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commit 308453aa9156a3b8ee382c0949befb507a32b0c1 upstream.
The MAC address of the physical interface is only copied to the VLAN
when it is first created, resulting in an inconsistency after MAC
address changes of only newly created VLANs having an up-to-date MAC.
The VLANs should continue inheriting the MAC address of the physical
interface until the VLAN MAC address is explicitly set to any value.
This allows IPv6 EUI64 addresses for the VLAN to reflect any changes
to the MAC of the physical interface and thus for DAD to behave as
expected.
Signed-off-by: Mike Manning <mmanning@brocade.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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__ip6_append_data and ip6_finish_output
[ Upstream commit e4c5e13aa45c23692e4acf56f0b3533f328199b2 ]
There is an inconsistent conditional judgement between __ip6_append_data
and ip6_finish_output functions, the variable length in __ip6_append_data
just include the length of application's payload and udp6 header, don't
include the length of ipv6 header, but in ip6_finish_output use
(skb->len > ip6_skb_dst_mtu(skb)) as judgement, and skb->len include the
length of ipv6 header.
That causes some particular application's udp6 payloads whose length are
between (MTU - IPv6 Header) and MTU were fragmented by ip6_fragment even
though the rst->dev support UFO feature.
Add the length of ipv6 header to length in __ip6_append_data to keep
consistent conditional judgement as ip6_finish_output for ip6 fragment.
Signed-off-by: Zheng Li <james.z.li@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6e7bc478c9a006c701c14476ec9d389a484b4864 upstream.
My recent change missed fact that UFO would perform a complete
UDP checksum before segmenting in frags.
In this case skb->ip_summed is set to CHECKSUM_NONE.
We need to add this valid case to skb_needs_check()
Fixes: b2504a5dbef3 ("net: reduce skb_warn_bad_offload() noise")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 628185cfddf1dfb701c4efe2cfd72cf5b09f5702 upstream.
Shahar reported a soft lockup in tc_classify(), where we run into an
endless loop when walking the classifier chain due to tp->next == tp
which is a state we should never run into. The issue only seems to
trigger under load in the tc control path.
What happens is that in tc_ctl_tfilter(), thread A allocates a new
tp, initializes it, sets tp_created to 1, and calls into tp->ops->change()
with it. In that classifier callback we had to unlock/lock the rtnl
mutex and returned with -EAGAIN. One reason why we need to drop there
is, for example, that we need to request an action module to be loaded.
This happens via tcf_exts_validate() -> tcf_action_init/_1() meaning
after we loaded and found the requested action, we need to redo the
whole request so we don't race against others. While we had to unlock
rtnl in that time, thread B's request was processed next on that CPU.
Thread B added a new tp instance successfully to the classifier chain.
When thread A returned grabbing the rtnl mutex again, propagating -EAGAIN
and destroying its tp instance which never got linked, we goto replay
and redo A's request.
This time when walking the classifier chain in tc_ctl_tfilter() for
checking for existing tp instances we had a priority match and found
the tp instance that was created and linked by thread B. Now calling
again into tp->ops->change() with that tp was successful and returned
without error.
tp_created was never cleared in the second round, thus kernel thinks
that we need to link it into the classifier chain (once again). tp and
*back point to the same object due to the match we had earlier on. Thus
for thread B's already public tp, we reset tp->next to tp itself and
link it into the chain, which eventually causes the mentioned endless
loop in tc_classify() once a packet hits the data path.
Fix is to clear tp_created at the beginning of each request, also when
we replay it. On the paths that can cause -EAGAIN we already destroy
the original tp instance we had and on replay we really need to start
from scratch. It seems that this issue was first introduced in commit
12186be7d2e1 ("net_cls: fix unconfigured struct tcf_proto keeps chaining
and avoid kernel panic when we use cls_cgroup").
Fixes: 12186be7d2e1 ("net_cls: fix unconfigured struct tcf_proto keeps chaining and avoid kernel panic when we use cls_cgroup")
Reported-by: Shahar Klein <shahark@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Shahar Klein <shahark@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2061dcd6bff8b774b4fac8b0739b6be3f87bc9f2 upstream.
I.e. one-to-many sockets in SCTP are not required to explicitly
call into connect(2) or sctp_connectx(2) prior to data exchange.
Instead, they can directly invoke sendmsg(2) and the SCTP stack
will automatically trigger connection establishment through 4WHS
via sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE(). However, this in its current
implementation is racy: INIT is being sent out immediately (as
it cannot be bundled anyway) and the rest of the DATA chunks are
queued up for later xmit when connection is established, meaning
sendmsg(2) will return successfully. This behaviour can result
in an undesired side-effect that the kernel made the application
think the data has already been transmitted, although none of it
has actually left the machine, worst case even after close(2)'ing
the socket.
Instead, when the association from client side has been shut down
e.g. first gracefully through SCTP_EOF and then close(2), the
client could afterwards still receive the server's INIT_ACK due
to a connection with higher latency. This INIT_ACK is then considered
out of the blue and hence responded with ABORT as there was no
alive assoc found anymore. This can be easily reproduced f.e.
with sctp_test application from lksctp. One way to fix this race
is to wait for the handshake to actually complete.
