checks against corruption of the inodes count. This can either
lead to a larger table to be read, or a smaller than expected
table to be read.
In the case of a too large inodes count, this would often have been
trapped by the existing sanity checks, but this patch introduces
a more exact check, which can identify too small values.
2. It checks the contents of the index table for corruption.
[phillip@squashfs.org.uk: fix checkpatch issue]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/527909353.754618.1612769948607@webmail.123-reg.co.uk
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210204130249.4495-4-phillip@squashfs.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Reported-by: syzbot+04419e3ff19d2970ea28@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f37aa4c7366e23f91b81d00bafd6a7ab54e4a381 upstream.
Sysbot has reported a number of "slab-out-of-bounds reads" and
"use-after-free read" errors which has been identified as being caused
by a corrupted index value read from the inode. This could be because
the metadata block is uncompressed, or because the "compression" bit has
been corrupted (turning a compressed block into an uncompressed block).
This patch adds additional sanity checks to detect this, and the
following corruption.
1. It checks against corruption of the ids count. This can either
lead to a larger table to be read, or a smaller than expected
table to be read.
In the case of a too large ids count, this would often have been
trapped by the existing sanity checks, but this patch introduces
a more exact check, which can identify too small values.
2. It checks the contents of the index table for corruption.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210204130249.4495-3-phillip@squashfs.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Reported-by: syzbot+b06d57ba83f604522af2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+c021ba012da41ee9807c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+5024636e8b5fd19f0f19@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+bcbc661df46657d0fa4f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 68f23b89067fdf187763e75a56087550624fdbee ]
Without memcg, there is a one-to-one mapping between the bdi and
bdi_writeback structures. In this world, things are fairly
straightforward; the first thing bdi_unregister() does is to shutdown
the bdi_writeback structure (or wb), and part of that writeback ensures
that no other work queued against the wb, and that the wb is fully
drained.
With memcg, however, there is a one-to-many relationship between the bdi
and bdi_writeback structures; that is, there are multiple wb objects
which can all point to a single bdi. There is a refcount which prevents
the bdi object from being released (and hence, unregistered). So in
theory, the bdi_unregister() *should* only get called once its refcount
goes to zero (bdi_put will drop the refcount, and when it is zero,
release_bdi gets called, which calls bdi_unregister).
Unfortunately, del_gendisk() in block/gen_hd.c never got the memo about
the Brave New memcg World, and calls bdi_unregister directly. It does
this without informing the file system, or the memcg code, or anything
else. This causes the root wb associated with the bdi to be
unregistered, but none of the memcg-specific wb's are shutdown. So when
one of these wb's are woken up to do delayed work, they try to
dereference their wb->bdi->dev to fetch the device name, but
unfortunately bdi->dev is now NULL, thanks to the bdi_unregister()
called by del_gendisk(). As a result, *boom*.
Fortunately, it looks like the rest of the writeback path is perfectly
happy with bdi->dev and bdi->owner being NULL, so the simplest fix is to
create a bdi_dev_name() function which can handle bdi->dev being NULL.
This also allows us to bulletproof the writeback tracepoints to prevent
them from dereferencing a NULL pointer and crashing the kernel if one is
tracing with memcg's enabled, and an iSCSI device dies or a USB storage
stick is pulled.
The most common way of triggering this will be hotremoval of a device
while writeback with memcg enabled is going on. It was triggering
several times a day in a heavily loaded production environment.
Google Bug Id: 145475544
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191227194829.150110-1-tytso@mit.edu
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191228005211.163952-1-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 585fc0d2871c9318c949fbf45b1f081edd489e96 upstream.
If a new hugetlb page is allocated during fallocate it will not be
marked as active (set_page_huge_active) which will result in a later
isolate_huge_page failure when the page migration code would like to
move that page. Such a failure would be unexpected and wrong.
Only export set_page_huge_active, just leave clear_page_huge_active as
static. Because there are no external users.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210115124942.46403-3-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Fixes: 70c3547e36f5 (hugetlbfs: add hugetlbfs_fallocate())
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 21b200d091826a83aafc95d847139b2b0582f6d1 upstream.
Assuming
- //HOST/a is mounted on /mnt
- //HOST/b is mounted on /mnt/b
On a slow connection, running 'df' and killing it while it's
processing /mnt/b can make cifs_get_inode_info() returns -ERESTARTSYS.
