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2022-11-01cred: Do not default to init_cred in prepare_kernel_cred()Kees Cook
A common exploit pattern for ROP attacks is to abuse prepare_kernel_cred() in order to construct escalated privileges[1]. Instead of providing a short-hand argument (NULL) to the "daemon" argument to indicate using init_cred as the base cred, require that "daemon" is always set to an actual task. Replace all existing callers that were passing NULL with &init_task. Future attacks will need to have sufficiently powerful read/write primitives to have found an appropriately privileged task and written it to the ROP stack as an argument to succeed, which is similarly difficult to the prior effort needed to escalate privileges before struct cred existed: locate the current cred and overwrite the uid member. This has the added benefit of meaning that prepare_kernel_cred() can no longer exceed the privileges of the init task, which may have changed from the original init_cred (e.g. dropping capabilities from the bounding set). [1] https://google.com/search?q=commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0)) Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org> Cc: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Cc: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com> Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com> Cc: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna@kernel.org> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: "Michal Koutný" <mkoutny@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org Cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org> Acked-by: Russ Weight <russell.h.weight@intel.com> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Acked-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221026232943.never.775-kees@kernel.org
2021-01-27net: remove redundant 'depends on NET'Masahiro Yamada
These Kconfig files are included from net/Kconfig, inside the if NET ... endif. Remove 'depends on NET', which we know it is already met. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210125232026.106855-1-masahiroy@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-04-28docs: networking: convert dns_resolver.txt to ReSTMauro Carvalho Chehab
- add SPDX header; - adjust titles and chapters, adding proper markups; - comment out text-only TOC from html/pdf output; - mark code blocks and literals as such; - adjust identation, whitespaces and blank lines; - add to networking/index.rst. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-03-29KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphoreWaiman Long
A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a keyutils test: [12537.027242] ====================================================== [12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE --------- - - [12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------ [12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock: [12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12537.208365] [12537.208365] but task is already holding lock: [12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 [12537.270476] [12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock. [12537.270476] [12537.307209] [12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [12537.340754] [12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}: [12537.367434] down_write+0x4d/0x110 [12537.385202] __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280 [12537.405232] request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70 [12537.427221] request_key+0x3c/0x80 [12537.444839] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] [12537.468445] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] [12537.496731] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] [12537.519418] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] [12537.546263] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] [12537.573551] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] [12537.601045] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 [12537.617906] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [12537.636225] [12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}: [12537.664525] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 [12537.683734] request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70 [12537.705640] request_key+0x3c/0x80 [12537.723304] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] [12537.746773] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] [12537.775607] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] [12537.798322] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] [12537.823369] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] [12537.847262] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] [12537.873477] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 [12537.890281] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [12537.908649] [12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}: [12537.935225] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 [12537.954450] cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs] [12537.977250] smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs] [12538.000659] cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs] [12538.023920] read_pages+0xf5/0x560 [12538.041583] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0 [12538.067047] ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10 [12538.092069] filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830 [12538.111637] __do_fault+0x82/0x260 [12538.129216] do_fault+0x419/0xfb0 [12538.146390] __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0 [12538.167408] handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550 [12538.187401] __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60 [12538.207395] do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0 [12538.225777] page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [12538.243010] [12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: [12538.267875] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 [12538.286848] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 [12538.306006] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 [12538.327936] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 [12538.352154] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 [12538.370558] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 [12538.391470] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 [12538.410511] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf [12538.435535] [12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this: [12538.435535] [12538.472829] Chain exists of: [12538.472829] &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class [12538.472829] [12538.524820] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [12538.524820] [12538.551431] CPU0 CPU1 [12538.572654] ---- ---- [12538.595865] lock(&type->lock_class); [12538.613737] lock(root_key_user.cons_lock); [12538.644234] lock(&type->lock_class); [12538.672410] lock(&mm->mmap_sem); [12538.687758] [12538.687758] *** DEADLOCK *** [12538.687758] [12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598: [12538.732097] #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 [12538.770573] [12538.770573] stack backtrace: [12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G [12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015 [12538.881963] Call Trace: [12538.892897] dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0 [12538.907908] print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279 [12538.932891] ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250 [12538.948979] check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0 [12538.971643] ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190 [12538.992738] ? check_usage+0x550/0x550 [12539.009845] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 [12539.025484] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0 [12539.043555] __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0 [12539.061551] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10 [12539.080554] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 [12539.100330] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12539.119079] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 [12539.135869] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12539.153234] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 [12539.172787] ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110 [12539.190059] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 [12539.211526] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 [12539.227561] ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0 [12539.249076] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 [12539.266660] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 [12539.283091] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf One way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead, an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding the lock. That requires taking out the __user modifier from all the relevant read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace write helpers. That is, 1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy. 2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy(). 3) All the fault handling code is removed. Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch. Fixes: ^1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-07-10Revert "Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs" This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus effectively commits 7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION") 2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL") that the merge brought in). It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of in-kernel X.509 certificates [2]. The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in order to not impact the rest of the merge window. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-08Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells: "This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be based on an internal ACL by the following means: - Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask. Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings. ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain tags/namespaces. Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus acquiring use of possessor permits. - Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed" * tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
2019-07-08Merge tag 'keys-namespace-20190627' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull keyring namespacing from David Howells: "These patches help make keys and keyrings more namespace aware. Firstly some miscellaneous patches to make the process easier: - Simplify key index_key handling so that the word-sized chunks assoc_array requires don't have to be shifted about, making it easier to add more bits into the key. - Cache the hash value in the key so that we don't have to calculate on every key we examine during a search (it involves a bunch of multiplications). - Allow keying_search() to search non-recursively. Then the main patches: - Make it so that keyring names are per-user_namespace from the point of view of KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING so that they're not accessible cross-user_namespace. keyctl_capabilities() shows KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEYRING_NAME for this. - Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace rather than the user_struct. This prevents them propagating directly across user_namespaces boundaries (ie. the KEY_SPEC_* flags will only pick from the current user_namespace). - Make it possible to include the target namespace in which the key shall operate in the index_key. This will allow the possibility of multiple keys with the same description, but different target domains to be held in the same keyring. keyctl_capabilities() shows KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEY_TAG for this. - Make it so that keys are implicitly invalidated by removal of a domain tag, causing them to be garbage collected. - Institute a network namespace domain tag that allows keys to be differentiated by the network namespace in which they operate. New keys that are of a type marked 'KEY_TYPE_NET_DOMAIN' are assigned the network domain in force when they are created. - Make it so that the desired network namespace can be handed down into the request_key() mechanism. This allows AFS, NFS, etc. to request keys specific to the network namespace of the superblock. This also means that the keys in the DNS record cache are thenceforth namespaced, provided network filesystems pass the appropriate network namespace down into dns_query(). For DNS, AFS and NFS are good, whilst CIFS and Ceph are not. Other cache keyrings, such as idmapper keyrings, also need to set the domain tag - for which they need access to the network namespace of the superblock" * tag 'keys-namespace-20190627' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanism keys: Network namespace domain tag keys: Garbage collect keys for which the domain has been removed keys: Include target namespace in match criteria keys: Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace keys: Namespace keyring names keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches keys: Cache the hash value to avoid lots of recalculation keys: Simplify key description management