The fix defers waiting after sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE() and
sctp_primitive_SEND() succeeded, so that DATA chunks cooked up
from sctp_sendmsg() have already been placed into the output
queue through the side-effect interpreter, and therefore can then
be bundeled together with COOKIE_ECHO control chunks.
strace from example application (shortened):
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_SEQPACKET, IPPROTO_SCTP) = 3
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
msg_iov(0)=[], msg_controllen=48, {cmsg_len=48, cmsg_level=0x84 /* SOL_??? */, cmsg_type=, ...},
msg_flags=0}, 0) = 0 // graceful shutdown for SOCK_SEQPACKET via SCTP_EOF
close(3) = 0
tcpdump before patch (fooling the application):
22:33:36.306142 IP 192.168.1.114.41462 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 3879023686] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 3139201684]
22:33:36.316619 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.41462: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 3345394793] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 3380109591]
22:33:36.317600 IP 192.168.1.114.41462 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [ABORT]
tcpdump after patch:
14:28:58.884116 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 438593213] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 3092969729]
14:28:58.888414 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 381429855] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 2141904492]
14:28:58.888638 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO] , (2) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969729] [...]
14:28:58.893278 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK] , (2) [SACK] [cum ack 3092969729] [a_rwnd 106491] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
14:28:58.893591 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969730] [...]
14:28:59.096963 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3092969730] [a_rwnd 106496] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
14:28:59.097086 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969731] [...] , (2) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969732] [...]
14:28:59.103218 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3092969732] [a_rwnd 106486] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
14:28:59.103330 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [SHUTDOWN]
14:28:59.107793 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [SHUTDOWN ACK]
14:28:59.107890 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [SHUTDOWN COMPLETE]
Looks like this bug is from the pre-git history museum. ;)
Fixes: 08707d5482df ("lksctp-2_5_31-0_5_1.patch")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4762fb980465463734f02c67c67f40beb8903f73 upstream.
Use spin_lock_bh in ip6_fl_purge() to prevent following potentially
deadlock scenario between ip6_fl_purge() and ip6_fl_gc() timer.
=================================
[ INFO: inconsistent lock state ]
3.19.0 #1 Not tainted
---------------------------------
inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage.
swapper/5/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes:
(ip6_fl_lock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffff8171155d>] ip6_fl_gc+0x2d/0x180
{SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
[<ffffffff810ee9a0>] __lock_acquire+0x4a0/0x10b0
[<ffffffff810efd54>] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2b0
[<ffffffff81751d2d>] _raw_spin_lock+0x3d/0x80
[<ffffffff81711798>] ip6_flowlabel_net_exit+0x28/0x110
[<ffffffff815f9759>] ops_exit_list.isra.1+0x39/0x60
[<ffffffff815fa320>] cleanup_net+0x100/0x1e0
[<ffffffff810ad80a>] process_one_work+0x20a/0x830
[<ffffffff810adf4b>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x460
[<ffffffff810b42f4>] kthread+0x104/0x120
[<ffffffff81752bfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
irq event stamp: 84640
hardirqs last enabled at (84640): [<ffffffff81752080>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x50
hardirqs last disabled at (84639): [<ffffffff81751eff>] _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x1f/0x80
softirqs last enabled at (84628): [<ffffffff81091ad1>] _local_bh_enable+0x21/0x50
softirqs last disabled at (84629): [<ffffffff81093b7d>] irq_exit+0x12d/0x150
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(ip6_fl_lock);
<Interrupt>
lock(ip6_fl_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
Signed-off-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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l2cap socket
commit 96c26653ce65bf84f3212f8b00d4316c1efcbf4c upstream.
... rather than relying on ciptool(8) never passing it anything else. Give
it e.g. an AF_UNIX connected socket (from socketpair(2)) and it'll oops,
trying to evaluate &l2cap_pi(sock->sk)->chan->dst...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 88d9077c27d0c1a7c022d9dc987640beecf23560 upstream.
The bnep_get_device function may be triggered by an ioctl just after a
connection has gone down. In such a case the respective L2CAP chan->conn
pointer will get set to NULL (by l2cap_chan_del). This patch adds a
missing NULL check for this case in the bnep_get_device() function.
Reported-by: Patrik Flykt <patrik.flykt@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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l2cap socket
commit 71bb99a02b32b4cc4265118e85f6035ca72923f0 upstream.
same story as cmtp
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b2504a5dbef3305ef41988ad270b0e8ec289331c upstream.
Dmitry reported warnings occurring in __skb_gso_segment() [1]
All SKB_GSO_DODGY producers can allow user space to feed
packets that trigger the current check.
We could prevent them from doing so, rejecting packets, but
this might add regressions to existing programs.
It turns out our SKB_GSO_DODGY handlers properly set up checksum
information that is needed anyway when packets needs to be segmented.
