From 0efaaa86581c596f9426482c731f262d843807b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2020 08:50:08 +0200 Subject: docs: crypto: convert asymmetric-keys.txt to ReST This file is almost compatible with ReST. Just minor changes were needed: - Adjust document and titles markups; - Adjust numbered list markups; - Add a comments markup for the Contents section; - Add markups for literal blocks. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c2275ea94e0507a01b020ab66dfa824d8b1c2545.1592203650.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet --- Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst | 424 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 424 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst (limited to 'Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst') diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst b/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..349f44a29392 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst @@ -0,0 +1,424 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +============================================= +Asymmetric / Public-key Cryptography Key Type +============================================= + +.. Contents: + + - Overview. + - Key identification. + - Accessing asymmetric keys. + - Signature verification. + - Asymmetric key subtypes. + - Instantiation data parsers. + - Keyring link restrictions. + + +Overview +======== + +The "asymmetric" key type is designed to be a container for the keys used in +public-key cryptography, without imposing any particular restrictions on the +form or mechanism of the cryptography or form of the key. + +The asymmetric key is given a subtype that defines what sort of data is +associated with the key and provides operations to describe and destroy it. +However, no requirement is made that the key data actually be stored in the +key. + +A completely in-kernel key retention and operation subtype can be defined, but +it would also be possible to provide access to cryptographic hardware (such as +a TPM) that might be used to both retain the relevant key and perform +operations using that key. In such a case, the asymmetric key would then +merely be an interface to the TPM driver. + +Also provided is the concept of a data parser. Data parsers are responsible +for extracting information from the blobs of data passed to the instantiation +function. The first data parser that recognises the blob gets to set the +subtype of the key and define the operations that can be done on that key. + +A data parser may interpret the data blob as containing the bits representing a +key, or it may interpret it as a reference to a key held somewhere else in the +system (for example, a TPM). + + +Key Identification +================== + +If a key is added with an empty name, the instantiation data parsers are given +the opportunity to pre-parse a key and to determine the description the key +should be given from the content of the key. + +This can then be used to refer to the key, either by complete match or by +partial match. The key type may also use other criteria to refer to a key. + +The asymmetric key type's match function can then perform a wider range of +comparisons than just the straightforward comparison of the description with +the criterion string: + + 1) If the criterion string is of the form "id:" then the match + function will examine a key's fingerprint to see if the hex digits given + after the "id:" match the tail. For instance:: + + keyctl search @s asymmetric id:5acc2142 + + will match a key with fingerprint:: + + 1A00 2040 7601 7889 DE11 882C 3823 04AD 5ACC 2142 + + 2) If the criterion string is of the form ":" then the + match will match the ID as in (1), but with the added restriction that + only keys of the specified subtype (e.g. tpm) will be matched. For + instance:: + + keyctl search @s asymmetric tpm:5acc2142 + +Looking in /proc/keys, the last 8 hex digits of the key fingerprint are +displayed, along with the subtype:: + + 1a39e171 I----- 1 perm 3f010000 0 0 asymmetric modsign.0: DSA 5acc2142 [] + + +Accessing Asymmetric Keys +========================= + +For general access to asymmetric keys from within the kernel, the following +inclusion is required:: + + #include + +This gives access to functions for dealing with asymmetric / public keys. +Three enums are defined there for representing public-key cryptography +algorithms:: + + enum pkey_algo + +digest algorithms used by those:: + + enum pkey_hash_algo + +and key identifier representations:: + + enum pkey_id_type + +Note that the key type representation types are required because key +identifiers from different standards aren't necessarily compatible. For +instance, PGP generates key identifiers by hashing the key data plus some +PGP-specific metadata, whereas X.509 has arbitrary certificate identifiers. + +The operations defined upon a key are: + + 1) Signature verification. + +Other operations are possible (such as encryption) with the same key data +required for verification, but not currently supported, and others +(eg. decryption and signature generation) require extra key