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commit 574d356b7a02c7e1b01a1d9cba8a26b3c2888f45 upstream.
If the requested msize is too small (either from command line argument
or from the server version reply), we won't get any work done.
If it's *really* too small, nothing will work, and this got caught by
syzbot recently (on a new kmem_cache_create_usercopy() call)
Just set a minimum msize to 4k in both code paths, until someone
complains they have a use-case for a smaller msize.
We need to check in both mount option and server reply individually
because the msize for the first version request would be unchecked
with just a global check on clnt->msize.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1541407968-31350-1-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.org
Reported-by: syzbot+0c1d61e4db7db94102ca@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Cc: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b8be5674fa9a6f3677865ea93f7803c4212f3e10 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4ecd55ea074217473f94cfee21bb72864d39f8d7 upstream.
After commit d202cce8963d, an expired cache_head can be removed from the
cache_detail's hash.
However, the expired cache_head may be waiting for a reply from a
previously submitted request. Such a cache_head has an increased
refcounter and therefore it won't be freed after cache_put(freeme).
Because the cache_head was removed from the hash it cannot be found
during cache_clean() and can be leaked forever, together with stalled
cache_request and other taken resources.
In our case we noticed it because an entry in the export cache was
holding a reference on a filesystem.
Fixes d202cce8963d ("sunrpc: never return expired entries in sunrpc_cache_lookup")
Cc: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 2.6.35
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3a0ed3e9619738067214871e9cb826fa23b2ddb9 ]
Al Viro mentioned (Message-ID
<20170626041334.GZ10672@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>)
that there is probably a race condition
lurking in accesses of sk_stamp on 32-bit machines.
sock->sk_stamp is of type ktime_t which is always an s64.
On a 32 bit architecture, we might run into situations of
unsafe access as the access to the field becomes non atomic.
Use seqlocks for synchronization.
This allows us to avoid using spinlocks for readers as
readers do not need mutual exclusion.
Another approach to solve this is to require sk_lock for all
modifications of the timestamps. The current approach allows
for timestamps to have their own lock: sk_stamp_lock.
This allows for the patch to not compete with already
existing critical sections, and side effects are limited
to the paths in the patch.
The addition of the new field maintains the data locality
optimizations from
commit 9115e8cd2a0c ("net: reorganize struct sock for better data
locality")
Note that all the instances of the sk_stamp accesses
are either through the ioctl or the syscall recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a915b982d8f5e4295f64b8dd37ce753874867e88 ]
If a server side socket is bound to an address, but not in the listening
state yet, incoming connection requests should receive a reset control
packet in response. However, the function used to send the reset
silently drops the reset packet if the sending socket isn't bound
to a remote address (as is the case for a bound socket not yet in
the listening state). This change fixes this by using the src
of the incoming packet as destination for the reset packet in
this case.
Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets")
Reviewed-by: Adit Ranadive <aditr@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Vishnu Dasa <vdasa@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jorgen Hansen <jhansen@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4a2eb0c37b4759416996fbb4c45b932500cf06d3 ]
syzbot reported a kernel-infoleak, which is caused by an uninitialized
field(sin6_flowinfo) of addr->a.v6 in sctp_inet6addr_event().
The call trace is as below:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0x19a/0x230 lib/usercopy.c:33
CPU: 1 PID: 8164 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc3+ #95
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x32d/0x480 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x12c/0x290 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:683
kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x32a/0xa50 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:743
kmsan_copy_to_user+0x78/0xd0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:634
_copy_to_user+0x19a/0x230 lib/usercopy.c:33
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:183 [inline]
sctp_getsockopt_local_addrs net/sctp/socket.c:5998 [inline]
sctp_getsockopt+0x15248/0x186f0 net/sctp/socket.c:7477
sock_common_getsockopt+0x13f/0x180 net/core/sock.c:2937
__sys_getsockopt+0x489/0x550 net/socket.c:1939
__do_sys_getsockopt net/socket.c:1950 [inline]
__se_sys_getsockopt+0xe1/0x100 net/socket.c:1947
__x64_sys_getsockopt+0x62/0x80 net/socket.c:1947
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
sin6_flowinfo is not really used by SCTP, so it will be fixed by simply
setting it to 0.
The issue exists since very beginning.
Thanks Alexander for the reproducer provided.
Reported-by: syzbot+ad5d327e6936a2e284be@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6b8d95f1795c42161dc0984b6863e95d6acf24ed ]
Validate packet socket address length if a length is given. Zero
length is equivalent to not setting an address.
Fixes: 99137b7888f4 ("packet: validate address length")
Reported-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@idosch.org>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 99137b7888f4058087895d035d81c6b2d31015c5 ]
Packet sockets with SOCK_DGRAM may pass an address for use in
dev_hard_header. Ensure that it is of sufficient length.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7314f5480f3e37e570104dc5e0f28823ef849e72 ]
nr_find_socket(), nr_find_peer() and nr_find_listener() lock the
sock after finding it in the global list. However, the call path
requires BH disabled for the sock lock consistently.
Actually the locking is unnecessary at this point, we can just hold
the sock refcnt to make sure it is not gone after we unlock the global
list, and lock it later only when needed.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+f621cda8b7e598908efa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fb24274546310872eeeaf3d1d53799d8414aa0f2 ]
syzbot reported the use of uninitialized udp6_addr::sin6_scope_id.
We can just set ::sin6_scope_id to zero, as tunnels are unlikely
to use an IPv6 address that needs a scope id and there is no
interface to bind in this context.
For net-next, it looks different as we have cfg->bind_ifindex there
so we can probably call ipv6_iface_scope_id().
Same for ::sin6_flowinfo, tunnels don't use it.
Fixes: 8024e02879dd ("udp: Add udp_sock_create for UDP tunnels to open listener socket")
Reported-by: syzbot+c56449ed3652e6720f30@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c433570458e49bccea5c551df628d058b3526289 ]
There are multiple issues here:
1. After freeing dev->ax25_ptr, we need to set it to NULL otherwise
we may use a dangling pointer.
2. There is a race between ax25_setsockopt() and device notifier as
reported by syzbot. Close it by holding RTNL lock.
3. We need to test if dev->ax25_ptr is NULL before using it.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+ae6bb869cbed29b29040@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0a9a4304f3614e25d9de9b63502ca633c01c0d70 ]
If an asynchronous connection attempt completes while another task is
in xprt_connect(), then the call to rpc_sleep_on() could end up
racing with the call to xprt_wake_pending_tasks().