By checking again skb_needs_check() after skb_mac_gso_segment(),
we should remove these pesky warnings, at a very minor cost.
With help from Willem de Bruijn
[1]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6768 at net/core/dev.c:2439 skb_warn_bad_offload+0x2af/0x390 net/core/dev.c:2434
lo: caps=(0x000000a2803b7c69, 0x0000000000000000) len=138 data_len=0 gso_size=15883 gso_type=4 ip_summed=0
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 1 PID: 6768 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.9.0 #5
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
ffff8801c063ecd8 ffffffff82346bdf ffffffff00000001 1ffff100380c7d2e
ffffed00380c7d26 0000000041b58ab3 ffffffff84b37e38 ffffffff823468f1
ffffffff84820740 ffffffff84f289c0 dffffc0000000000 ffff8801c063ee20
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff82346bdf>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline]
[<ffffffff82346bdf>] dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:51
[<ffffffff81827e34>] panic+0x1fb/0x412 kernel/panic.c:179
[<ffffffff8141f704>] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[<ffffffff8141f7e5>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0xc5/0x100 kernel/panic.c:565
[<ffffffff8356cbaf>] skb_warn_bad_offload+0x2af/0x390 net/core/dev.c:2434
[<ffffffff83585cd2>] __skb_gso_segment+0x482/0x780 net/core/dev.c:2706
[<ffffffff83586f19>] skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:3985 [inline]
[<ffffffff83586f19>] validate_xmit_skb+0x5c9/0xc20 net/core/dev.c:2969
[<ffffffff835892bb>] __dev_queue_xmit+0xe6b/0x1e70 net/core/dev.c:3383
[<ffffffff8358a2d7>] dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3424
[<ffffffff83ad161d>] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2930 [inline]
[<ffffffff83ad161d>] packet_sendmsg+0x32ed/0x4d30 net/packet/af_packet.c:2955
[<ffffffff834f0aaa>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
[<ffffffff834f0aaa>] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:631
[<ffffffff834f329a>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x8fa/0x9f0 net/socket.c:1954
[<ffffffff834f5e58>] __sys_sendmsg+0x138/0x300 net/socket.c:1988
[<ffffffff834f604d>] SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:1999 [inline]
[<ffffffff834f604d>] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:1995
[<ffffffff84371941>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 89e357d83c06b6fac581c3ca7f0ee3ae7e67109e upstream.
A dump may come in the middle of another dump, modifying its dump
structure members. This race condition will result in NULL pointer
dereference in kernel. So add a lock to prevent that race.
Fixes: 83321d6b9872 ("[AF_KEY]: Dump SA/SP entries non-atomically")
Signed-off-by: Yuejie Shi <syjcnss@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 096f41d3a8fcbb8dde7f71379b1ca85fe213eded upstream.
The parsing of sadb_x_ipsecrequest is broken in a number of ways.
First of all we're not verifying sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len. This
is needed when the structure carries addresses at the end. Worse
we don't even look at the length when we parse those optional
addresses.
The migration code had similar parsing code that's better but
it also has some deficiencies. The length is overcounted first
of all as it includes the header itself. It also fails to check
the length before dereferencing the sa_family field.
This patch fixes those problems in parse_sockaddr_pair and then
uses it in parse_ipsecrequest.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 329d82309824ff1082dc4a91a5bbed8c3bec1580 upstream.
This file is filled with complex cryptography. Thus, the comparisons of
MACs and secret keys and curve points and so forth should not add timing
attacks, which could either result in a direct forgery, or, given the
complexity, some other type of attack.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f6a5885fc4d68e7f25ffb42b9d8d80aebb3bacbb upstream.
Verify that the caller-provided sockaddr structure is large enough to
contain the sa_family field, before accessing it in bind() handlers of the
AF_NFC socket. Since the syscall doesn't enforce a minimum size of the
corresponding memory region, very short sockaddrs (zero or one byte long)
result in operating on uninitialized memory while referencing .sa_family.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 608c4adfcabab220142ee335a2a003ccd1c0b25b upstream.
Fix the sockaddr length verification in the connect() handler of NFC/LLCP
sockets, to compare against the size of the actual structure expected on
input (sockaddr_nfc_llcp) instead of its shorter version (sockaddr_nfc).
Both structures are defined in include/uapi/linux/nfc.h. The fields
specific to the _llcp extended struct are as follows:
276 __u8 dsap; /* Destination SAP, if known */
277 __u8 ssap; /* Source SAP to be bound to */
278 char service_name[NFC_LLCP_MAX_SERVICE_NAME]; /* Service name URI */;
279 size_t service_name_len;
If the caller doesn't provide a sufficiently long sockaddr buffer, these
fields remain uninitialized (and they currently originate from the stack
frame of the top-level sys_connect handler). They are then copied by
llcp_sock_connect() into internal storage (nfc_llcp_sock structure), and
could be subsequently read back through the user-mode getsockname()
function (handled by llcp_sock_getname()). This would result in the
disclosure of up to ~70 uninitialized bytes from the kernel stack to
user-mode clients capable of creating AFC_NFC sockets.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a0323b979f81ad2deb2c8836eab506534891876a upstream.