This triggers the following chain of events:
=> the dentry revalidation fail
=> dentry is put and released
=> superblock associated with the dentry is put
=> /mnt/b is unmounted
This patch makes cifs_d_revalidate() return the error instead of 0
(invalid) when cifs_revalidate_dentry() fails, except for ENOENT (file
deleted) and ESTALE (file recreated).
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Suggested-by: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4610ba7ad877fafc0a25a30c6c82015304120426 upstream.
mm_release() contains the futex exit handling. mm_release() is called from
do_exit()->exit_mm() and from exec()->exec_mm().
In the exit_mm() case PF_EXITING and the futex state is updated. In the
exec_mm() case these states are not touched.
As the futex exit code needs further protections against exit races, this
needs to be split into two functions.
Preparatory only, no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.240518241@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 51b2ee7d006a736a9126e8111d1f24e4fd0afaa6 upstream.
If you export a subdirectory of a filesystem, a READDIRPLUS on the root
of that export will return the filehandle of the parent with the ".."
entry.
The filehandle is optional, so let's just not return the filehandle for
".." if we're at the root of an export.
Note that once the client learns one filehandle outside of the export,
they can trivially access the rest of the export using further lookups.
However, it is also not very difficult to guess filehandles outside of
the export. So exporting a subdirectory of a filesystem should
considered equivalent to providing access to the entire filesystem. To
avoid confusion, we recommend only exporting entire filesystems.
Reported-by: Youjipeng <wangzhibei1999@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit dfd56c2c0c0dbb11be939b804ddc8d5395ab3432 upstream.
When setting password salt in the superblock, we forget to recompute the
superblock checksum so it will not match until the next superblock
modification which recomputes the checksum. Fix it.
CC: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Fixes: 9bd8212f981e ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201216101844.22917-8-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 896567ee7f17a8a736cda8a28cc987228410a2ac upstream.
Before referencing the inode, we must ensure that the superblock can be
referenced. Otherwise, we can end up with iput() calling superblock
operations that are no longer valid or accessible.
Fixes: ea7c38fef0b7 ("NFSv4: Ensure we reference the inode for return-on-close in delegreturn")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6b4b8e6b4ad8553660421d6360678b3811d5deb9 ]
We got a "deleted inode referenced" warning cross our fsstress test. The
bug can be reproduced easily with following steps:
cd /dev/shm
mkdir test/
fallocate -l 128M img
mkfs.ext4 -b 1024 img
mount img test/
dd if=/dev/zero of=test/foo bs=1M count=128
mkdir test/dir/ && cd test/dir/
for ((i=0;i<1000;i++)); do touch file$i; done # consume all block
cd ~ && renameat2(AT_FDCWD, /dev/shm/test/dir/file1, AT_FDCWD,
/dev/shm/test/dir/dst_file, RENAME_WHITEOUT) # ext4_add_entry in
ext4_rename will return ENOSPC!!
cd /dev/shm/ && umount test/ && mount img test/ && ls -li test/dir/file1
We will get the output:
"ls: cannot access 'test/dir/file1': Structure needs cleaning"
and the dmesg show:
"EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_lookup:1626: inode #2049: comm ls:
deleted inode referenced: 139"
ext4_rename will create a special inode for whiteout and use this 'ino'
to replace the source file's dir entry 'ino'. Once error happens
latter(the error above was the ENOSPC return from ext4_add_entry in
ext4_rename since all space has been consumed), the cleanup do drop the
nlink for whiteout, but forget to restore 'ino' with source file. This
will trigger the bug describle as above.
Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: cd808deced43 ("ext4: support RENAME_WHITEOUT")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210105062857.3566-1-yangerkun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 20f1431160c6b590cdc269a846fc5a448abf5b98 upstream
Write buffers use a kmalloc()'ed buffer, they can leak
up to seven bytes of kernel memory to flash if writes are not
aligned.
So use ubifs_pad() to fill these gaps with padding bytes.