So add a second test of the connection state after we've put the
task to sleep and set the XPRT_CONNECTING flag, when we know that there
can be no asynchronous connection attempts still in progress.
Fixes: 0b9e79431377d ("SUNRPC: Move the test for XPRT_CONNECTING into...")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 66033f47ca60294a95fc85ec3a3cc909dab7b765 ]
Even if we send an IPv6 packet without options, MAX_HEADER might not be
enough to account for the additional headroom required by alignment of
hardware headers.
On a configuration without HYPERV_NET, WLAN, AX25, and with IPV6_TUNNEL,
sending short SCTP packets over IPv4 over L2TP over IPv6, we start with
100 bytes of allocated headroom in sctp_packet_transmit(), end up with 54
bytes after l2tp_xmit_skb(), and 14 bytes in ip6_finish_output2().
Those would be enough to append our 14 bytes header, but we're going to
align that to 16 bytes, and write 2 bytes out of the allocated slab in
neigh_hh_output().
KASan says:
[ 264.967848] ==================================================================
[ 264.967861] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_finish_output2+0x1aec/0x1c70
[ 264.967866] Write of size 16 at addr 000000006af1c7fe by task netperf/6201
[ 264.967870]
[ 264.967876] CPU: 0 PID: 6201 Comm: netperf Not tainted 4.20.0-rc4+ #1
[ 264.967881] Hardware name: IBM 2827 H43 400 (z/VM 6.4.0)
[ 264.967887] Call Trace:
[ 264.967896] ([<00000000001347d6>] show_stack+0x56/0xa0)
[ 264.967903] [<00000000017e379c>] dump_stack+0x23c/0x290
[ 264.967912] [<00000000007bc594>] print_address_description+0xf4/0x290
[ 264.967919] [<00000000007bc8fc>] kasan_report+0x13c/0x240
[ 264.967927] [<000000000162f5e4>] ip6_finish_output2+0x1aec/0x1c70
[ 264.967935] [<000000000163f890>] ip6_finish_output+0x430/0x7f0
[ 264.967943] [<000000000163fe44>] ip6_output+0x1f4/0x580
[ 264.967953] [<000000000163882a>] ip6_xmit+0xfea/0x1ce8
[ 264.967963] [<00000000017396e2>] inet6_csk_xmit+0x282/0x3f8
[ 264.968033] [<000003ff805fb0ba>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0xe02/0x13e0 [l2tp_core]
[ 264.968037] [<000003ff80631192>] l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0xda/0x150 [l2tp_eth]
[ 264.968041] [<0000000001220020>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x268/0x928
[ 264.968069] [<0000000001330e8e>] sch_direct_xmit+0x7ae/0x1350
[ 264.968071] [<000000000122359c>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x2b7c/0x3478
[ 264.968075] [<00000000013d2862>] ip_finish_output2+0xce2/0x11a0
[ 264.968078] [<00000000013d9b14>] ip_finish_output+0x56c/0x8c8
[ 264.968081] [<00000000013ddd1e>] ip_output+0x226/0x4c0
[ 264.968083] [<00000000013dbd6c>] __ip_queue_xmit+0x894/0x1938
[ 264.968100] [<000003ff80bc3a5c>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x29d4/0x3648 [sctp]
[ 264.968116] [<000003ff80b7bf68>] sctp_outq_flush_ctrl.constprop.5+0x8d0/0xe50 [sctp]
[ 264.968131] [<000003ff80b7c716>] sctp_outq_flush+0x22e/0x7d8 [sctp]
[ 264.968146] [<000003ff80b35c68>] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.16+0x530/0x6800 [sctp]
[ 264.968161] [<000003ff80b3410a>] sctp_do_sm+0x222/0x648 [sctp]
[ 264.968177] [<000003ff80bbddac>] sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0xbc/0xf8 [sctp]
[ 264.968192] [<000003ff80b93328>] __sctp_connect+0x830/0xc20 [sctp]
[ 264.968208] [<000003ff80bb11ce>] sctp_inet_connect+0x2e6/0x378 [sctp]
[ 264.968212] [<0000000001197942>] __sys_connect+0x21a/0x450
[ 264.968215] [<000000000119aff8>] sys_socketcall+0x3d0/0xb08
[ 264.968218] [<000000000184ea7a>] system_call+0x2a2/0x2c0
[...]
Just like ip_finish_output2() does for IPv4, check that we have enough
headroom in ip6_xmit(), and reallocate it if we don't.
This issue is older than git history.
Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 688838934c231bb08f46db687e57f6d8bf82709c ]
kmsan was able to trigger a kernel-infoleak using a gre device [1]
nlmsg_populate_fdb_fill() has a hard coded assumption
that dev->addr_len is ETH_ALEN, as normally guaranteed
for ARPHRD_ETHER devices.