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX and NFC_ATTR_PROTOCOLS attributes (in
addition to NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client
prior to accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer
dereference exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode
programs, if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 20777bc57c346b6994f465e0d8261a7fbf213a09 upstream.
Commit 7eda8b8e9677 ("NFC: Use IDR library to assing NFC devices IDs")
moved device-id allocation and struct-device initialisation from
nfc_allocate_device() to nfc_register_device().
This broke just about every nfc-device-registration error path, which
continue to call nfc_free_device() that tries to put the device
reference of the now uninitialised (but zeroed) struct device:
kobject: '(null)' (ce316420): is not initialized, yet kobject_put() is being called.
The late struct-device initialisation also meant that various work
queues whose names are derived from the nfc device name were also
misnamed:
421 root 0 SW< [(null)_nci_cmd_]
422 root 0 SW< [(null)_nci_rx_w]
423 root 0 SW< [(null)_nci_tx_w]
Move the id-allocation and struct-device initialisation back to
nfc_allocate_device() and fix up the single call site which did not use
nfc_free_device() in its error path.
Fixes: 7eda8b8e9677 ("NFC: Use IDR library to assing NFC devices IDs")
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9361df14d1cbf966409d5d6f48bb334384fbe138 upstream.
nla policy checks for only maximum length of the attribute data
when the attribute type is NLA_BINARY. If userspace sends less
data than specified, the wireless drivers may access illegal
memory. When type is NLA_UNSPEC, nla policy check ensures that
userspace sends minimum specified length number of bytes.
Remove type assignment to NLA_BINARY from nla_policy of
NL80211_ATTR_PMKID to make this NLA_UNSPEC and to make sure minimum
WLAN_PMKID_LEN bytes are received from userspace with
NL80211_ATTR_PMKID.
Fixes: 67fbb16be69d ("nl80211: PMKSA caching support")
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d7f13f7450369281a5d0ea463cc69890a15923ae upstream.
validate_scan_freqs() retrieves frequencies from attributes
nested in the attribute NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES with
nla_get_u32(), which reads 4 bytes from each attribute
without validating the size of data received. Attributes
nested in NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES don't have an nla policy.
Validate size of each attribute before parsing to avoid potential buffer
overread.
Fixes: 2a519311926 ("cfg80211/nl80211: scanning (and mac80211 update to use it)")
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8feb69c7bd89513be80eb19198d48f154b254021 upstream.
Buffer overread may happen as nl80211_set_station() reads 4 bytes
from the attribute NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_MESH_POWER_MODE without
validating the size of data received when userspace sends less
than 4 bytes of data with NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_MESH_POWER_MODE.
Define nla_policy for NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_MESH_POWER_MODE to avoid
the buffer overread.
Fixes: 3b1c5a5307f ("{cfg,nl}80211: mesh power mode primitives and userspace access")
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ec8add2a4c9df723c94a863b8fcd6d93c472deed upstream.
Currently, when the link for $DEV is down, this command succeeds but the
address is removed immediately by DAD (1):
ip addr add 1111::12/64 dev $DEV valid_lft 3600 preferred_lft 1800
In the same situation, this will succeed and not remove the address (2):
ip addr add 1111::12/64 dev $DEV
ip addr change 1111::12/64 dev $DEV valid_lft 3600 preferred_lft 1800
The comment in addrconf_dad_begin() when !IF_READY makes it look like
this is the intended behavior, but doesn't explain why:
* If the device is not ready:
* - keep it tentative if it is a permanent address.
* - otherwise, kill it.
We clearly cannot prevent userspace from doing (2), but we can make (1)
work consistently with (2).
addrconf_dad_stop() is only called in two cases: if DAD failed, or to
skip DAD when the link is down. In that second case, the fix is to avoid
deleting the address, like we already do for permanent addresses.
Fixes: 3c21edbd1137 ("[IPV6]: Defer IPv6 device initialization until the link becomes ready.")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6f64ec74515925cced6df4571638b5a099a49aae upstream.
Similar to the fix provided by Dominik Heidler in commit
9b3dc0a17d73 ("l2tp: cast l2tp traffic counter to unsigned")
we need to take care of 32bit kernels in dev_get_stats().
When using atomic_long_read(), we add a 'long' to u64 and
might misinterpret high order bit, unless we cast to unsigned.
Fixes: caf586e5f23ce ("net: add a core netdev->rx_dropped counter")
Fixes: 015f0688f57ca ("net: net: add a core netdev->tx_dropped counter")
Fixes: 6e7333d315a76 ("net: add rx_nohandler stat counter")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d747a7a51b00984127a88113cdbbc26f91e9d815 upstream.
We have to reset the sk->sk_rx_dst when we disconnect a TCP
connection, because otherwise when we re-connect it this
dst reference is simply overridden in tcp_finish_connect().