This was never a problem while scanning because the scanner logic
manually aligns node lengths and skips over these gaps.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 1e51764a3c2ac05a2 ("UBIFS: add new flash file system")
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 10f04d40a9fa29785206c619f80d8beedb778837 ]
The on-disk quota format supports quota files with upto 2^32 blocks. Be
careful when computing quota file offsets in the quota files from block
numbers as they can overflow 32-bit types. Since quota files larger than
4GB would require ~26 millions of quota users, this is mostly a
theoretical concern now but better be careful, fuzzers would find the
problem sooner or later anyway...
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit d24396c5290ba8ab04ba505176874c4e04a2d53c upstream.
when directory item has an invalid value set for ih_entry_count it might
trigger use-after-free or out-of-bounds read in bin_search_in_dir_item()
ih_entry_count * IH_SIZE for directory item should not be larger than
ih_item_len
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201101140958.3650143-1-rkovhaev@gmail.com
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+83b6f7cf9922cae5c4d7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=83b6f7cf9922cae5c4d7
Signed-off-by: Rustam Kovhaev <rkovhaev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c61b3e4839007668360ed8b87d7da96d2e59fc6c upstream.
Bounds checking tools can flag a bug in dbAdjTree() for an array index
out of bounds in dmt_stree. Since dmt_stree can refer to the stree in
both structures dmaptree and dmapctl, use the larger array to eliminate
the false positive.
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9afc9a8a4909fece0e911e72b1060614ba2f7969 upstream.
The log of this problem is:
jffs2: Error garbage collecting node at 0x***!
jffs2: No space for garbage collection. Aborting GC thread
This is because GC believe that it do nothing, so it abort.
After going over the image of jffs2, I find a scene that
can trigger this problem stably.
The scene is: there is a normal dirent node at summary-area,
but abnormal at corresponding not-summary-area with error
name_crc.
The reason that GC exit abnormally is because it find that
abnormal dirent node to GC, but when it goes to function
jffs2_add_fd_to_list, it cannot meet the condition listed
below:
if ((*prev)->nhash == new->nhash && !strcmp((*prev)->name, new->name))
So no node is marked obsolete, statistical information of
erase_block do not change, which cause GC exit abnormally.
The root cause of this problem is: we do not check the
name_crc of the abnormal dirent node with summary is enabled.
Noticed that in function jffs2_scan_dirent_node, we use
function jffs2_scan_dirty_space to deal with the dirent
node with error name_crc. So this patch add a checking
code in function read_direntry to ensure the correctness
of dirent node. If checked failed, the dirent node will
be marked obsolete so GC will pass this node and this
problem will be fixed.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhe Li <lizhe67@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e5cafce3ad0f8652d6849314d951459c2bff7233 upstream.
A NULL pointer dereference may occur in __ceph_remove_cap with some of the
callbacks used in ceph_iterate_session_caps, namely trim_caps_cb and
remove_session_caps_cb. Those callers hold the session->s_mutex, so they
are prevented from concurrent execution, but ceph_evict_inode does not.
Since the callers of this function hold the i_ceph_lock, the fix is simply
a matter of returning immediately if caps->ci is NULL.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/43272
Suggested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cca415537244f6102cbb09b5b90db6ae2c953bdd upstream.
When freeing metadata, we will create an ext4_free_data and
insert it into the pending free list. After the current
transaction is committed, the object will be freed.
ext4_mb_free_metadata() will check whether the area to be freed
overlaps with the pending free list. If true, return directly. At this
time, ext4_free_data is leaked. Fortunately, the probability of this
problem is small, since it only occurs if the file system is corrupted
such that a block is claimed by more one inode and those inodes are
deleted within a single jbd2 transaction.
Signed-off-by: Chunguang Xu <brookxu@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604764698-4269-8-git-send-email-brookxu@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 881a3a11c2b858fe9b69ef79ac5ee9978a266dc9 upstream
btrfs_get_extent() sets variable ret, but out: error path expect error
to be in variable err so the error code is lost.