A similar issue was fixed recently in commit da71577545a5
("rtnetlink: Disallow FDB configuration for non-Ethernet device")
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copyout lib/iov_iter.c:143 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x4c0/0x2700 lib/iov_iter.c:576
CPU: 0 PID: 6697 Comm: syz-executor310 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc3+ #95
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x32d/0x480 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x12c/0x290 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:683
kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x32a/0xa50 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:743
kmsan_copy_to_user+0x78/0xd0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:634
copyout lib/iov_iter.c:143 [inline]
_copy_to_iter+0x4c0/0x2700 lib/iov_iter.c:576
copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:143 [inline]
skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x4e2/0x1070 net/core/datagram.c:431
skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3316 [inline]
netlink_recvmsg+0x6f9/0x19d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1975
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:794 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x1d1/0x230 net/socket.c:801
___sys_recvmsg+0x444/0xae0 net/socket.c:2278
__sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2327 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmsg+0x2fa/0x450 net/socket.c:2334
__x64_sys_recvmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2334
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
RIP: 0033:0x441119
Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 db 0a fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fffc7f008a8 EFLAGS: 00000207 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000441119
RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00000000200005c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006cc018 R08: 0000000000000100 R09: 0000000000000100
R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000207 R12: 0000000000402080
R13: 0000000000402110 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Uninit was stored to memory at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:246 [inline]
kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:261 [inline]
kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x13d/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:469
kmsan_memcpy_memmove_metadata+0x1a9/0xf70 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:344
kmsan_memcpy_metadata+0xb/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:362
__msan_memcpy+0x61/0x70 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:162
__nla_put lib/nlattr.c:744 [inline]
nla_put+0x20a/0x2d0 lib/nlattr.c:802
nlmsg_populate_fdb_fill+0x444/0x810 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3466
nlmsg_populate_fdb net/core/rtnetlink.c:3775 [inline]
ndo_dflt_fdb_dump+0x73a/0x960 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3807
rtnl_fdb_dump+0x1318/0x1cb0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3979
netlink_dump+0xc79/0x1c90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2244
__netlink_dump_start+0x10c4/0x11d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2352
netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:216 [inline]
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x141b/0x1540 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4910
netlink_rcv_skb+0x394/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4965
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x1699/0x1740 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
netlink_sendmsg+0x13c7/0x1440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xe3b/0x1240 net/socket.c:2116
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:246 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x6d/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:170
kmsan_kmalloc+0xa1/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:186
__kmalloc+0x14c/0x4d0 mm/slub.c:3825
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:551 [inline]
__hw_addr_create_ex net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:34 [inline]
__hw_addr_add_ex net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:80 [inline]
__dev_mc_add+0x357/0x8a0 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:670
dev_mc_add+0x6d/0x80 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:687
ip_mc_filter_add net/ipv4/igmp.c:1128 [inline]
igmp_group_added+0x4d4/0xb80 net/ipv4/igmp.c:1311
__ip_mc_inc_group+0xea9/0xf70 net/ipv4/igmp.c:1444
ip_mc_inc_group net/ipv4/igmp.c:1453 [inline]
ip_mc_up+0x1c3/0x400 net/ipv4/igmp.c:1775
inetdev_event+0x1d03/0x1d80 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1522
notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:93 [inline]
__raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline]
raw_notifier_call_chain+0x13d/0x240 kernel/notifier.c:401
__dev_notify_flags+0x3da/0x860 net/core/dev.c:1733
dev_change_flags+0x1ac/0x230 net/core/dev.c:7569
do_setlink+0x165f/0x5ea0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2492
rtnl_newlink+0x2ad7/0x35a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3111
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1148/0x1540 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4947
netlink_rcv_skb+0x394/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4965
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x1699/0x1740 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
netlink_sendmsg+0x13c7/0x1440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xe3b/0x1240 net/socket.c:2116
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
Bytes 36-37 of 105 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 105 starts at ffff88819686c000
Data copied to user address 0000000020000380
Fixes: d83b06036048 ("net: add fdb generic dump routine")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9410d386d0a829ace9558336263086c2fbbe8aed ]
__qdisc_drop_all() accesses skb->prev to get to the tail of the
segment-list.
With commit 68d2f84a1368 ("net: gro: properly remove skb from list")
the skb-list handling has been changed to set skb->next to NULL and set
the list-poison on skb->prev.
With that change, __qdisc_drop_all() will panic when it tries to
dereference skb->prev.
Since commit 992cba7e276d ("net: Add and use skb_list_del_init().")
__list_del_entry is used, leaving skb->prev unchanged (thus,
pointing to the list-head if it's the first skb of the list).
This will make __qdisc_drop_all modify the next-pointer of the list-head
and result in a panic later on:
[ 34.501053] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 34.501968] CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc2.mptcp #108
[ 34.502887] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
[ 34.504074] RIP: 0010:dev_gro_receive+0x343/0x1f90
[ 34.504751] Code: e0 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 30 00 0f 85 4a 1c 00 00 4d 8b 24 24 4c 39 65 d0 0f 84 0a 04 00 00 49 8d 7c 24 38 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 30 84 c0 74 08 3c 04
[ 34.507060] RSP: 0018:ffff8883af507930 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 34.507761] RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: ffff8883970b2c80 RCX: 1ffff11072e165a6
[ 34.508640] RDX: 1ffff11075867008 RSI: ffff8883ac338040 RDI: 0000000000000038
[ 34.509493] RBP: ffff8883af5079d0 R08: ffff8883970b2d40 R09: 0000000000000062
[ 34.510346] R10: 0000000000000034 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 34.511215] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8883ac338008
[ 34.512082] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8883af500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 34.513036] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 34.513741] CR2: 000055ccc3e9d020 CR3: 00000003abf32000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 34.514593] Call Trace:
[ 34.514893] <IRQ>
[ 34.515157] napi_gro_receive+0x93/0x150
[ 34.515632] receive_buf+0x893/0x3700
[ 34.516094] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1a0
[ 34.516629] ? virtnet_probe+0x1b40/0x1b40
[ 34.517153] ? __stable_node_chain+0x4d0/0x850
[ 34.517684] ? kfree+0x9a/0x180
[ 34.518067] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x171/0x190
[ 34.518582] ? detach_buf+0x1df/0x650
[ 34.519061] ? lapic_next_event+0x5a/0x90
[ 34.519539] ? virtqueue_get_buf_ctx+0x280/0x7f0
[ 34.520093] virtnet_poll+0x2df/0xd60
[ 34.520533] ? receive_buf+0x3700/0x3700
[ 34.521027] ? qdisc_watchdog_schedule_ns+0xd5/0x140
[ 34.521631] ? htb_dequeue+0x1817/0x25f0
[ 34.522107] ? sch_direct_xmit+0x142/0xf30
[ 34.522595] ? virtqueue_napi_schedule+0x26/0x30
[ 34.523155] net_rx_action+0x2f6/0xc50
[ 34.523601] ? napi_complete_done+0x2f0/0x2f0
[ 34.524126] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 34.524608] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x7d/0xd0
[ 34.525070] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0xd0/0xd0
[ 34.525563] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x6b/0x80
[ 34.526130] ? apic_ack_irq+0x9e/0xe0
[ 34.526567] __do_softirq+0x188/0x4b5
[ 34.527015] irq_exit+0x151/0x180
[ 34.527417] do_IRQ+0xdb/0x150
[ 34.527783] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf
[ 34.528223] </IRQ>
This patch makes sure that skb->prev is set to NULL when entering
netem_enqueue.
Cc: Prashant Bhole <bhole_prashant_q7@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Fixes: 68d2f84a1368 ("net: gro: properly remove skb from list")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9ec1190d065998650fd9260dea8cf3e1f56c0e8c upstream.