2019-06-27keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACLDavid Howells
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a greater range of subjects to represented. ============ WHY DO THIS? ============ The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of which should be grouped together. For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a key: (1) Changing a key's ownership. (2) Changing a key's security information. (3) Setting a keyring's restriction. And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime: (4) Setting an expiry time. (5) Revoking a key. and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache: (6) Invalidating a key. Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with controlling access to that key. Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however, be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is probably okay. As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers: (1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search. (2) Permitting keyrings to be joined. (3) Invalidation. But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really need to be controlled separately. Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks. =============== WHAT IS CHANGED =============== The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions: (1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring. (2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked. The SEARCH permission is split to create: (1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found. (2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring. (3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated. The WRITE permission is also split to create: (1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be added, removed and replaced in a keyring. (2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator. (3) REVOKE - see above. Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as: (*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key (*) Owner - permitted to the key owner (*) Group - permitted to the key group (*) Everyone - permitted to everyone Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to everyone else. Further subjects may be made available by later patches. The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now: VIEW Can view the key metadata READ Can read the key content WRITE Can update/modify the key content SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting LINK Can make a link to the key SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry INVAL Can invalidate REVOKE Can revoke JOIN Can join this keyring CLEAR Can clear this keyring The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated. The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set, or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token. The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL. The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE. The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an existing keyring. The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually created keyrings only. ====================== BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY ====================== To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be returned. It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero. SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned on if a keyring is being altered. The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs. It will make the following mappings: (1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH (2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR (3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set (4) CLEAR -> WRITE Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR. ======= TESTING ======= This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests: (1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the key. (2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-06-27keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanismDavid Howells
Create a request_key_net() function and use it to pass the network namespace domain tag into DNS revolver keys and rxrpc/AFS keys so that keys for different domains can coexist in the same keyring. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2019-06-26keys: Network namespace domain tagDavid Howells
Create key domain tags for network namespaces and make it possible to automatically tag keys that are used by networked services (e.g. AF_RXRPC, AFS, DNS) with the default network namespace if not set by the caller. This allows keys with the same description but in different namespaces to coexist within a keyring. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2019-05-21treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/KconfigThomas Gleixner
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which: - Have no license information of any form These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-15dns_resolver: Allow used keys to be invalidatedDavid Howells
Allow used DNS resolver keys to be invalidated after use if the caller is doing its own caching of the results. This reduces the amount of resources required. Fix AFS to invalidate DNS results to kill off permanent failure records that get lodged in the resolver keyring and prevent future lookups from happening. Fixes: 0a5143f2f89c ("afs: Implement VL server rotation") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-04-11dns: remove redundant zero length namelen checkColin Ian King
The zero namelen check is redundant as it has already been checked for zero at the start of the function. Remove the redundant check. Addresses-Coverity: ("Logically Dead Code") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-10-04dns: Allow the dns resolver to retrieve a server setDavid Howells