Fixes: 6bf9e4bd6a27 ("btrfs: inode: Verify inode mode to avoid NULL pointer dereference")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@denx.de>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9f7fec0ba89108b9385f1b9fb167861224912a4a upstream
Some of the self tests create a test inode, setup some extents and then do
calls to btrfs_get_extent() to test that the corresponding extent maps
exist and are correct. However btrfs_get_extent(), since the 5.2 merge
window, now errors out when it finds a regular or prealloc extent for an
inode that does not correspond to a regular file (its ->i_mode is not
S_IFREG). This causes the self tests to fail sometimes, specially when
KASAN, slub_debug and page poisoning are enabled:
$ modprobe btrfs
modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'btrfs': Invalid argument
$ dmesg
[ 9414.691648] Btrfs loaded, crc32c=crc32c-intel, debug=on, assert=on, integrity-checker=on, ref-verify=on
[ 9414.692655] BTRFS: selftest: sectorsize: 4096 nodesize: 4096
[ 9414.692658] BTRFS: selftest: running btrfs free space cache tests
[ 9414.692918] BTRFS: selftest: running extent only tests
[ 9414.693061] BTRFS: selftest: running bitmap only tests
[ 9414.693366] BTRFS: selftest: running bitmap and extent tests
[ 9414.696455] BTRFS: selftest: running space stealing from bitmap to extent tests
[ 9414.697131] BTRFS: selftest: running extent buffer operation tests
[ 9414.697133] BTRFS: selftest: running btrfs_split_item tests
[ 9414.697564] BTRFS: selftest: running extent I/O tests
[ 9414.697583] BTRFS: selftest: running find delalloc tests
[ 9415.081125] BTRFS: selftest: running find_first_clear_extent_bit test
[ 9415.081278] BTRFS: selftest: running extent buffer bitmap tests
[ 9415.124192] BTRFS: selftest: running inode tests
[ 9415.124195] BTRFS: selftest: running btrfs_get_extent tests
[ 9415.127909] BTRFS: selftest: running hole first btrfs_get_extent test
[ 9415.128343] BTRFS critical (device (efault)): regular/prealloc extent found for non-regular inode 256
[ 9415.131428] BTRFS: selftest: fs/btrfs/tests/inode-tests.c:904 expected a real extent, got 0
This happens because the test inodes are created without ever initializing
the i_mode field of the inode, and neither VFS's new_inode() nor the btrfs
callback btrfs_alloc_inode() initialize the i_mode. Initialization of the
i_mode is done through the various callbacks used by the VFS to create
new inodes (regular files, directories, symlinks, tmpfiles, etc), which
all call btrfs_new_inode() which in turn calls inode_init_owner(), which
sets the inode's i_mode. Since the tests only uses new_inode() to create
the test inodes, the i_mode was never initialized.
This always happens on a VM I used with kasan, slub_debug and many other
debug facilities enabled. It also happened to someone who reported this
on bugzilla (on a 5.3-rc).
Fix this by setting i_mode to S_IFREG at btrfs_new_test_inode().
Fixes: 6bf9e4bd6a2778 ("btrfs: inode: Verify inode mode to avoid NULL pointer dereference")
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204397
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 665d4953cde6d9e75c62a07ec8f4f8fd7d396ade upstream
In commit ac0b4145d662 ("btrfs: scrub: Don't use inode pages for device
replace") we removed the branch of copy_nocow_pages() to avoid
corruption for compressed nodatasum extents.
However above commit only solves the problem in scrub_extent(), if
during scrub_pages() we failed to read some pages,
sctx->no_io_error_seen will be non-zero and we go to fixup function
scrub_handle_errored_block().
In scrub_handle_errored_block(), for sctx without csum (no matter if
we're doing replace or scrub) we go to scrub_fixup_nodatasum() routine,
which does the similar thing with copy_nocow_pages(), but does it
without the extra check in copy_nocow_pages() routine.
So for test cases like btrfs/100, where we emulate read errors during
replace/scrub, we could corrupt compressed extent data again.
This patch will fix it just by avoiding any "optimization" for
nodatasum, just falls back to the normal fixup routine by try read from
any good copy.
This also solves WARN_ON() or dead lock caused by lame backref iteration
in scrub_fixup_nodatasum() routine.
The deadlock or WARN_ON() won't be triggered before commit ac0b4145d662
("btrfs: scrub: Don't use inode pages for device replace") since
copy_nocow_pages() have better locking and extra check for data extent,
and it's already doing the fixup work by try to read data from any good
copy, so it won't go scrub_fixup_nodatasum() anyway.
This patch disables the faulty code and will be removed completely in a
followup patch.
Fixes: ac0b4145d662 ("btrfs: scrub: Don't use inode pages for device replace")
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commoit 6f7de19ed3d4d3526ca5eca428009f97cf969c2f upstream
Commit ff3d27a048d9 ("btrfs: qgroup: Finish rescan when hit the last leaf
of extent tree") added a new exit for rescan finish.