If the buffered broadcast queue contains packets, letting new packets bypass
that queue can lead to heavy reordering, since the driver is probably throttling
transmission of buffered multicast packets after beacons.
Keep buffering packets until the buffer has been cleared (and no client
is in powersave mode).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5c21e8100dfd57c806e833ae905e26efbb87840f upstream.
This fixes stale beacon-int values that would keep a netdev
from going up.
To reproduce:
Create two VAP on one radio.
vap1 has beacon-int 100, start it.
vap2 has beacon-int 240, start it (and it will fail
because beacon-int mismatch).
reconfigure vap2 to have beacon-int 100 and start it.
It will fail because the stale beacon-int 240 will be used
in the ifup path and hostapd never gets a chance to set the
new beacon interval.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8dae5398ab1ac107b1517e8195ed043d5f422bd0 upstream.
call_encode can be invoked more than once per RPC call. Ensure that
each call to gss_wrap_req_priv does not overwrite pointers to
previously allocated memory.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 000ade8016400d93b4d7c89970d96b8c14773d45 upstream.
By passing a limit of 2 bytes to strncat, strncat is limited to writing
fewer bytes than what it's supposed to append to the name here.
Since the bounds are checked on the line above this, just remove the string
bounds checks entirely since they're unneeded.
Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultanxda@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0fb44559ffd67de8517098b81f675fa0210f13f0 upstream.
Dmitry reported a deadlock scenario:
unix_bind() path:
u->bindlock ==> sb_writer
do_splice() path:
sb_writer ==> pipe->mutex ==> u->bindlock
In the unix_bind() code path, unix_mknod() does not have to
be done with u->bindlock held, since it is a pure fs operation,
so we can just move unix_mknod() out.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e3d5e573a54dabdc0f9f3cb039d799323372b251 ]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 604d415e2bd642b7e02c80e719e0396b9d4a77a6 upstream.
syzkaller triggered a use-after-free [1], caused by a combination of
skb_get() in llc_conn_state_process() and usage of sk_eat_skb()
sk_eat_skb() is assuming the skb about to be freed is only used by
the current thread. TCP/DCCP stacks enforce this because current
thread holds the socket lock.
llc_conn_state_process() wants to make sure skb does not disappear,
and holds a reference on the skb it manipulates. But as soon as this
skb is added to socket receive queue, another thread can consume it.
This means that llc must use regular skb_unlink() and kfree_skb()
so that both producer and consumer can safely work on the same skb.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:21 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in refcount_read include/linux/refcount.h:43 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_unref include/linux/skbuff.h:967 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kfree_skb+0xb7/0x580 net/core/skbuff.c:655
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8801d1f6fba4 by task ksoftirqd/1/18
CPU: 1 PID: 18 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #295
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b6 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1b0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:272
atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:21 [inline]
refcount_read include/linux/refcount.h:43 [inline]
skb_unref include/linux/skbuff.h:967 [inline]
kfree_skb+0xb7/0x580 net/core/skbuff.c:655
llc_sap_state_process+0x9b/0x550 net/llc/llc_sap.c:224
llc_sap_rcv+0x156/0x1f0 net/llc/llc_sap.c:297
llc_sap_handler+0x65e/0xf80 net/llc/llc_sap.c:438
llc_rcv+0x79e/0xe20 net/llc/llc_input.c:208
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x14d/0x200 net/core/dev.c:4913
__netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5023
process_backlog+0x218/0x6f0 net/core/dev.c:5829
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6249 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x7c5/0x1950 net/core/dev.c:6315
__do_softirq+0x30c/0xb03 kernel/softirq.c:292
run_ksoftirqd+0x94/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:653
smpboot_thread_fn+0x68b/0xa00 kernel/smpboot.c:164
kthread+0x35a/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:246
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:413
Allocated by task 18:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xc7/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x144/0x730 mm/slab.c:3644
__alloc_skb+0x119/0x770 net/core/skbuff.c:193
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:995 [inline]
llc_alloc_frame+0xbc/0x370 net/llc/llc_sap.c:54
llc_station_ac_send_xid_r net/llc/llc_station.c:52 [inline]
llc_station_rcv+0x1dc/0x1420 net/llc/llc_station.c:111
llc_rcv+0xc32/0xe20 net/llc/llc_input.c:220
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x14d/0x200 net/core/dev.c:4913
__netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5023
process_backlog+0x218/0x6f0 net/core/dev.c:5829
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6249 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x7c5/0x1950 net/core/dev.c:6315
__do_softirq+0x30c/0xb03 kernel/softirq.c:292
Freed by task 16383:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x83/0x290 mm/slab.c:3756
kfree_skbmem+0x154/0x230 net/core/skbuff.c:582
__kfree_skb+0x1d/0x20 net/core/skbuff.c:642
sk_eat_skb include/net/sock.h:2366 [inline]
llc_ui_recvmsg+0xec2/0x1610 net/llc/af_llc.c:882
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:794 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0xd0/0x110 net/socket.c:801
___sys_recvmsg+0x2b6/0x680 net/socket.c:2278
__sys_recvmmsg+0x303/0xb90 net/socket.c:2390
do_sys_recvmmsg+0x181/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2466
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2484 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2480 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:2480
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801d1f6fac0
which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232
The buggy address is located 228 bytes inside of
232-byte region [ffff8801d1f6fac0, ffff8801d1f6fba8)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea000747dbc0 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801d9be7680 index:0xffff8801d1f6fe80
flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffffea0007346e88 ffffea000705b108 ffff8801d9be7680
raw: ffff8801d1f6fe80 ffff8801d1f6f0c0 000000010000000b 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8801d1f6fa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8801d1f6fb00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8801d1f6fb80: fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff8801d1f6fc00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8801d1f6fc80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit df132eff463873e14e019a07f387b4d577d6d1f9 upstream.
If a transport is removed by asconf but there still are some chunks with
this transport queuing on out_chunk_list, later an use-after-free issue
will be caused when accessing this transport from these chunks in
sctp_outq_flush().
This is an old bug, we fix it by clearing the transport of these chunks
in out_chunk_list when removing a transport in sctp_assoc_rm_peer().
Reported-by: syzbot+56a40ceee5fb35932f4d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 025911a5f4e36955498ed50806ad1b02f0f76288 ]
There is no need to have the '__be32 *p' variable static since new value
always be assigned before use it.