Allow the DNS resolver to retrieve a set of servers and their associated addresses, ports, preference and weight ratings. In terms of communication with userspace, "srv=1" is added to the callout string (the '1' indicating the maximum data version supported by the kernel) to ask the userspace side for this. If the userspace side doesn't recognise it, it will ignore the option and return the usual text address list. If the userspace side does recognise it, it will return some binary data that begins with a zero byte that would cause the string parsers to give an error. The second byte contains the version of the data in the blob (this may be between 1 and the version specified in the callout data). The remainder of the payload is version-specific. In version 1, the payload looks like (note that this is packed): u8 Non-string marker (ie. 0) u8 Content (0 => Server list) u8 Version (ie. 1) u8 Source (eg. DNS_RECORD_FROM_DNS_SRV) u8 Status (eg. DNS_LOOKUP_GOOD) u8 Number of servers foreach-server { u16 Name length (LE) u16 Priority (as per SRV record) (LE) u16 Weight (as per SRV record) (LE) u16 Port (LE) u8 Source (eg. DNS_RECORD_FROM_NSS) u8 Status (eg. DNS_LOOKUP_GOT_NOT_FOUND) u8 Protocol (eg. DNS_SERVER_PROTOCOL_UDP) u8 Number of addresses char[] Name (not NUL-terminated) foreach-address { u8 Family (AF_INET{,6}) union { u8[4] ipv4_addr u8[16] ipv6_addr } } } This can then be used to fetch a whole cell's VL-server configuration for AFS, for example. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-07-24net: remove blank lines at end of fileStephen Hemminger
Several files have extra line at end of file. Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-07-16KEYS: DNS: fix parsing multiple optionsEric Biggers
My recent fix for dns_resolver_preparse() printing very long strings was incomplete, as shown by syzbot which still managed to hit the WARN_ONCE() in set_precision() by adding a crafted "dns_resolver" key: precision 50001 too large WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 864 at lib/vsprintf.c:2164 vsnprintf+0x48a/0x5a0 The bug this time isn't just a printing bug, but also a logical error when multiple options ("#"-separated strings) are given in the key payload. Specifically, when separating an option string into name and value, if there is no value then the name is incorrectly considered to end at the end of the key payload, rather than the end of the current option. This bypasses validation of the option length, and also means that specifying multiple options is broken -- which presumably has gone unnoticed as there is currently only one valid option anyway. A similar problem also applied to option values, as the kstrtoul() when parsing the "dnserror" option will read past the end of the current option and into the next option. Fix these bugs by correctly computing the length of the option name and by copying the option value, null-terminated, into a temporary buffer. Reproducer for the WARN_ONCE() that syzbot hit: perl -e 'print "#A#", "\0" x 50000' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s Reproducer for "dnserror" option being parsed incorrectly (expected behavior is to fail when seeing the unknown option "foo", actual behavior was to read the dnserror value as "1#foo" and fail there): perl -e 'print "#dnserror=1#foo\0"' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Fixes: 4a2d789267e0 ("DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-17KEYS: DNS: limit the length of option stringsEric Biggers
Adding a dns_resolver key whose payload contains a very long option name resulted in that string being printed in full. This hit the WARN_ONCE() in set_precision() during the printk(), because printk() only supports a precision of up to 32767 bytes: precision 1000000 too large WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 752 at lib/vsprintf.c:2189 vsnprintf+0x4bc/0x5b0 Fix it by limiting option strings (combined name + value) to a much more reasonable 128 bytes. The exact limit is arbitrary, but currently the only recognized option is formatted as "dnserror=%lu" which fits well within this limit. Also ratelimit the printks. Reproducer: perl -e 'print "#", "A" x 1000000, "\x00"' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @s This bug was found using syzkaller. Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Fixes: 4a2d789267e0 ("DNS: If the DNS server returns an error, allow that to be cached [ver #2]") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-26net: Use octal not symbolic permissionsJoe Perches
Prefer the direct use of octal for permissions. Done with checkpatch -f --types=SYMBOLIC_PERMS --fix-inplace and some typing. Miscellanea: o Whitespace neatening around these conversions. Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-06afs: Support the AFS dynamic rootDavid Howells
Support the AFS dynamic root which is a pseudo-volume that doesn't connect to any server resource, but rather is just a root directory that dynamically creates mountpoint directories where the name of such a directory is the name of the cell. Such a mount can be created thus: mount -t afs none /afs -o dyn Dynamic root superblocks aren't shared except by bind mounts and propagation. Cell root volumes can then be mounted by referring to them by name, e.g.: ls /afs/grand.central.org/ ls /afs/.grand.central.org/ The kernel will upcall to consult the DNS if the address wasn't supplied directly. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-10-18KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative keyDavid Howells
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection error into one field such that: (1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically. (2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state. (3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers. This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using any locking. The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't actually an error code. The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated() function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative keys are also 'instantiated'. Additionally, barriering is included: (1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation. (2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key. Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the payload content after reading the payload pointers. Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+ Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2017-03-03Merge branch 'WIP.sched-core-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull sched.h split-up from Ingo Molnar: "The point of these changes is to significantly reduce the <linux/sched.h> header footprint, to speed up the kernel build and to have a cleaner header structure. After these changes the new <linux/sched.h>'s typical preprocessed size goes down from a previous ~0.68 MB (~22K lines) to ~0.45 MB (~15K lines), which is around 40% faster to build on typical configs. Not much changed from the last version (-v2) posted three weeks ago: I eliminated quirks, backmerged fixes plus I rebased it to an upstream SHA1 from yesterday that includes most changes queued up in -next plus all sched.h changes that were pending from Andrew. I've re-tested the series both on x86 and on cross-arch defconfigs, and did a bisectability test at a number of random points. I tried to test as many build configurations as possible, but some build breakage is probably still left - but it should be mostly limited to architectures that have no cross-compiler binaries available on kernel.org, and non-default configurations" * 'WIP.sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (146 commits) sched/headers: Clean up <linux/sched.h> sched/headers: Remove #ifdefs from <linux/sched.h> sched/headers: Remove the <linux/topology.h> include from <linux/sched.h> sched/headers, hrtimer: Remove the <linux/wait.h> include from <linux/hrtimer.h> sched/headers, x86/apic: Remove the <linux/pm.h> header inclusion from <asm/apic.h> sched/headers, timers: Remove the <linux/sysctl.h> include from <linux/timer.h> sched/headers: Remove <linux/magic.h> from <linux/sched/task_stack.h> sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/init.h> sched/core: Remove unused prefetch_stack() sched/headers: Remove <linux/rculist.h> from <linux/sched.h> sched/headers: Remove the 'init_pid_ns' prototype from <linux/sched.h> sched/headers: Remove <linux/signal.h> from <linux/sched.h> sched/headers: Remove <linux/rwsem.h> from <linux/sched.h> sched/headers: Remove the runqueue_is_locked() prototype sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/hotplug.h> sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/debug.h> sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/nohz.h> sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/stat.h> sched/headers: Remove the <linux/gfp.h> include from <linux/sched.h> sched/headers: Remove <linux/rtmutex.h> from <linux/sched.h> ...
2017-03-02sched/headers: Prepare to remove <linux/cred.h> inclusion from <linux/sched.h>Ingo Molnar
Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h doing that for them. Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high, it's still a net win, because <linux/sched.h> is included in over 2,200 files ... Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02KEYS: Differentiate uses of rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload()David Howells
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in two different, incompatible ways: (1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used to protect the key. (2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is used to protect the key and the may be being modified. Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce: (1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked: dereference_key_locked() user_key_payload_locked() (2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock: dereference_key_rcu() user_key_payload_rcu() This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W ------------------------------- ./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987: #0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable) lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190 nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4] nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4] nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4] rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc] call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc] __rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc] rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc] nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4] _nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4] nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4] nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4] nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4] nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4] nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 do_mount+0x254/0xf70 SyS_mount+0x94/0x100 system_call+0x38/0xe0 Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-04-11KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyringDavid Howells
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide blacklisting. This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE. To this end: (1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to the vetting function. This is called as: int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *key_type, unsigned long key_flags, const union key_payload *key_payload), where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED. [*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed. The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the link. The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set through keyring_alloc(). Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function is called. (2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the restriction check. (3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted. (4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL. (5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for authoritative keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-11-18net: dns_resolver: convert time_t to time64_tAya Mahfouz
Changes the definition of the pointer _expiry from time_t to time64_t. This is to handle the Y2038 problem where time_t will overflow in the year 2038. The change is safe because the kernel subsystems that call dns_query pass NULL. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Aya Mahfouz <mahfouz.saif.elyazal@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-21KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload dataDavid Howells
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk as it seems pointless to keep them separate. Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded user-defined keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
2014-10-01Merge commit 'v3.16' into nextJames Morris
2014-09-16KEYS: Make the key matching functions return boolDavid Howells
Make the key matching functions pointed to by key_match_data::cmp return bool rather than int. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-16KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparseDavid Howells