However after finishing quota rescan, we set
fs_info->qgroup_rescan_progress to (u64)-1 before we exit through the
original exit path.
While we missed that assignment of (u64)-1 in the new exit path.
The end result is, the quota status item doesn't have the same value.
(-1 vs the last bytenr + 1)
Although it doesn't affect quota accounting, it's still better to keep
the original behavior.
Reported-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Fixes: ff3d27a048d9 ("btrfs: qgroup: Finish rescan when hit the last leaf of extent tree")
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4a9d81caf841cd2c0ae36abec9c2963bf21d0284 ]
If the elem is deleted during be iterated on it, the iteration
process will fall into an endless loop.
kernel: NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#4 stuck for 22s! [nfsd:17137]
PID: 17137 TASK: ffff8818d93c0000 CPU: 4 COMMAND: "nfsd"
[exception RIP: __state_in_grace+76]
RIP: ffffffffc00e817c RSP: ffff8818d3aefc98 RFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffff881dc0c38298 RBX: ffffffff81b03580 RCX: ffff881dc02c9f50
RDX: ffff881e3fce8500 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffff81b03580
RBP: ffff8818d3aefca0 R8: 0000000000000020 R9: ffff8818d3aefd40
R10: ffff88017fc03800 R11: ffff8818e83933c0 R12: ffff8818d3aefd40
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8818e8391068 R15: ffff8818fa6e4000
CS: 0010 SS: 0018
#0 [ffff8818d3aefc98] opens_in_grace at ffffffffc00e81e3 [grace]
#1 [ffff8818d3aefca8] nfs4_preprocess_stateid_op at ffffffffc02a3e6c [nfsd]
#2 [ffff8818d3aefd18] nfsd4_write at ffffffffc028ed5b [nfsd]
#3 [ffff8818d3aefd80] nfsd4_proc_compound at ffffffffc0290a0d [nfsd]
#4 [ffff8818d3aefdd0] nfsd_dispatch at ffffffffc027b800 [nfsd]
#5 [ffff8818d3aefe08] svc_process_common at ffffffffc02017f3 [sunrpc]
#6 [ffff8818d3aefe70] svc_process at ffffffffc0201ce3 [sunrpc]
#7 [ffff8818d3aefe98] nfsd at ffffffffc027b117 [nfsd]
#8 [ffff8818d3aefec8] kthread at ffffffff810b88c1
#9 [ffff8818d3aeff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff816d1607
The troublemake elem:
crash> lock_manager ffff881dc0c38298
struct lock_manager {
list = {
next = 0xffff881dc0c38298,
prev = 0xffff881dc0c38298
},
block_opens = false
}
Fixes: c87fb4a378f9 ("lockd: NLM grace period shouldn't block NFSv4 opens")
Signed-off-by: Cheng Lin <cheng.lin130@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4420440c57892779f265108f46f83832a88ca795 ]
The warning message from nfsd terminating normally
can confuse system adminstrators or monitoring software.
Though it's not exactly fair to pin-point a commit where it
originated, the current form in the current place started
to appear in:
Fixes: e096bbc6488d ("knfsd: remove special handling for SIGHUP")
Signed-off-by: kazuo ito <kzpn200@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit bf701b765eaa82dd164d65edc5747ec7288bb5c3 ]
nfsiod is currently a concurrency-managed workqueue (CMWQ).
This means that workitems scheduled to nfsiod on a given CPU are queued
behind all other work items queued on any CMWQ on the same CPU. This
can introduce unexpected latency.
Occaionally nfsiod can even cause excessive latency. If the work item
to complete a CLOSE request calls the final iput() on an inode, the
address_space of that inode will be dismantled. This takes time
proportional to the number of in-memory pages, which on a large host
working on large files (e.g.. 5TB), can be a large number of pages
resulting in a noticable number of seconds.
We can avoid these latency problems by switching nfsiod to WQ_UNBOUND.
This causes each concurrent work item to gets a dedicated thread which
can be scheduled to an idle CPU.