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 33d9a2c72f086cbf1087b2fd2d1a15aa9df14a7f ]
eth_type_trans() assumes initial value for skb->pkt_type
is PACKET_HOST.
This is indeed the value right after a fresh skb allocation.
However, it is possible that GRO merged a packet with a different
value (like PACKET_OTHERHOST in case macvlan is used), so
we need to make sure napi->skb will have pkt_type set back to
PACKET_HOST.
Otherwise, valid packets might be dropped by the stack because
their pkt_type is not PACKET_HOST.
napi_reuse_skb() was added in commit 96e93eab2033 ("gro: Add
internal interfaces for VLAN"), but this bug always has
been there.
Fixes: 96e93eab2033 ("gro: Add internal interfaces for VLAN")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5d7a5bcb67c70cbc904057ef52d3fcfeb24420bb upstream.
When truncating the encode buffer, the page_ptr is getting
advanced, causing the next page to be skipped while encoding.
The page is still included in the response, so the response
contains a page of bogus data.
We need to adjust the page_ptr backwards to ensure we encode
the next page into the correct place.
We saw this triggered when concurrent directory modifications caused
nfsd4_encode_direct_fattr() to return nfserr_noent, and the resulting
call to xdr_truncate_encode() corrupted the READDIR reply.
Signed-off-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 62e3941776fea8678bb8120607039410b1b61a65 ]
p9stat_free is more of a cleanup function than a 'free' function as it
only frees the content of the struct; there are chances of use-after-free
if it is improperly used (e.g. p9stat_free called twice as it used to be
possible to)
Clearing dangling pointers makes the function idempotent and safer to use.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1535410108-20650-2-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.org
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Reported-by: syzbot+d4252148d198410b864f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bb6ad5572c0022e17e846b382d7413cdcf8055be upstream.
In call_xpt_users(), we delete the entry from the list, but we
do not reinitialise it. This triggers the list poisoning when
we later call unregister_xpt_user() in nfsd4_del_conns().
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 076ed3da0c9b2f88d9157dbe7044a45641ae369e upstream.
commit 40413955ee26 ("Cipso: cipso_v4_optptr enter infinite loop") fixed
a possible infinite loop in the IP option parsing of CIPSO. The fix
assumes that ip_options_compile filtered out all zero length options and
that no other one-byte options beside IPOPT_END and IPOPT_NOOP exist.
While this assumption currently holds true, add explicit checks for zero
length and invalid length options to be safe for the future. Even though
ip_options_compile should have validated the options, the introduction of
new one-byte options can still confuse this code without the additional
checks.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Nuernberger <snu@amazon.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Simon Veith <sveith@amazon.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 38b4f18d56372e1e21771ab7b0357b853330186c ]
gred_change_table_def() takes a pointer to TCA_GRED_DPS attribute,
and expects it will be able to interpret its contents as
struct tc_gred_sopt. Pass the correct gred attribute, instead of
TCA_OPTIONS.
This bug meant the table definition could never be changed after
Qdisc was initialized (unless whatever TCA_OPTIONS contained both
passed netlink validation and was a valid struct tc_gred_sopt...).
Old behaviour:
$ ip link add type dummy
$ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \
gred setup vqs 4 default 0
$ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \
gred setup vqs 4 default 0
RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
Now:
$ ip link add type dummy
$ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \
gred setup vqs 4 default 0
$ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \
gred setup vqs 4 default 0
$ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \
gred setup vqs 4 default 0
Fixes: f62d6b936df5 ("[PKT_SCHED]: GRED: Use central VQ change procedure")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit da71577545a52be3e0e9225a946e5fd79cfab015 ]
When an FDB entry is configured, the address is validated to have the
length of an Ethernet address, but the device for which the address is
configured can be of any type.
The above can result in the use of uninitialized memory when the address
is later compared against existing addresses since 'dev->addr_len' is
used and it may be greater than ETH_ALEN, as with ip6tnl devices.
Fix this by making sure that FDB entries are only configured for
Ethernet devices.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in memcmp+0x11d/0x180 lib/string.c:863
CPU: 1 PID: 4318 Comm: syz-executor998 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc3+ #49
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x14b/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x183/0x2b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:956
__msan_warning+0x70/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:645
memcmp+0x11d/0x180 lib/string.c:863
dev_uc_add_excl+0x165/0x7b0 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:464
ndo_dflt_fdb_add net/core/rtnetlink.c:3463 [inline]
rtnl_fdb_add+0x1081/0x1270 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3558
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xa0b/0x1530 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4715
netlink_rcv_skb+0x36e/0x5f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454
rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4733
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x1638/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x1205/0x1290 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xe70/0x1290 net/socket.c:2114
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2152 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2161 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2159
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2159
do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
RIP: 0033:0x440ee9
Code: e8 cc ab 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7
48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff
ff 0f 83 bb 0a fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fff6a93b518 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000440ee9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 00000000004002c8 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 000000000000b4b0
R13: 0000000000401ec0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:256 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:181
kmsan_kmalloc+0x98/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:91
kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:100
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2718 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x9e7/0x1160 mm/slub.c:4351
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x2f5/0x9e0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline]
netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline]
netlink_sendmsg+0xb49/0x1290 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xe70/0x1290 net/socket.c:2114
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2152 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2161 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2159
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2159
do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
v2:
* Make error message more specific (David)
Fixes: 090096bf3db1 ("net: generic fdb support for drivers without ndo_fdb_<op>")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+3a288d5f5530b901310e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+d53ab4e92a1db04110ff@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 7de414a9dd91426318df7b63da024b2b07e53df5 ]
Most callers of pskb_trim_rcsum() simply drop the skb when
it fails, however, ip_check_defrag() still continues to pass
the skb up to stack. This is suspicious.
In ip_check_defrag(), after we learn the skb is an IP fragment,
passing the skb to callers makes no sense, because callers expect
fragments are defrag'ed on success. So, dropping the skb when we
can't defrag it is reasonable.
Note, prior to commit 88078d98d1bb, this is not a big problem as
checksum will be fixed up anyway. After it, the checksum is not
correct on failure.
Found this during code review.