This fixes a dst leak which leads to a loopback dev refcnt
leak. It is a long-standing bug, Kevin reported a very similar
(if not same) bug before. Thanks to Andrei for providing such
a reliable reproducer which greatly narrows down the problem.
Fixes: 41063e9dd119 ("ipv4: Early TCP socket demux.")
Reported-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Kevin Xu <kaiwen.xu@hulu.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 60abc0be96e00ca71bac083215ac91ad2e575096 upstream.
The per netns loopback_dev->ip6_ptr is unregistered and set to
NULL when its mtu is set to smaller than IPV6_MIN_MTU, this
leads to that we could set rt->rt6i_idev NULL after a
rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev() and then crash after another
call.
In this case we should just bring its inet6_dev down, rather
than unregistering it, at least prior to commit 176c39af29bc
("netns: fix addrconf_ifdown kernel panic") we always
override the case for loopback.
Thanks a lot to Andrey for finding a reliable reproducer.
Fixes: 176c39af29bc ("netns: fix addrconf_ifdown kernel panic")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Lezcano <dlezcano@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1e3d0c2c70cd3edb5deed186c5f5c75f2b84a633 upstream.
There are some missing error codes here so we accidentally return NULL
instead of an error pointer. It results in a NULL pointer dereference.
Fixes: df71837d5024 ("[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e747f64336fc15e1c823344942923195b800aa1e upstream.
The default error code in pfkey_msg2xfrm_state() is -ENOBUFS. We
added a new call to security_xfrm_state_alloc() which sets "err" to zero
so there several places where we can return ERR_PTR(0) if kmalloc()
fails. The caller is expecting error pointers so it leads to a NULL
dereference.
Fixes: df71837d5024 ("[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9b3eb54106cf6acd03f07cf0ab01c13676a226c2 upstream.
When CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY=y, xfrm_dst stores a copy of the flowi for
that dst. Unfortunately, the code that allocates and fills this copy
doesn't care about what type of flowi (flowi, flowi4, flowi6) gets
passed. In multiple code paths (from raw_sendmsg, from TCP when
replying to a FIN, in vxlan, geneve, and gre), the flowi that gets
passed to xfrm is actually an on-stack flowi4, so we end up reading
stuff from the stack past the end of the flowi4 struct.
Since xfrm_dst->origin isn't used anywhere following commit
ca116922afa8 ("xfrm: Eliminate "fl" and "pol" args to
xfrm_bundle_ok()."), just get rid of it. xfrm_dst->partner isn't used
either, so get rid of that too.
Fixes: 9d6ec938019c ("ipv4: Use flowi4 in public route lookup interfaces.")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9745e362add89432d2c951272a99b0a5fe4348a9 ]
The register_vlan_device would invoke free_netdev directly, when
register_vlan_dev failed. It would trigger the BUG_ON in free_netdev
if the dev was already registered. In this case, the netdev would be
freed in netdev_run_todo later.
So add one condition check now. Only when dev is not registered, then
free it directly.
The following is the part coredump when netdev_upper_dev_link failed
in register_vlan_dev. I removed the lines which are too long.
[ 411.237457] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 411.237458] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:7998!
[ 411.237484] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 411.237705] [last unloaded: 8021q]
[ 411.237718] CPU: 1 PID: 12845 Comm: vconfig Tainted: G E 4.12.0-rc5+ #6
[ 411.237737] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/02/2015
[ 411.237764] task: ffff9cbeb6685580 task.stack: ffffa7d2807d8000
[ 411.237782] RIP: 0010:free_netdev+0x116/0x120
[ 411.237794] RSP: 0018:ffffa7d2807dbdb0 EFLAGS: 00010297
[ 411.237808] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff9cbeb6ba8fd8 RCX: 0000000000001878
[ 411.237826] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000282 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 411.237844] RBP: ffffa7d2807dbdc8 R08: 0002986100029841 R09: 0002982100029801
[ 411.237861] R10: 0004000100029980 R11: 0004000100029980 R12: ffff9cbeb6ba9000
[ 411.238761] R13: ffff9cbeb6ba9060 R14: ffff9cbe60f1a000 R15: ffff9cbeb6ba9000
[ 411.239518] FS: 00007fb690d81700(0000) GS:ffff9cbebb640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 411.239949] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 411.240454] CR2: 00007f7115624000 CR3: 0000000077cdf000 CR4: 00000000003406e0
[ 411.240936] Call Trace:
[ 411.241462] vlan_ioctl_handler+0x3f1/0x400 [8021q]
[ 411.241910] sock_ioctl+0x18b/0x2c0
[ 411.242394] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa1/0x5d0
[ 411.242853] ? sock_alloc_file+0xa6/0x130
[ 411.243465] SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
[ 411.243900] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xa9
[ 411.244425] RIP: 0033:0x7fb69089a357
[ 411.244863] RSP: 002b:00007ffcd04e0fc8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[ 411.245445] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcd04e2884 RCX: 00007fb69089a357
[ 411.245903] RDX: 00007ffcd04e0fd0 RSI: 0000000000008983 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 411.246527] RBP: 00007ffcd04e0fd0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 1999999999999999
[ 411.246976] R10: 000000000000053f R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000004
[ 411.247414] R13: 00007ffcd04e1128 R14: 00007ffcd04e2888 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 411.249129] RIP: free_netdev+0x116/0x120 RSP: ffffa7d2807dbdb0
Signed-off-by: Gao Feng <gfree.wind@vip.163.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 76371d2e3ad1f84426a30ebcd8c3b9b98f4c724f ]
In the existing dn_route.c code, dn_route_output_slow() takes
dst->__refcnt before calling dn_insert_route() while dn_route_input_slow()
does not take dst->__refcnt before calling dn_insert_route().