There is precedent for this as several other filesystems use WQ_UNBOUND
workqueue for handling various async events.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Fixes: ada609ee2ac2 ("workqueue: use WQ_MEM_RECLAIM instead of WQ_RESCUER")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9b82d88d5976e5f2b8015d58913654856576ace5 ]
NLM uses an interval-based rebinding, i.e. it clears the transport's
binding under certain conditions if more than 60 seconds have elapsed
since the connection was last bound.
This rebinding is not necessary for an autobind RPC client over a
connection-oriented protocol like TCP.
It can also cause problems: it is possible for nlm_bind_host() to clear
XPRT_BOUND whilst a connection worker is in the middle of trying to
reconnect, after it had already been checked in xprt_connect().
When the connection worker notices that XPRT_BOUND has been cleared
under it, in xs_tcp_finish_connecting(), that results in:
xs_tcp_setup_socket: connect returned unhandled error -107
Worse, it's possible that the two can get into lockstep, resulting in
the same behaviour repeated indefinitely, with the above error every
300 seconds, without ever recovering, and the connection never being
established. This has been seen in practice, with a large number of NLM
client tasks, following a server restart.
The existing callers of nlm_bind_host & nlm_rebind_host should not need
to force the rebind, for TCP, so restrict the interval-based rebinding
to UDP only.
For TCP, we will still rebind when needed, e.g. on timeout, and connection
error (including closure), since connection-related errors on an existing
connection, ECONNREFUSED when trying to connect, and rpc_check_timeout(),
already unconditionally clear XPRT_BOUND.
To avoid having to add the fix, and explanation, to both nlm_bind_host()
and nlm_rebind_host(), remove the duplicate code from the former, and
have it call the latter.
Drop the dprintk, which adds no value over a trace.
Signed-off-by: Calum Mackay <calum.mackay@oracle.com>
Fixes: 35f5a422ce1a ("SUNRPC: new interface to force an RPC rebind")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 05ad917561fca39a03338cb21fe9622f998b0f9c ]
Currently, the client will always ask for security_labels if the server
returns that it supports that feature regardless of any LSM modules
(such as Selinux) enforcing security policy. This adds performance
penalty to the READDIR operation.
Client adjusts superblock's support of the security_label based on
the server's support but also current client's configuration of the
LSM modules. Thus, prior to using the default bitmask in READDIR,
this patch checks the server's capabilities and then instructs
READDIR to remove FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL from the bitmask.
v5: fixing silly mistakes of the rushed v4
v4: simplifying logic
v3: changing label's initialization per Ondrej's comment
v2: dropping selinux hook and using the sb cap.
Suggested-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Fixes: 2b0143b5c986 ("VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 778721510e84209f78e31e2ccb296ae36d623f5e upstream.
If gfs2 tries to mount a (corrupt) file system that has no resource
groups it still tries to set preferences on the first one, which causes
a kernel null pointer dereference. This patch adds a check to function
gfs2_ri_update so this condition is detected and reported back as an
error.
Reported-by: syzbot+e3f23ce40269a4c9053a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 212253367dc7b49ed3fc194ce71b0992eacaecf2 upstream.
This patch fixes a potential use-after-free bug in
cifs_echo_request().