Fixes: 88078d98d1bb ("net: pskb_trim_rcsum() and CHECKSUM_COMPLETE are friends")
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit b336decab22158937975293aea79396525f92bb3 ]
syzbot reported an use-after-free involving sctp_id2asoc. Dmitry Vyukov
helped to root cause it and it is because of reading the asoc after it
was freed:
CPU 1 CPU 2
(working on socket 1) (working on socket 2)
sctp_association_destroy
sctp_id2asoc
spin lock
grab the asoc from idr
spin unlock
spin lock
remove asoc from idr
spin unlock
free(asoc)
if asoc->base.sk != sk ... [*]
This can only be hit if trying to fetch asocs from different sockets. As
we have a single IDR for all asocs, in all SCTP sockets, their id is
unique on the system. An application can try to send stuff on an id
that matches on another socket, and the if in [*] will protect from such
usage. But it didn't consider that as that asoc may belong to another
socket, it may be freed in parallel (read: under another socket lock).
We fix it by moving the checks in [*] into the protected region. This
fixes it because the asoc cannot be freed while the lock is held.
Reported-by: syzbot+c7dd55d7aec49d48e49a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b6168562c8ce2bd5a30e213021650422e08764dc ]
In ethtool_ioctl(), the ioctl command 'ethcmd' is checked through a switch
statement to see whether it is necessary to pre-process the ethtool
structure, because, as mentioned in the comment, the structure
ethtool_rxnfc is defined with padding. If yes, a user-space buffer 'rxnfc'
is allocated through compat_alloc_user_space(). One thing to note here is
that, if 'ethcmd' is ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL, the size of the buffer 'rxnfc' is
partially determined by 'rule_cnt', which is actually acquired from the
user-space buffer 'compat_rxnfc', i.e., 'compat_rxnfc->rule_cnt', through
get_user(). After 'rxnfc' is allocated, the data in the original user-space
buffer 'compat_rxnfc' is then copied to 'rxnfc' through copy_in_user(),
including the 'rule_cnt' field. However, after this copy, no check is
re-enforced on 'rxnfc->rule_cnt'. So it is possible that a malicious user
race to change the value in the 'compat_rxnfc->rule_cnt' between these two
copies. Through this way, the attacker can bypass the previous check on
'rule_cnt' and inject malicious data. This can cause undefined behavior of
the kernel and introduce potential security risk.
This patch avoids the above issue via copying the value acquired by
get_user() to 'rxnfc->rule_cn', if 'ethcmd' is ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL.
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4ba4c566ba8448a05e6257e0b98a21f1a0d55315 ]
The loop wants to skip previously dumped addresses, so loops until
current index >= saved index. If the message fills it wants to save
the index for the next address to dump - ie., the one that did not
fit in the current message.
Currently, it is incrementing the index counter before comparing to the
saved index, and then the saved index is off by 1 - it assumes the
current address is going to fit in the message.
Change the index handling to increment only after a succesful dump.
Fixes: 502a2ffd7376a ("ipv6: convert idev_list to list macros")
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ee1abcf689353f36d9322231b4320926096bdee0 ]
Commit a61bbcf28a8c ("[NET]: Store skb->timestamp as offset to a base
timestamp") introduces a neighbour control buffer and zeroes it out in
ndisc_rcv(), as ndisc_recv_ns() uses it.
Commit f2776ff04722 ("[IPV6]: Fix address/interface handling in UDP and
DCCP, according to the scoping architecture.") introduces the usage of the
IPv6 control buffer in protocol error handlers (e.g. inet6_iif() in
present-day __udp6_lib_err()).
Now, with commit b94f1c0904da ("ipv6: Use icmpv6_notify() to propagate
redirect, instead of rt6_redirect()."), we call protocol error handlers
from ndisc_redirect_rcv(), after the control buffer is already stolen and
some parts are already zeroed out. This implies that inet6_iif() on this
path will always return zero.
This gives unexpected results on UDP socket lookup in __udp6_lib_err(), as
we might actually need to match sockets for a given interface.
Instead of always claiming the control buffer in ndisc_rcv(), do that only
when needed.
Fixes: b94f1c0904da ("ipv6: Use icmpv6_notify() to propagate redirect, instead of rt6_redirect().")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit dc012f3628eaecfb5ba68404a5c30ef501daf63d ]
syzbot found a use-after-free in inet6_mc_check [1]
The problem here is that inet6_mc_check() uses rcu
and read_lock(&iml->sflock)
So the fact that ip6_mc_leave_src() is called under RTNL
and the socket lock does not help us, we need to acquire
iml->sflock in write mode.
In the future, we should convert all this stuff to RCU.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ipv6_addr_equal include/net/ipv6.h:521 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in inet6_mc_check+0xae7/0xb40 net/ipv6/mcast.c:649
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801ce7f2510 by task syz-executor0/22432
CPU: 1 PID: 22432 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc7+ #280
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433
ipv6_addr_equal include/net/ipv6.h:521 [inline]
inet6_mc_check+0xae7/0xb40 net/ipv6/mcast.c:649
__raw_v6_lookup+0x320/0x3f0 net/ipv6/raw.c:98
ipv6_raw_deliver net/ipv6/raw.c:183 [inline]
raw6_local_deliver+0x3d3/0xcb0 net/ipv6/raw.c:240
ip6_input_finish+0x467/0x1aa0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:345
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline]
ip6_input+0xe9/0x600 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:426
ip6_mc_input+0x48a/0xd20 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:503
dst_input include/net/dst.h:450 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x17a/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:76
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0x120/0x640 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:271
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x14d/0x200 net/core/dev.c:4913
__netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5023
netif_receive_skb_internal+0x12c/0x620 net/core/dev.c:5126
napi_frags_finish net/core/dev.c:5664 [inline]
napi_gro_frags+0x75a/0xc90 net/core/dev.c:5737
tun_get_user+0x3189/0x4250 drivers/net/tun.c:1923
tun_chr_write_iter+0xb9/0x154 drivers/net/tun.c:1968
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1808 [inline]
do_iter_readv_writev+0x8b0/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:680
do_iter_write+0x185/0x5f0 fs/read_write.c:959
vfs_writev+0x1f1/0x360 fs/read_write.c:1004
do_writev+0x11a/0x310 fs/read_write.c:1039
__do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1112 [inline]
__se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1109 [inline]
__x64_sys_writev+0x75/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1109
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457421
Code: 75 14 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 34 b5 fb ff c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 1a 2d 00 00 48 89 04 24 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 8b 3c 24 48 89 c2 e8 63 2d 00 00 48 89 d0 48 83 c4 08 48 3d 01
RSP: 002b:00007f2d30ecaba0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000003e RCX: 0000000000457421