This makes the whole routing code very buggy.
In dn_dst_check_expire(), dnrt_free() is called when rt expires. This
makes the routes inserted by dn_route_output_slow() not able to be
freed as the refcnt is not released.
In dn_dst_gc(), dnrt_drop() is called to release rt which could
potentially cause the dst->__refcnt to be dropped to -1.
In dn_run_flush(), dst_free() is called to release all the dst. Again,
it makes the dst inserted by dn_route_output_slow() not able to be
released and also, it does not wait on the rcu and could potentially
cause crash in the path where other users still refer to this dst.
This patch makes sure both input and output path do not take
dst->__refcnt before calling dn_insert_route() and also makes sure
dnrt_free()/dst_free() is called when removing dst from the hash table.
The only difference between those 2 calls is that dnrt_free() waits on
the rcu while dst_free() does not.
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f8a894b218138888542a5058d0e902378fd0d4ec ]
Now when starting the dad work in addrconf_mod_dad_work, if the dad work
is idle and queued, it needs to hold ifa.
The problem is there's one gap in [1], during which if the pending dad work
is removed elsewhere. It will miss to hold ifa, but the dad word is still
idea and queue.
if (!delayed_work_pending(&ifp->dad_work))
in6_ifa_hold(ifp);
<--------------[1]
mod_delayed_work(addrconf_wq, &ifp->dad_work, delay);
An use-after-free issue can be caused by this.
Chen Wei found this issue when WARN_ON(!hlist_unhashed(&ifp->addr_lst)) in
net6_ifa_finish_destroy was hit because of it.
As Hannes' suggestion, this patch is to fix it by holding ifa first in
addrconf_mod_dad_work, then calling mod_delayed_work and putting ifa if
the dad_work is already in queue.
Note that this patch did not choose to fix it with:
if (!mod_delayed_work(delay))
in6_ifa_hold(ifp);
As with it, when delay == 0, dad_work would be scheduled immediately, all
addrconf_mod_dad_work(0) callings had to be moved under ifp->lock.
Reported-by: Wei Chen <weichen@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b4846fc3c8559649277e3e4e6b5cec5348a8d208 ]
Andrey reported a lockdep warning on non-initialized
spinlock:
INFO: trying to register non-static key.
the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation.
turning off the locking correctness validator.
CPU: 1 PID: 4099 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.12.0-rc6+ #9
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
register_lock_class+0x717/0x1aa0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:755
? 0xffffffffa0000000
__lock_acquire+0x269/0x3690 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3255
lock_acquire+0x22d/0x560 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3855
__raw_spin_lock_bh ./include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:135
_raw_spin_lock_bh+0x36/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:175
spin_lock_bh ./include/linux/spinlock.h:304
ip_mc_clear_src+0x27/0x1e0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2076
igmpv3_clear_delrec+0xee/0x4f0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:1194
ip_mc_destroy_dev+0x4e/0x190 net/ipv4/igmp.c:1736
We miss a spin_lock_init() in igmpv3_add_delrec(), probably
because previously we never use it on this code path. Since
we already unlink it from the global mc_tomb list, it is
probably safe not to acquire this spinlock here. It does not
harm to have it although, to avoid conditional locking.
Fixes: c38b7d327aaf ("igmp: acquire pmc lock for ip_mc_clear_src()")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c38b7d327aafd1e3ad7ff53eefac990673b65667 ]
Andrey reported a use-after-free in add_grec():
for (psf = *psf_list; psf; psf = psf_next) {
...
psf_next = psf->sf_next;
where the struct ip_sf_list's were already freed by:
kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:3882
ip_mc_clear_src+0x69/0x1c0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2078
ip_mc_dec_group+0x19a/0x470 net/ipv4/igmp.c:1618
ip_mc_drop_socket+0x145/0x230 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2609
inet_release+0x4e/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:411
sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:597
sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1072
This happens because we don't hold pmc->lock in ip_mc_clear_src()
and a parallel mr_ifc_timer timer could jump in and access them.
The RCU lock is there but it is merely for pmc itself, this
spinlock could actually ensure we don't access them in parallel.
