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2018-11-29Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20181129' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull SELinux fix from Paul Moore: "One more SELinux fix for v4.20: add some missing netlink message to SELinux permission mappings. The netlink messages were added in v4.19, but unfortunately we didn't catch it then because the mechanism to catch these things was bypassed. In addition to adding the mappings, we're adding some comments to the code to hopefully prevent bypasses in the future" * tag 'selinux-pr-20181129' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: add support for RTM_NEWCHAIN, RTM_DELCHAIN, and RTM_GETCHAIN
2018-11-29selinux: add support for RTM_NEWCHAIN, RTM_DELCHAIN, and RTM_GETCHAINPaul Moore
Commit 32a4f5ecd738 ("net: sched: introduce chain object to uapi") added new RTM_* definitions without properly updating SELinux, this patch adds the necessary SELinux support. While there was a BUILD_BUG_ON() in the SELinux code to protect from exactly this case, it was bypassed in the broken commit. In order to hopefully prevent this from happening in the future, add additional comments which provide some instructions on how to resolve the BUILD_BUG_ON() failures. Fixes: 32a4f5ecd738 ("net: sched: introduce chain object to uapi") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.19 Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-11-15Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20181115' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore: "Two small SELinux fixes for v4.20. Ondrej's patch adds a check on user input, and my patch ensures we don't look past the end of a buffer. Both patches are quite small and pass the selinux-testsuite" * tag 'selinux-pr-20181115' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: fix non-MLS handling in mls_context_to_sid() selinux: check length properly in SCTP bind hook
2018-11-13selinux: fix non-MLS handling in mls_context_to_sid()Paul Moore
Commit 95ffe194204a ("selinux: refactor mls_context_to_sid() and make it stricter") inadvertently changed how we handle labels that did not contain MLS information. This patch restores the proper behavior in mls_context_to_sid() and adds a comment explaining the proper behavior to help ensure this doesn't happen again. Fixes: 95ffe194204a ("selinux: refactor mls_context_to_sid() and make it stricter") Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-11-13integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding fieldMimi Zohar
On systems with IMA-appraisal enabled with a policy requiring file signatures, the "good" signature values are stored on the filesystem as extended attributes (security.ima). Signature verification failure would normally be limited to just a particular file (eg. executable), but during boot signature verification failure could result in a system hang. Defining and requiring a new public_key_signature field requires all callers of asymmetric signature verification to be updated to reflect the change. This patch updates the integrity asymmetric_verify() caller. Fixes: 82f94f24475c ("KEYS: Provide software public key query function [ver #2]") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-11-13selinux: check length properly in SCTP bind hookOndrej Mosnacek
selinux_sctp_bind_connect() must verify if the address buffer has sufficient length before accessing the 'sa_family' field. See __sctp_connect() for a similar check. The length of the whole address ('len') is already checked in the callees. Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us> Fixes: d452930fd3b9 ("selinux: Add SCTP support") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.17+ Cc: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-11-02Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-11-01' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen: "Features/Improvements: - replace spin_is_locked() with lockdep - add base support for secmark labeling and matching Cleanups: - clean an indentation issue, remove extraneous space - remove no-op permission check in policy_unpack - fix checkpatch missing spaces error in Parse secmark policy - fix network performance issue in aa_label_sk_perm Bug fixes: - add #ifdef checks for secmark filtering - fix an error code in __aa_create_ns() - don't try to replace stale label in ptrace checks - fix failure to audit context info in build_change_hat - check buffer bounds when mapping permissions mask - fully initialize aa_perms struct when answering userspace query - fix uninitialized value in aa_split_fqname" * tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: apparmor: clean an indentation issue, remove extraneous space apparmor: fix checkpatch error in Parse secmark policy apparmor: add #ifdef checks for secmark filtering apparmor: Fix uninitialized value in aa_split_fqname apparmor: don't try to replace stale label in ptraceme check apparmor: Replace spin_is_locked() with lockdep apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policy apparmor: Parse secmark policy apparmor: Add a wildcard secid apparmor: don't try to replace stale label in ptrace access check apparmor: Fix network performance issue in aa_label_sk_perm