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm. Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse to override it as needed. The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the user_match() function. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-16KEYS: Preparse match dataDavid Howells
Preparse the match data. This provides several advantages: (1) The preparser can reject invalid criteria up front. (2) The preparser can convert the criteria to binary data if necessary (the asymmetric key type really wants to do binary comparison of the key IDs). (3) The preparser can set the type of search to be performed. This means that it's not then a one-off setting in the key type. (4) The preparser can set an appropriate comparator function. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-07-22Merge branch 'keys-fixes' into keys-nextDavid Howells
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2014-07-22KEYS: DNS: Use key preparsingDavid Howells
Make use of key preparsing in the DNS resolver so that quota size determination can take place prior to keyring locking when a key is being added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
2014-07-20dns_resolver: Null-terminate the right stringBen Hutchings
*_result[len] is parsed as *(_result[len]) which is not at all what we want to touch here. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Fixes: 84a7c0b1db1c ("dns_resolver: assure that dns_query() result is null-terminated") Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-17KEYS: Allow special keys (eg. DNS results) to be invalidated by CAP_SYS_ADMINDavid Howells
Special kernel keys, such as those used to hold DNS results for AFS, CIFS and NFS and those used to hold idmapper results for NFS, used to be 'invalidateable' with key_revoke(). However, since the default permissions for keys were reduced: Commit: 96b5c8fea6c0861621051290d705ec2e971963f1 KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys it has become impossible to do this. Add a key flag (KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL) that will permit a key to be invalidated by root. This should not be used for system keyrings as the garbage collector will try and remove any invalidate key. For system keyrings, KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR can be used instead. After this, from userspace, keyctl_invalidate() and "keyctl invalidate" can be used by any possessor of CAP_SYS_ADMIN (typically root) to invalidate DNS and idmapper keys. Invalidated keys are immediately garbage collected and will be immediately rerequested if needed again. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
2014-06-11Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller
Conflicts: net/core/rtnetlink.c net/core/skbuff.c Both conflicts were very simple overlapping changes. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-06-11dns_resolver: assure that dns_query() result is null-terminatedManuel Schölling
dns_query() credulously assumes that keys are null-terminated and returns a copy of a memory block that is off by one. Signed-off-by: Manuel Schölling <manuel.schoelling@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-06-05dns_resolver: Do not accept domain names longer than 255 charsManuel Schölling
According to RFC1035 "[...] the total length of a domain name (i.e., label octets and label length octets) is restricted to 255 octets or less." Signed-off-by: Manuel Schölling <manuel.schoelling@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-12-06net/*: Fix FSF address in file headersJeff Kirsher
Several files refer to an old address for the Free Software Foundation in the file header comment. Resolve by replacing the address with the URL <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/> so that we do not have to keep updating the header comments anytime the address changes. CC: John Fastabend <john.r.fastabend@intel.com> CC: Alex Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> CC: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org> CC: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com> CC: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-07-12net: strict_strtoul is obsolete, use kstrtoul instead“Cosmin
patch found using checkpatch.pl Signed-off-by: Cosmin Stanescu <cosmin90stanescu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-12-16Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "A quiet cycle for the security subsystem with just a few maintenance updates." * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: Smack: create a sysfs mount point for smackfs Smack: use select not depends in Kconfig Yama: remove locking from delete path Yama: add RCU to drop read locking drivers/char/tpm: remove tasklet and cleanup KEYS: Use keyring_alloc() to create special keyrings KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-thread seccomp: Make syscall skipping and nr changes more consistent key: Fix resource leak keys: Fix unreachable code KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or update
2012-10-14Merge branch 'modules-next' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux Pull module signing support from Rusty Russell: "module signing is the highlight, but it's an all-over David Howells frenzy..." Hmm "Magrathea: Glacier signing key". Somebody has been reading too much HHGTTG. * 'modules-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux: (37 commits) X.509: Fix indefinite length element skip error handling X.509: Convert some printk calls to pr_devel asymmetric keys: fix printk format warning MODSIGN: Fix 32-bit overflow in X.509 certificate validity date checking MODSIGN: Make mrproper should remove generated files. MODSIGN: Use utf8 strings in signer's name in autogenerated X.509 certs MODSIGN: Use the same digest for the autogen key sig as for the module sig MODSIGN: Sign modules during the build process MODSIGN: Provide a script for generating a key ID from an X.509 cert MODSIGN: Implement module signature checking MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the kernel MODSIGN: Automatically generate module signing keys if missing MODSIGN: Provide Kconfig options MODSIGN: Provide gitignore and make clean rules for extra files MODSIGN: Add FIPS policy module: signature checking hook X.509: Add a crypto key parser for binary (DER) X.509 certificates MPILIB: Provide a function to read raw data into an MPI X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder X.509: Add simple ASN.1 grammar compiler ...