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007f2d30ecabf0 RDI: 00000000000000f0
RBP: 0000000020000500 R08: 00000000000000f0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f2d30ecb6d4
R13: 00000000004c4890 R14: 00000000004d7b90 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Allocated by task 22437:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xc7/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
__do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3718 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x14e/0x760 mm/slab.c:3727
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:518 [inline]
sock_kmalloc+0x15a/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:1983
ip6_mc_source+0x14dd/0x1960 net/ipv6/mcast.c:427
do_ipv6_setsockopt.isra.9+0x3afb/0x45d0 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:743
ipv6_setsockopt+0xbd/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:933
rawv6_setsockopt+0x59/0x140 net/ipv6/raw.c:1069
sock_common_setsockopt+0x9a/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:3038
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ba/0x3c0 net/socket.c:1902
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1913 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1910 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:1910
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 22430:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
kfree+0xcf/0x230 mm/slab.c:3813
__sock_kfree_s net/core/sock.c:2004 [inline]
sock_kfree_s+0x29/0x60 net/core/sock.c:2010
ip6_mc_leave_src+0x11a/0x1d0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2448
__ipv6_sock_mc_close+0x20b/0x4e0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:310
ipv6_sock_mc_close+0x158/0x1d0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:328
inet6_release+0x40/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:452
__sock_release+0xd7/0x250 net/socket.c:579
sock_close+0x19/0x20 net/socket.c:1141
__fput+0x385/0xa30 fs/file_table.c:278
____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:309
task_work_run+0x1e8/0x2a0 kernel/task_work.c:113
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:193 [inline]
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x318/0x380 arch/x86/entry/common.c:166
prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:197 [inline]
syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:268 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x6be/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:293
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801ce7f2500
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
The buggy address is located 16 bytes inside of
192-byte region [ffff8801ce7f2500, ffff8801ce7f25c0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea000739fc80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801da800040 index:0x0
flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffffea0006f6e548 ffffea000737b948 ffff8801da800040
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff8801ce7f2000 0000000100000010 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8801ce7f2400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8801ce7f2480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8801ce7f2500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8801ce7f2580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8801ce7f2600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6 ]
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7a84bd46647ff181eb2659fdc99590e6f16e501d ]
Commit ed5a377d87dc ("sctp: translate host order to network order when
setting a hmacid") corrected the hmacid byte-order when setting a hmacid.
but the same issue also exists on getting a hmacid.
We fix it by changing hmacids to host order when users get them with
getsockopt.
Fixes: Commit ed5a377d87dc ("sctp: translate host order to network order when setting a hmacid")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 025331df34f6722f86b467cb13a69326444ab1bc ]
When allocating rtnl dump messages, struct ifla_port_vsi is never dumped,
so we can save header plus payload in rtnl_port_size(). Infact, attribute
IFLA_PORT_VSI_TYPE and struct ifla_port_vsi are not used anywhere in
the kernel. We only need to keep the nla policy should applications in
user space be filling this out. Same NLA_BINARY issue exists as was fixed
in 364d5716a7ad ("rtnetlink: ifla_vf_policy: fix misuses of NLA_BINARY")
and others, but then again IFLA_PORT_VSI_TYPE is not used anywhere, so
just add a comment that it's unused.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 32bf94fb5c2ec4ec842152d0e5937cd4bb6738fa ]
XFRM mode parameters passed as part of the user templates
in the IP_XFRM_POLICY are never properly validated. Passing
values other than valid XFRM modes can cause stack-out-of-bounds
reads to occur later in the XFRM processing:
[ 140.535608] ================================================================
[ 140.543058] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in xfrm_state_find+0x17e4/0x1cc4
[ 140.550306] Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0238a7a58 by task repro/5148
[ 140.557369]
[ 140.558927] Call trace:
[ 140.558936] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x388
[ 140.558940] show_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 140.558946] __dump_stack+0x24/0x2c
[ 140.558949] dump_stack+0x8c/0xd0
[ 140.558956] print_address_description+0x74/0x234
[ 140.558960] kasan_report+0x240/0x264
[ 140.558963] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x2c/0x38
[ 140.558967] xfrm_state_find+0x17e4/0x1cc4
[ 140.558971] xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x40c/0x1fb8
[ 140.558975] xfrm_lookup+0x238/0x1444
[ 140.558977] xfrm_lookup_route+0x48/0x11c
[ 140.558984] ip_route_output_flow+0x88/0xc4
[ 140.558991] raw_sendmsg+0xa74/0x266c
[ 140.558996] inet_sendmsg+0x258/0x3b0
[ 140.559002] sock_sendmsg+0xbc/0xec
[ 140.559005] SyS_sendto+0x3a8/0x5a8
[ 140.559008] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
[ 140.559009]
[ 140.592245] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 140.597981] page_owner info is not active (free page?)
[ 140.603267]
[ 140.653503] ================================================================
Signed-off-by: Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 24f33e64fcd0d50a4b1a8e5b41bd0257aa66b0e8 ]
Core regulatory hints didn't set wiphy_idx to WIPHY_IDX_INVALID. Since
the regulatory request is zeroed, wiphy_idx was always implicitly set to
0. This resulted in updating only phy #0.
Fix that.
Fixes: 806a9e39670b ("cfg80211: make regulatory_request use wiphy_idx instead of wiphy")
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
[add fixes tag]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 215ab0f021c9fea3c18b75e7d522400ee6a49990 ]
After commit d6990976af7c5d8f55903bfb4289b6fb030bf754 ("vti6: fix PMTU caching
and reporting on xmit"), some too big skbs might be potentially passed down to
__xfrm6_output, causing it to fail to transmit but not free the skb, causing a
leak of skb, and consequentially a leak of dst references.
After running pmtu.sh, that shows as failure to unregister devices in a namespace:
[ 311.397671] unregister_netdevice: waiting for veth_b to become free. Usage count = 1
The fix is to call kfree_skb in case of transmit failures.