2018-11-01apparmor: clean an indentation issue, remove extraneous spaceColin Ian King
Trivial fix to clean up an indentation issue, remove space Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-11-01apparmor: fix checkpatch error in Parse secmark policyJohn Johansen
Fix missed spacing error reported by checkpatch for 9caafbe2b4cf ("Parse secmark policy") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: Move trusted.h to include/keys [ver #2]Denis Kenzior
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: trusted: Expose common functionality [ver #2]Denis Kenzior
This patch exposes some common functionality needed to send TPM commands. Several functions from keys/trusted.c are exposed for use by the new tpm key subtype and a module dependency is introduced. In the future, common functionality between the trusted key type and the asym_tpm subtype should be factored out into a common utility library. Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]David Howells
Provide five keyctl functions that permit userspace to make use of the new key type ops for accessing and driving asymmetric keys. (*) Query an asymmetric key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY, key_serial_t key, unsigned long reserved, struct keyctl_pkey_query *info); Get information about an asymmetric key. The information is returned in the keyctl_pkey_query struct: __u32 supported_ops; A bit mask of flags indicating which ops are supported. This is constructed from a bitwise-OR of: KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_{ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY} __u32 key_size; The size in bits of the key. __u16 max_data_size; __u16 max_sig_size; __u16 max_enc_size; __u16 max_dec_size; The maximum sizes in bytes of a blob of data to be signed, a signature blob, a blob to be encrypted and a blob to be decrypted. reserved must be set to 0. This is intended for future use to hand over one or more passphrases needed unlock a key. If successful, 0 is returned. If the key is not an asymmetric key, EOPNOTSUPP is returned. (*) Encrypt, decrypt, sign or verify a blob using an asymmetric key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, void *out); long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, void *out); long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, void *out); long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, const void *in2); Use an asymmetric key to perform a public-key cryptographic operation a blob of data. The parameter block pointed to by params contains a number of integer values: __s32 key_id; __u32 in_len; __u32 out_len; __u32 in2_len; For a given operation, the in and out buffers are used as follows: Operation ID in,in_len out,out_len in2,in2_len ======================= =============== =============== =========== KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT Raw data Encrypted data - KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT Encrypted data Raw data - KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN Raw data Signature - KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Raw data - Signature info is a string of key=value pairs that supply supplementary information. The __spare space in the parameter block must be set to 0. This is intended, amongst other things, to allow the passing of passphrases required to unlock a key. If successful, encrypt, decrypt and sign all return the amount of data written into the output buffer. Verification returns 0 on success. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-25Merge branch 'next-loadpin' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull LoadPin updates from James Morris: "From Kees: This is a small reporting improvement and the param change needed for the ordering series (but since the loadpin change is desired and separable, I'm putting it here)" * 'next-loadpin' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce" LoadPin: Report friendly block device name
2018-10-25Merge branch 'next-smack' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull smack updates from James Morris: "From Casey: three patches for Smack for 4.20. Two clean up warnings and one is a rarely encountered ptrace capability check" * 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: Smack: Mark expected switch fall-through Smack: ptrace capability use fixes Smack: remove set but not used variable 'root_inode'