For instance,
thread 1
--------
cifs_demultiplex_thread()
clean_demultiplex_info()
kfree(server)
thread 2 (workqueue)
--------
apic_timer_interrupt()
smp_apic_timer_interrupt()
irq_exit()
__do_softirq()
run_timer_softirq()
call_timer_fn()
cifs_echo_request() <- use-after-free in server ptr
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ca10845a56856fff4de3804c85e6424d0f6d0cde upstream
While running btrfs/061, btrfs/073, btrfs/078, or btrfs/178 we hit the
following lockdep splat:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.9.0-rc3+ #4 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kswapd0/100 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff96ecc22ef4a0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8dd74700 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #3 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}:
fs_reclaim_acquire+0x65/0x80
slab_pre_alloc_hook.constprop.0+0x20/0x200
kmem_cache_alloc+0x37/0x270
alloc_inode+0x82/0xb0
iget_locked+0x10d/0x2c0
kernfs_get_inode+0x1b/0x130
kernfs_get_tree+0x136/0x240
sysfs_get_tree+0x16/0x40
vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
path_mount+0x434/0xc00
__x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #2 (kernfs_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0
kernfs_add_one+0x23/0x150
kernfs_create_link+0x63/0xa0
sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x5e/0xd0
btrfs_sysfs_add_devices_dir+0x81/0x130
btrfs_init_new_device+0x67f/0x1250
btrfs_ioctl+0x1ef/0x2e20
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #1 (&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0
btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x125/0x3a0
find_free_extent+0xdf6/0x1210
btrfs_reserve_extent+0xb3/0x1b0
btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb0/0x310
alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4a/0x60
__btrfs_cow_block+0x11a/0x530
btrfs_cow_block+0x104/0x220
btrfs_search_slot+0x52e/0x9d0
btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x64/0xb0
btrfs_insert_delayed_items+0x90/0x4f0
btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x93/0x140
btrfs_log_inode+0x5de/0x2020
btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x429/0xc90
btrfs_log_new_name+0x95/0x9b
btrfs_rename2+0xbb9/0x1800
vfs_rename+0x64f/0x9f0
do_renameat2+0x320/0x4e0
__x64_sys_rename+0x1f/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__lock_acquire+0x119c/0x1fc0
lock_acquire+0xa7/0x3d0
__mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0
__btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330
btrfs_evict_inode+0x24c/0x500
evict+0xcf/0x1f0
dispose_list+0x48/0x70
prune_icache_sb+0x44/0x50
super_cache_scan+0x161/0x1e0
do_shrink_slab+0x178/0x3c0
shrink_slab+0x17c/0x290
shrink_node+0x2b2/0x6d0
balance_pgdat+0x30a/0x670
kswapd+0x213/0x4c0
kthread+0x138/0x160
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
&delayed_node->mutex --> kernfs_mutex --> fs_reclaim
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(fs_reclaim);
lock(kernfs_mutex);
lock(fs_reclaim);
lock(&delayed_node->mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by kswapd0/100:
#0: ffffffff8dd74700 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30
#1: ffffffff8dd65c50 (shrinker_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: shrink_slab+0x115/0x290
#2: ffff96ed2ade30e0 (&type->s_umount_key#36){++++}-{3:3}, at: super_cache_scan+0x38/0x1e0
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 100 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc3+ #4
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x8b/0xb8
check_noncircular+0x12d/0x150
__lock_acquire+0x119c/0x1fc0
lock_acquire+0xa7/0x3d0
? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330
__mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0
? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330
? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330
? lock_acquire+0xa7/0x3d0
? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
__btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330
btrfs_evict_inode+0x24c/0x500
evict+0xcf/0x1f0
dispose_list+0x48/0x70
prune_icache_sb+0x44/0x50
super_cache_scan+0x161/0x1e0
do_shrink_slab+0x178/0x3c0
shrink_slab+0x17c/0x290
shrink_node+0x2b2/0x6d0
balance_pgdat+0x30a/0x670
kswapd+0x213/0x4c0
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x41/0x50
? add_wait_queue_exclusive+0x70/0x70
? balance_pgdat+0x670/0x670
kthread+0x138/0x160
? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
This happens because we are holding the chunk_mutex at the time of
adding in a new device. However we only need to hold the
device_list_mutex, as we're going to iterate over the fs_devices
devices. Move the sysfs init stuff outside of the chunk_mutex to get
rid of this lockdep splat.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4.x: f3cd2c58110dad14e: btrfs: sysfs, rename device_link add/remove functions
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4.x
Reported-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ff04f3b6f2e27f8ae28a498416af2a8dd5072b43 ]
The memory leak addressed by commit fe5186cf12e3 is a false positive:
all allocations are recorded in a linked list, and freed when the
filesystem is unmounted. This leads to double frees, and as reported
by David, leads to crashes if SLUB is configured to self destruct when
double frees occur.
So drop the redundant kfree() again, and instead, mark the offending
pointer variable so the allocation is ignored by kmemleak.
Cc: Vamshi K Sthambamkadi <vamshi.k.sthambamkadi@gmail.com>
Fixes: fe5186cf12e3 ("efivarfs: fix memory leak in efivarfs_create()")
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8d4c3e76e3be11a64df95ddee52e99092d42fc19 ]
If this is attempted by a kthread, then return -EOPNOTSUPP as we don't
currently support that. Once we can get task_pid_ptr() doing the right
thing, then this can go away again.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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