Fixes: dd767856a36e ("xfrm6: Don't call icmpv6_send on local error")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 07bf7908950a8b14e81aa1807e3c667eab39287a ]
We don't validate the address prefix lengths in the xfrm
selector we got from userspace. This can lead to undefined
behaviour in the address matching functions if the prefix
is too big for the given address family. Fix this by checking
the prefixes and refuse SA/policy insertation when a prefix
is invalid.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Air Icy <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 76c0ddd8c3a683f6e2c6e60e11dc1a1558caf4bc ]
the ip6 tunnel xmit ndo assumes that the processed skb always
contains an ip[v6] header, but syzbot has found a way to send
frames that fall short of this assumption, leading to the following splat:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ip6ip6_tnl_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1307
[inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ip6_tnl_start_xmit+0x7d2/0x1ef0
net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1390
CPU: 0 PID: 4504 Comm: syz-executor558 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #87
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
__msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:683
ip6ip6_tnl_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1307 [inline]
ip6_tnl_start_xmit+0x7d2/0x1ef0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1390
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4066 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4075 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3026 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5f1/0xc70 net/core/dev.c:3042
__dev_queue_xmit+0x27ee/0x3520 net/core/dev.c:3557
dev_queue_xmit+0x4b/0x60 net/core/dev.c:3590
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2944 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x7c70/0x8a30 net/packet/af_packet.c:2969
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2046
__sys_sendmmsg+0x42d/0x800 net/socket.c:2136
SYSC_sendmmsg+0xc4/0x110 net/socket.c:2167
SyS_sendmmsg+0x63/0x90 net/socket.c:2162
do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
RIP: 0033:0x441819
RSP: 002b:00007ffe58ee8268 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000441819
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006cd018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000402510
R13: 00000000004025a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:188
kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:314
kmsan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:321
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:445 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2737 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xaed/0x11c0 mm/slub.c:4369
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x2cf/0x9f0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:984 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0x1d4/0xb20 net/core/skbuff.c:5234
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xb56/0x1190 net/core/sock.c:2085
packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2803 [inline]
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2894 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x6454/0x8a30 net/packet/af_packet.c:2969
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2046
__sys_sendmmsg+0x42d/0x800 net/socket.c:2136
SYSC_sendmmsg+0xc4/0x110 net/socket.c:2167
SyS_sendmmsg+0x63/0x90 net/socket.c:2162
do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
This change addresses the issue adding the needed check before
accessing the inner header.
The ipv4 side of the issue is apparently there since the ipv4 over ipv6
initial support, and the ipv6 side predates git history.
Fixes: c4d3efafcc93 ("[IPV6] IP6TUNNEL: Add support to IPv4 over IPv6 tunnel.")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+3fde91d4d394747d6db4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0e1d6eca5113858ed2caea61a5adc03c595f6096 ]
We have an impressive number of syzkaller bugs that are linked
to the fact that syzbot was able to create a networking device
with millions of TX (or RX) queues.
Let's limit the number of RX/TX queues to 4096, this really should
cover all known cases.
A separate patch will add various cond_resched() in the loops
handling sysfs entries at device creation and dismantle.
Tested:
lpaa6:~# ip link add gre-4097 numtxqueues 4097 numrxqueues 4097 type ip6gretap
RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
lpaa6:~# time ip link add gre-4096 numtxqueues 4096 numrxqueues 4096 type ip6gretap
real 0m0.180s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.107s
Fixes: 76ff5cc91935 ("rtnl: allow to specify number of rx and tx queues on device creation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f88b4c01b97e09535505cf3c327fdbce55c27f00 ]
netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get() assumes that if it finds the
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR attribute, it must also have the
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK attribute as well. However, this is
not necessarily the case as the current checks in
netlbl_unlabel_staticadd() and friends are not sufficent to
enforce this.
If passed a netlink message with NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR, and NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK attributes,
these functions will all call netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get() which
will then attempt dereference NULL when fetching the non-existent
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK attribute:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0
Process unlab (pid: 31762, stack limit = 0xffffff80502d8000)
Call trace:
netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get+0x44/0xd8
netlbl_unlabel_staticremovedef+0x98/0xe0
genl_rcv_msg+0x354/0x388
netlink_rcv_skb+0xac/0x118
genl_rcv+0x34/0x48
netlink_unicast+0x158/0x1f0
netlink_sendmsg+0x32c/0x338
sock_sendmsg+0x44/0x60
___sys_sendmsg+0x1d0/0x2a8
__sys_sendmsg+0x64/0xb4
SyS_sendmsg+0x34/0x4c
el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
Code: 51001149 7100113f 540000a0 f9401508 (79400108)
---[ end trace f6438a488e737143 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Signed-off-by: Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 86f9bd1ff61c413a2a251fa736463295e4e24733 ]
The backend handling for /proc/net/if_inet6 in addrconf.c doesn't properly
handle starting/stopping the iteration. The problem is that at some point
during the iteration, an overflow is detected and the process is
subsequently stopped. The item being shown via seq_printf() when the
overflow occurs is not actually shown, though. When start() is
subsequently called to resume iterating, it returns the next item, and
thus the item that was being processed when the overflow occurred never
gets printed.
Alter the meaning of the private data member "offset". Currently, when it
is not 0 (which only happens at the very beginning), "offset" represents
the next hlist item to be printed. After this change, "offset" always
represents the current item.
This is also consistent with the private data member "bucket", which
represents the current bucket, and also the use of "pos" as defined in
seq_file.txt:
The pos passed to start() will always be either zero, or the most
recent pos used in the previous session.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Barnhill <0xeffeff@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ccfec9e5cb2d48df5a955b7bf47f7782157d3bc2]
Cong noted that we need the same checks introduced by commit 76c0ddd8c3a6
("ip6_tunnel: be careful when accessing the inner header")
even for ipv4 tunnels.
Fixes: c54419321455 ("GRE: Refactor GRE tunneling code.")
Suggested-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c953d63548207a085abcb12a15fefc8a11ffdf0a upstream.
The info->target comes from userspace and it would be used directly.
So we need to add the sanity check to make sure it is a valid standard
target, although the ebtables tool has already checked it. Kernel needs
to validate anything coming from userspace.
If the target is set as an evil value, it would break the ebtables
and cause a panic. Because the non-standard target is treated as one
offset.
Now add one helper function ebt_invalid_target, and we would replace
the macro INVALID_TARGET later.
Signed-off-by: Gao Feng <gfree.wind@vip.163.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Loic <hackurx@opensec.fr>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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