2018-10-25Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "From Mimi: This contains a couple of bug fixes, including one for a recent problem with calculating file hashes on overlayfs, and some code cleanup" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: MAINTAINERS: add Jarkko as maintainer for trusted keys ima: open a new file instance if no read permissions ima: fix showing large 'violations' or 'runtime_measurements_count' security/integrity: remove unnecessary 'init_keyring' variable security/integrity: constify some read-only data vfs: require i_size <= SIZE_MAX in kernel_read_file()
2018-10-24Merge branch 'next-general' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "In this patchset, there are a couple of minor updates, as well as some reworking of the LSM initialization code from Kees Cook (these prepare the way for ordered stackable LSMs, but are a valuable cleanup on their own)" * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info LSM: Remove initcall tracing LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization security: fix LSM description location keys: Fix the use of the C++ keyword "private" in uapi/linux/keyctl.h seccomp: remove unnecessary unlikely() security: tomoyo: Fix obsolete function security/capabilities: remove check for -EINVAL
2018-10-24Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20181022' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore: "Three SELinux patches for v4.20, all fall under the bug-fix or behave-better category, which is good. All three have pretty good descriptions too, which is even better" * tag 'selinux-pr-20181022' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: Add __GFP_NOWARN to allocation at str_read() selinux: refactor mls_context_to_sid() and make it stricter selinux: fix mounting of cgroup2 under older policies
2018-10-24Merge branch 'siginfo-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull siginfo updates from Eric Biederman: "I have been slowly sorting out siginfo and this is the culmination of that work. The primary result is in several ways the signal infrastructure has been made less error prone. The code has been updated so that manually specifying SEND_SIG_FORCED is never necessary. The conversion to the new siginfo sending functions is now complete, which makes it difficult to send a signal without filling in the proper siginfo fields. At the tail end of the patchset comes the optimization of decreasing the size of struct siginfo in the kernel from 128 bytes to about 48 bytes on 64bit. The fundamental observation that enables this is by definition none of the known ways to use struct siginfo uses the extra bytes. This comes at the cost of a small user space observable difference. For the rare case of siginfo being injected into the kernel only what can be copied into kernel_siginfo is delivered to the destination, the rest of the bytes are set to 0. For cases where the signal and the si_code are known this is safe, because we know those bytes are not used. For cases where the signal and si_code combination is unknown the bits that won't fit into struct kernel_siginfo are tested to verify they are zero, and the send fails if they are not. I made an extensive search through userspace code and I could not find anything that would break because of the above change. If it turns out I did break something it will take just the revert of a single change to restore kernel_siginfo to the same size as userspace siginfo. Testing did reveal dependencies on preferring the signo passed to sigqueueinfo over si->signo, so bit the bullet and added the complexity necessary to handle that case. Testing also revealed bad things can happen if a negative signal number is passed into the system calls. Something no sane application will do but something a malicious program or a fuzzer might do. So I have fixed the code that performs the bounds checks to ensure negative signal numbers are handled" * 'siginfo-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (80 commits) signal: Guard against negative signal numbers in copy_siginfo_from_user32 signal: Guard against negative signal numbers in copy_siginfo_from_user signal: In sigqueueinfo prefer sig not si_signo signal: Use a smaller struct siginfo in the kernel signal: Distinguish between kernel_siginfo and siginfo signal: Introduce copy_siginfo_from_user and use it's return value signal: Remove the need for __ARCH_SI_PREABLE_SIZE and SI_PAD_SIZE signal: Fail sigqueueinfo if si_signo != sig signal/sparc: Move EMT_TAGOVF into the generic siginfo.h signal/unicore32: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate signal/unicore32: Generate siginfo in ucs32_notify_die signal/unicore32: Use send_sig_fault where appropriate signal/arc: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate signal/arc: Push siginfo generation into unhandled_exception signal/ia64: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate signal/ia64: Use the force_sig(SIGSEGV,...) in ia64_rt_sigreturn signal/ia64: Use the generic force_sigsegv in setup_frame signal/arm/kvm: Use send_sig_mceerr signal/arm: Use send_sig_fault where appropriate signal/arm: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate ...