Thanks to Eric and Long for discussion on this bug.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f146e872eb12ebbe92d8e583b2637e0741440db3 ]
The kernel may sleep under a rcu read lock in cfpkt_create_pfx, and the
function call path is:
cfcnfg_linkup_rsp (acquire the lock by rcu_read_lock)
cfctrl_linkdown_req
cfpkt_create
cfpkt_create_pfx
alloc_skb(GFP_KERNEL) --> may sleep
cfserl_receive (acquire the lock by rcu_read_lock)
cfpkt_split
cfpkt_create_pfx
alloc_skb(GFP_KERNEL) --> may sleep
There is "in_interrupt" in cfpkt_create_pfx to decide use "GFP_KERNEL" or
"GFP_ATOMIC". In this situation, "GFP_KERNEL" is used because the function
is called under a rcu read lock, instead in interrupt.
To fix it, only "GFP_ATOMIC" is used in cfpkt_create_pfx.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@163.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f186ce61bb8235d80068c390dc2aad7ca427a4c2 ]
It looks like this:
Message from syslogd@flamingo at Apr 26 00:45:00 ...
kernel:unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 4
They seem to coincide with net namespace teardown.
The message is emitted by netdev_wait_allrefs().
Forced a kdump in netdev_run_todo, but found that the refcount on the lo
device was already 0 at the time we got to the panic.
Used bcc to check the blocking in netdev_run_todo. The only places
where we're off cpu there are in the rcu_barrier() and msleep() calls.
That behavior is expected. The msleep time coincides with the amount of
time we spend waiting for the refcount to reach zero; the rcu_barrier()
wait times are not excessive.
After looking through the list of callbacks that the netdevice notifiers
invoke in this path, it appears that the dst_dev_event is the most
interesting. The dst_ifdown path places a hold on the loopback_dev as
part of releasing the dev associated with the original dst cache entry.
Most of our notifier callbacks are straight-forward, but this one a)
looks complex, and b) places a hold on the network interface in
question.
I constructed a new bcc script that watches various events in the
liftime of a dst cache entry. Note that dst_ifdown will take a hold on
the loopback device until the invalidated dst entry gets freed.
[ __dst_free] on DST: ffff883ccabb7900 IF tap1008300eth0 invoked at 1282115677036183
__dst_free
rcu_nocb_kthread
kthread
ret_from_fork
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit dd0da17b209ed91f39872766634ca967c170ada1 ]
Verify that the length of the socket buffer is sufficient to cover the
nlmsghdr structure before accessing the nlh->nlmsg_len field for further
input sanitization. If the client only supplies 1-3 bytes of data in
sk_buff, then nlh->nlmsg_len remains partially uninitialized and
contains leftover memory from the corresponding kernel allocation.
Operating on such data may result in indeterminate evaluation of the
nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) expression.
The bug was discovered by a runtime instrumentation designed to detect
use of uninitialized memory in the kernel. The patch prevents this and
other similar tools (e.g. KMSAN) from flagging this behavior in the future.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c28294b941232931fbd714099798eb7aa7e865d7 ]
KMSAN reported a use of uninitialized memory in dev_set_alias(),
which was caused by calling strlcpy() (which in turn called strlen())
on the user-supplied non-terminated string.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 87e94dbc210a720a34be5c1174faee5c84be963e upstream.
This patch fixes the creation of connection tracking entry from
netlink when synproxy is used. It was missing the addition of
the synproxy extension.
This was causing kernel crashes when a conntrack entry created by
conntrackd was used after the switch of traffic from active node
to the passive node.
Signed-off-by: Eric Leblond <eric@regit.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2638fd0f92d4397884fd991d8f4925cb3f081901 upstream.
Denys provided an awesome KASAN report pointing to an use
after free in xt_TCPMSS
I have provided three patches to fix this issue, either in xt_TCPMSS or
in xt_tcpudp.c. It seems xt_TCPMSS patch has the smallest possible
impact.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <nuclearcat@nuclearcat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 00ea1ceebe0d9f2dc1cc2b7bd575a00100c27869 upstream.
If ip6_dst_lookup_tail has acquired a dst and fails the IPv4-mapped
check, release the dst before returning an error.
Fixes: ec5e3b0a1d41 ("ipv6: Inhibit IPv4-mapped src address on the wire.")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 98c67d187db7808b1f3c95f2110dd4392d034182 upstream.
Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5f2f97656ada8d811d3c1bef503ced266fcd53a0 upstream.
This fixes CVE-2017-7482.
When a kerberos 5 ticket is being decoded so that it can be loaded into an
rxrpc-type key, there are several places in which the length of a
variable-length field is checked to make sure that it's not going to
overrun the available data - but the data is padded to the nearest
four-byte boundary and the code doesn't check for this extra. This could
lead to the size-remaining variable wrapping and the data pointer going
over the end of the buffer.
Fix this by making the various variable-length data checks use the padded
length.
Reported-by: 石磊 <shilei-c@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@auristor.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 769dc04db3ed8484798aceb015b94deacc2ba557 upstream.
When a peer sends a BAR frame with PM bit clear, we should
not modify its PM state as madated by the spec in
802.11-20012 10.2.1.2.