2012-10-08KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or updateDavid Howells
Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the instantiation and update routines being called. This is done with the provision of two new key type operations: int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and instantiate cases). The second operation is called to clean up if the first was called. preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure: struct key_preparsed_payload { char *description; void *type_data[2]; void *payload; const void *data; size_t datalen; size_t quotalen; }; Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared, the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen. The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update() ops. The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a string to the description field. This can be used by passing a NULL or "" description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update() function. This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description to tell the upcall about the key to be created. This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key. The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this: int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-10-02Merge branch 'modsign-keys-devel' into security-next-keysDavid Howells
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-10-02KEYS: Use keyring_alloc() to create special keyringsDavid Howells
Use keyring_alloc() to create special keyrings now that it has a permissions parameter rather than using key_alloc() + key_instantiate_and_link(). Also document and export keyring_alloc() so that modules can use it too. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-09-13userns: net: Call key_alloc with GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID instead of ↵Eric W. Biederman
0, 0 In net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c and net/rxrpc/ar-key.c make them work with user namespaces enabled where key_alloc takes kuids and kgids. Pass GLOBAL_ROOT_UID and GLOBAL_ROOT_GID instead of bare 0's. Cc: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-09-13KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or updateDavid Howells
Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the instantiation and update routines being called. This is done with the provision of two new key type operations: int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and instantiate cases). The second operation is called to clean up if the first was called. preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure: struct key_preparsed_payload { char *description; void *type_data[2]; void *payload; const void *data; size_t datalen; size_t quotalen; }; Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared, the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen. The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update() ops. The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a string to the description field. This can be used by passing a NULL or "" description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update() function. This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description to tell the upcall about the key to be created. This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key. The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this: int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-05-21Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "New notable features: - The seccomp work from Will Drewry - PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS from Andy Lutomirski - Longer security labels for Smack from Casey Schaufler - Additional ptrace restriction modes for Yama by Kees Cook" Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/Kconfig and include/linux/filter.h * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits) apparmor: fix long path failure due to disconnected path apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfined ima: fix filename hint to reflect script interpreter name KEYS: Don't check for NULL key pointer in key_validate() Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4 gfp flags for security_inode_alloc()? Smack: recursive tramsmute Yama: replace capable() with ns_capable() TOMOYO: Accept manager programs which do not start with / . KEYS: Add invalidation support KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings KEYS: Permit in-place link replacement in keyring list KEYS: Perform RCU synchronisation on keys prior to key destruction KEYS: Announce key type (un)registration KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig KEYS: Use the compat keyctl() syscall wrapper on Sparc64 for Sparc32 compat Yama: remove an unused variable samples/seccomp: fix dependencies on arch macros Yama: add additional ptrace scopes ...
2012-05-11KEYS: Announce key type (un)registrationDavid Howells
Announce the (un)registration of a key type in the core key code rather than in the callers. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2012-04-15net: cleanup unsigned to unsigned intEric Dumazet
Use of "unsigned int" is preferred to bare "unsigned" in net tree. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-01-19KEYS: Allow special keyrings to be clearedDavid Howells
The kernel contains some special internal keyrings, for instance the DNS resolver keyring : 2a93faf1 I----- 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .dns_resolver: empty It would occasionally be useful to allow the contents of such keyrings to be flushed by root (cache invalidation). Allow a flag to be set on a keyring to mark that someone possessing the sysadmin capability can clear the keyring, even without normal write access to the keyring. Set this flag on the special keyrings created by the DNS resolver, the NFS identity mapper and the CIFS identity mapper. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>