2018-10-18Merge tag 'loadpin-security-next' of ↵James Morris
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux into next-loadpin LoadPin: report improvement and parameter renaming - Report human-readable device name during init - Change boot parameter and Kconfig "enabled" to "enforce"
2018-10-18LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce"Kees Cook
LoadPin's "enabled" setting is really about enforcement, not whether or not the LSM is using LSM hooks. Instead, split this out so that LSM enabling can be logically distinct from whether enforcement is happening (for example, the pinning happens when the LSM is enabled, but the pin is only checked when "enforce" is set). This allows LoadPin to continue to operate sanely in test environments once LSM enable/disable is centrally handled (i.e. we want LoadPin to be enabled separately from its enforcement). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-10-18LoadPin: Report friendly block device nameKees Cook
Instead of only reporting major/minor, include the actual block device name, at least as seen by the kernel. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-12apparmor: add #ifdef checks for secmark filteringArnd Bergmann
The newly added code fails to build when either SECMARK or NETFILTER are disabled: security/apparmor/lsm.c: In function 'apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb': security/apparmor/lsm.c:1138:12: error: 'struct sk_buff' has no member named 'secmark'; did you mean 'mark'? security/apparmor/lsm.c:1671:21: error: 'struct nf_hook_state' declared inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration [-Werror] Add a set of #ifdef checks around it to only enable the code that we can compile and that makes sense in that configuration. Fixes: ab9f2115081a ("apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policy") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-10-10LSM: Don't ignore initialization failuresKees Cook
LSM initialization failures have traditionally been ignored. We should at least WARN when something goes wrong. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-10LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructureKees Cook
Booting with "lsm.debug" will report future details on how LSM ordering decisions are being made. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-10LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_infoKees Cook
In preparation for making LSM selections outside of the LSMs, include the name of LSMs in struct lsm_info. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-10LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM()Kees Cook
Instead of using argument-based initializers, switch to defining the contents of struct lsm_info on a per-LSM basis. This also drops the final use of the now inaccurate "initcall" naming. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-10LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_infoKees Cook
In preparation for doing more interesting LSM init probing, this converts the existing initcall system into an explicit call into a function pointer from a section-collected struct lsm_info array. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-10LSM: Remove initcall tracingKees Cook
This partially reverts commit 58eacfffc417 ("init, tracing: instrument security and console initcall trace events") since security init calls are about to no longer resemble regular init calls. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-10LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_infoKees Cook
In preparation for switching from initcall to just a regular set of pointers in a section, rename the internal section name. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-10LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initializationKees Cook
For a while now, the LSM core has said it was "initializED", rather than "initializING". This adjust the report to be more accurate (i.e. before this was reported before any LSMs had been initialized.) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-10ima: open a new file instance if no read permissionsGoldwyn Rodrigues
Open a new file instance as opposed to changing file->f_mode when the file is not readable. This is done to accomodate overlayfs stacked file operations change. The real struct file is hidden behind the overlays struct file. So, any file->f_mode manipulations are not reflected on the real struct file. Open the file again in read mode if original file cannot be read, read and calculate the hash. Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-4.19) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2018-10-10ima: fix showing large 'violations' or 'runtime_measurements_count'Eric Biggers
The 12 character temporary buffer is not necessarily long enough to hold a 'long' value. Increase it. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2018-10-10security/integrity: remove unnecessary 'init_keyring' variableEric Biggers
The 'init_keyring' variable actually just gave the value of CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING. We should check the config option directly instead. No change in behavior; this just simplifies the code. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2018-10-10security/integrity: constify some read-only dataEric Biggers