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ec5e3b0a1d41fbda0cc33a45bc9e54e91d9d12c7 ]
This patch adds a check for the problematic case of an IPv4-mapped IPv6
source address and a destination address that is neither an IPv4-mapped
IPv6 address nor in6addr_any, and returns an appropriate error. The
check in done before returning from looking up the route.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan T. Leighton <jtleight@udel.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 052d2369d1b479cdbbe020fdd6d057d3c342db74 ]
This patch adds a check on the type of the source address for the case
where the destination address is in6addr_any. If the source is an
IPv4-mapped IPv6 source address, the destination is changed to
::ffff:127.0.0.1, and otherwise the destination is changed to ::1. This
is done in three locations to handle UDP calls to either connect() or
sendmsg() and TCP calls to connect(). Note that udpv6_sendmsg() delays
handling an in6addr_any destination until very late, so the patch only
needs to handle the case where the source is an IPv4-mapped IPv6
address.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan T. Leighton <jtleight@udel.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 77d4b1d36926a9b8387c6b53eeba42bcaaffcea3 ]
Alexander reported various KASAN messages triggered in recent kernels
The problem is that ping sockets should not use udp_poll() in the first
place, and recent changes in UDP stack finally exposed this old bug.
Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Fixes: 6d0bfe226116 ("net: ipv6: Add IPv6 support to the ping socket.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Cc: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Acked-By: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Tested-By: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e3e86b5119f81e5e2499bea7ea1ebe8ac6aab789 ]
If ip6_find_1stfragopt() fails and we return an error we have to free
up 'segs' because nobody else is going to.
Fixes: 2423496af35d ("ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options")
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 44abafc4cc094214a99f860f778c48ecb23422fc ]
When the sender switches its congestion control during loss
recovery, if the recovery is spurious then it may incorrectly
revert cwnd and ssthresh to the older values set by a previous
congestion control. Consider a congestion control (like BBR)
that does not use ssthresh and keeps it infinite: the connection
may incorrectly revert cwnd to an infinite value when switching
from BBR to another congestion control.
This patch fixes it by disallowing such cwnd undo operation
upon switching congestion control. Note that undo_marker
is not reset s.t. the packets that were incorrectly marked
lost would be corrected. We only avoid undoing the cwnd in
tcp_undo_cwnd_reduction().
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6e80ac5cc992ab6256c3dae87f7e57db15e1a58c ]
xfrm6_find_1stfragopt() may now return an error code and we must
not treat it as a length.
Fixes: 2423496af35d ("ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Acked-by: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 804ec7ebe8ea003999ca8d1bfc499edc6a9e07df ]
sometimes ICMP replies to INIT chunks are ignored by the client, even if
the encapsulated SCTP headers match an open socket. This happens when the
ICMP packet is carried by a paged skb: use skb_header_pointer() to read
packet contents beyond the SCTP header, so that chunk header and initiate
tag are validated correctly.
v2:
- don't use skb_header_pointer() to read the transport header, since
icmp_socket_deliver() already puts these 8 bytes in the linear area.
- change commit message to make specific reference to INIT chunks.
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ba615f675281d76fd19aa03558777f81fb6b6084 ]
Fastopen API should be used to perform fastopen operations on the TCP
socket. It does not make sense to use fastopen API to perform disconnect
by calling it with AF_UNSPEC. The fastopen data path is also prone to
race conditions and bugs when using with AF_UNSPEC.
One issue reported and analyzed by Vegard Nossum is as follows:
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Thread A: Thread B:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
sendto()
- tcp_sendmsg()
- sk_stream_memory_free() = 0
- goto wait_for_sndbuf
- sk_stream_wait_memory()
- sk_wait_event() // sleep
| sendto(flags=MSG_FASTOPEN, dest_addr=AF_UNSPEC)
| - tcp_sendmsg()
| - tcp_sendmsg_fastopen()
| - __inet_stream_connect()
| - tcp_disconnect() //because of AF_UNSPEC
| - tcp_transmit_skb()// send RST
| - return 0; // no reconnect!
| - sk_stream_wait_connect()
| - sock_error()
| - xchg(&sk->sk_err, 0)
| - return -ECONNRESET
- ... // wake up, see sk->sk_err == 0
- skb_entail() on TCP_CLOSE socket
If the connection is reopened then we will send a brand new SYN packet
after thread A has already queued a buffer. At this point I think the
socket internal state (sequence numbers etc.) becomes messed up.
When the new connection is closed, the FIN-ACK is rejected because the
sequence number is outside the window. The other side tries to
retransmit,
but __tcp_retransmit_skb() calls tcp_trim_head() on an empty skb which
corrupts the skb data length and hits a BUG() in copy_and_csum_bits().
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Hence, this patch adds a check for AF_UNSPEC in the fastopen data path
and return EOPNOTSUPP to user if such case happens.
Fixes: cf60af03ca4e7 ("tcp: Fast Open client - sendmsg(MSG_FASTOPEN)")
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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