Constify some static data that is never modified, so that it is placed in .rodata. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2018-10-03signal: Distinguish between kernel_siginfo and siginfoEric W. Biederman
Linus recently observed that if we did not worry about the padding member in struct siginfo it is only about 48 bytes, and 48 bytes is much nicer than 128 bytes for allocating on the stack and copying around in the kernel. The obvious thing of only adding the padding when userspace is including siginfo.h won't work as there are sigframe definitions in the kernel that embed struct siginfo. So split siginfo in two; kernel_siginfo and siginfo. Keeping the traditional name for the userspace definition. While the version that is used internally to the kernel and ultimately will not be padded to 128 bytes is called kernel_siginfo. The definition of struct kernel_siginfo I have put in include/signal_types.h A set of buildtime checks has been added to verify the two structures have the same field offsets. To make it easy to verify the change kernel_siginfo retains the same size as siginfo. The reduction in size comes in a following change. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-10-03apparmor: Fix uninitialized value in aa_split_fqnameZubin Mithra
Syzkaller reported a OOB-read with the stacktrace below. This occurs inside __aa_lookupn_ns as `n` is not initialized. `n` is obtained from aa_splitn_fqname. In cases where `name` is invalid, aa_splitn_fqname returns without initializing `ns_name` and `ns_len`. Fix this by always initializing `ns_name` and `ns_len`. __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430 memcmp+0xe3/0x160 lib/string.c:861 strnstr+0x4b/0x70 lib/string.c:934 __aa_lookupn_ns+0xc1/0x570 security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:209 aa_lookupn_ns+0x88/0x1e0 security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:240 aa_fqlookupn_profile+0x1b9/0x1010 security/apparmor/policy.c:468 fqlookupn_profile+0x80/0xc0 security/apparmor/label.c:1844 aa_label_strn_parse+0xa3a/0x1230 security/apparmor/label.c:1908 aa_label_parse+0x42/0x50 security/apparmor/label.c:1943 aa_change_profile+0x513/0x3510 security/apparmor/domain.c:1362 apparmor_setprocattr+0xaa4/0x1150 security/apparmor/lsm.c:658 security_setprocattr+0x66/0xc0 security/security.c:1298 proc_pid_attr_write+0x301/0x540 fs/proc/base.c:2555 __vfs_write+0x119/0x9f0 fs/read_write.c:485 vfs_write+0x1fc/0x560 fs/read_write.c:549 ksys_write+0x101/0x260 fs/read_write.c:598 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:610 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:607 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:607 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: 3b0aaf5866bf ("apparmor: add lib fn to find the "split" for fqnames") Reported-by: syzbot+61e4b490d9d2da591b50@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-10-03apparmor: don't try to replace stale label in ptraceme checkJann Horn
begin_current_label_crit_section() must run in sleepable context because when label_is_stale() is true, aa_replace_current_label() runs, which uses prepare_creds(), which can sleep. Until now, the ptraceme access check (which runs with tasklist_lock held) violated this rule. Fixes: b2d09ae449ced ("apparmor: move ptrace checks to using labels") Reported-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-10-03apparmor: Replace spin_is_locked() with lockdepLance Roy
lockdep_assert_held() is better suited to checking locking requirements, since it won't get confused when someone else holds the lock. This is also a step towards possibly removing spin_is_locked(). Signed-off-by: Lance Roy <ldr709@gmail.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-10-03apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policyMatthew Garrett
Add support for dropping or accepting packets based on their secmark tags. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-10-03apparmor: Parse secmark policyMatthew Garrett
Add support for parsing secmark policy provided by userspace, and store that in the overall policy. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-10-03apparmor: Add a wildcard secidMatthew Garrett
Reserve a secid value that we can use as a wildcard, allowing us to define policy that's expected to match against all secids. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-25Revert "uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct ↵Lubomir Rintel
member name" This changes UAPI, breaking iwd and libell: ell/key.c: In function 'kernel_dh_compute': ell/key.c:205:38: error: 'struct keyctl_dh_params' has no member named 'private'; did you mean 'dh_private'? struct keyctl_dh_params params = { .private = private, ^~~~~~~ dh_private This reverts commit 8a2336e549d385bb0b46880435b411df8d8200e8. Fixes: 8a2336e549d3 ("uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name") Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-18Smack: Mark expected switch fall-throughGustavo A. R. Silva
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases where we are expecting to fall through. Notice that in this particular case, I replaced "No break" with a proper "Fall through" annotation, which is what GCC is expecting to find. Warning level 2 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=2 Addresses-Coverity-ID: 115051 ("Missing break in switch") Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-18Smack: ptrace capability use fixesCasey Schaufler
This fixes a pair of problems in the Smack ptrace checks related to checking capabilities. In both cases, as reported by Lukasz Pawelczyk, the raw capability calls are used rather than the Smack wrapper that check addition restrictions. In one case, as reported by Jann Horn, the wrong task is being checked for capabilities. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-18Smack: remove set but not used variable 'root_inode'YueHaibing
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning: security/smack/smackfs.c: In function 'smk_fill_super': security/smack/smackfs.c:2856:16: warning: variable 'root_inode' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-14Revert "x86/mm/legacy: Populate the user page-table with user pgd's"Joerg Roedel
This reverts commit 1f40a46cf47c12d93a5ad9dccd82bd36ff8f956a. It turned out that this patch is not sufficient to enable PTI on 32 bit systems with legacy 2-level page-tables. In this paging mode the huge-page PTEs are in the top-level page-table directory, where also the mirroring to the user-space page-table happens. So every huge PTE exits twice, in the kernel and in the user page-table. That means that accessed/dirty bits need to be fetched from two PTEs in this mode to be safe, but this is not trivial to implement because it needs changes to generic code just for the sake of enabling PTI with 32-bit legacy paging. As all systems that need PTI should support PAE anyway, remove support for PTI when 32-bit legacy paging is used. Fixes: 7757d607c6b3 ('x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32') Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536922754-31379-1-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-09-13selinux: Add __GFP_NOWARN to allocation at str_read()Tetsuo Handa
syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for this case. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0 Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+ac488b9811036cea7ea0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-09-13apparmor: don't try to replace stale label in ptrace access checkJann Horn
As a comment above begin_current_label_crit_section() explains, begin_current_label_crit_section() must run in sleepable context because when label_is_stale() is true, aa_replace_current_label() runs, which uses prepare_creds(), which can sleep. Until now, the ptrace access check (which runs with a task lock held) violated this rule. Also add a might_sleep() assertion to begin_current_label_crit_section(), because asserts are less likely to be ignored than comments. Fixes: b2d09ae449ced ("apparmor: move ptrace checks to using labels") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-07apparmor: Fix network performance issue in aa_label_sk_permTony Jones
The netperf benchmark shows a 5.73% reduction in throughput for small (64 byte) transfers by unconfined tasks. DEFINE_AUDIT_SK() in aa_label_sk_perm() should not be performed unconditionally, rather only when the label is confined. netperf-tcp 56974a6fc^ 56974a6fc Min 64 563.48 ( 0.00%) 531.17 ( -5.73%) Min 128 1056.92 ( 0.00%) 999.44 ( -5.44%) Min 256 1945.95 ( 0.00%) 1867.97 ( -4.01%) Min 1024 6761.40 ( 0.00%) 6364.23 ( -5.87%) Min 2048 11110.53 ( 0.00%) 10606.20 ( -4.54%) Min 3312 13692.67 ( 0.00%) 13158.41 ( -3.90%) Min 4096 14926.29 ( 0.00%) 14457.46 ( -3.14%) Min 8192 18399.34 ( 0.00%) 18091.65 ( -1.67%) Min 16384 21384.13 ( 0.00%) 21158.05 ( -1.06%) Hmean 64 564.96 ( 0.00%) 534.38 ( -5.41%) Hmean 128 1064.42 ( 0.00%) 1010.12 ( -5.10%) Hmean 256 1965.85 ( 0.00%) 1879.16 ( -4.41%) Hmean 1024 6839.77 ( 0.00%) 6478.70 ( -5.28%) Hmean 2048 11154.80 ( 0.00%) 10671.13 ( -4.34%) Hmean 3312 13838.12 ( 0.00%) 13249.01 ( -4.26%) Hmean 4096 15009.99 ( 0.00%) 14561.36 ( -2.99%) Hmean 8192 18975.57 ( 0.00%) 18326.54 ( -3.42%) Hmean 16384 21440.44 ( 0.00%) 21324.59 ( -0.54%) Stddev 64 1.24 ( 0.00%) 2.85 (-130.64%) Stddev 128 4.51 ( 0.00%) 6.53 ( -44.84%) Stddev 256 11.67 ( 0.00%) 8.50 ( 27.16%) Stddev 1024 48.33 ( 0.00%) 75.07 ( -55.34%) Stddev 2048 54.82 ( 0.00%) 65.16 ( -18.86%) Stddev 3312 153.57 ( 0.00%) 56.29 ( 63.35%) Stddev 4096 100.25 ( 0.00%) 88.50 ( 11.72%) Stddev 8192 358.13 ( 0.00%) 169.99 ( 52.54%) Stddev 16384 43.99 ( 0.00%) 141.82 (-222.39%) Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de> Fixes: 56974a6fcfef ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-06Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-09-06' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor Pull apparmor fix from John Johansen: "A fix for an issue syzbot discovered last week: - Fix for bad debug check when converting secids to secctx" * tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-09-06' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: apparmor: fix bad debug check in apparmor_secid_to_secctx()