data. + + +Signature Verification +---------------------- + +An operation is provided to perform cryptographic signature verification, using +an asymmetric key to provide or to provide access to the public key:: + + int verify_signature(const struct key *key, + const struct public_key_signature *sig); + +The caller must have already obtained the key from some source and can then use +it to check the signature. The caller must have parsed the signature and +transferred the relevant bits to the structure pointed to by sig:: + + struct public_key_signature { + u8 *digest; + u8 digest_size; + enum pkey_hash_algo pkey_hash_algo : 8; + u8 nr_mpi; + union { + MPI mpi[2]; + ... + }; + }; + +The algorithm used must be noted in sig->pkey_hash_algo, and all the MPIs that +make up the actual signature must be stored in sig->mpi[] and the count of MPIs +placed in sig->nr_mpi. + +In addition, the data must have been digested by the caller and the resulting +hash must be pointed to by sig->digest and the size of the hash be placed in +sig->digest_size. + +The function will return 0 upon success or -EKEYREJECTED if the signature +doesn't match. + +The function may also return -ENOTSUPP if an unsupported public-key algorithm +or public-key/hash algorithm combination is specified or the key doesn't +support the operation; -EBADMSG or -ERANGE if some of the parameters have weird +data; or -ENOMEM if an allocation can't be performed. -EINVAL can be returned +if the key argument is the wrong type or is incompletely set up. + + +Asymmetric Key Subtypes +======================= + +Asymmetric keys have a subtype that defines the set of operations that can be +performed on that key and that determines what data is attached as the key +payload. The payload format is entirely at the whim of the subtype. + +The subtype is selected by the key data parser and the parser must initialise +the data required for it. The asymmetric key retains a reference on the +subtype module. + +The subtype definition structure can be found in:: + + #include + +and looks like the following:: + + struct asymmetric_key_subtype { + struct module *owner; + const char *name; + + void (*describe)(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m); + void (*destroy)(void *payload); + int (*query)(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params, + struct kernel_pkey_query *info); + int (*eds_op)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, + const void *in, void *out); + int (*verify_signature)(const struct key *key, + const struct public_key_signature *sig); + }; + +Asymmetric keys point to this with their payload[asym_subtype] member. + +The owner and name fields should be set to the owning module and the name of +the subtype. Currently, the name is only used for print statements. + +There are a number of operations defined by the subtype: + + 1) describe(). + + Mandatory. This allows the subtype to display something in /proc/keys + against the key. For instance the name of the public key algorithm type + could be displayed. The key type will display the tail of the key + identity string after this. + + 2) destroy(). + + Mandatory. This should free the memory associated with the key. The + asymmetric key will look after freeing the fingerprint and releasing the + reference on the subtype module. + + 3) query(). + + Mandatory. This is a function for querying the capabilities of a key. + + 4) eds_op(). + + Optional. This is the entry point for the encryption, decryption and + signature creation operations (which are distinguished by the operation ID + in the parameter struct). The subtype may do anything it likes to + implement an operation, including offloading to hardware. + + 5) verify_signature(). + + Optional. This is the entry point for signature verification. The + subtype may do anything it likes to implement an operation, including + offloading to hardware. + +Instantiation Data Parsers +========================== + +The asymmetric key type doesn't generally want to store or to deal with a raw +blob of data that holds the key data. It would have to parse it and error +check it each time it wanted to use it. Further, the contents of the blob may +have various checks that can be performed on it (eg. self-signatures, validity +dates) and may contain useful data about the key (identifiers, capabilities). + +Also, the blob may represent a pointer to some hardware containing the key +rather than the key itself. + +Examples of blob formats for which parsers could be implemented include: + + - OpenPGP packet stream [RFC 4880]. + - X.509 ASN.1 stream. + - Pointer to TPM key. + - Pointer to UEFI key. + - PKCS#8 private key [RFC 5208]. + - PKCS#5 encrypted private key [RFC 2898]. + +During key instantiation each parser in the list is tried until one doesn't +return -EBADMSG. + +The parser definition structure can be found in:: + + #include + +and looks like the following:: + + struct asymmetric_key_parser { + struct module *owner; + const char *name; + + int (*parse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); + }; + +The owner and name fields should be set to the owning module and the name of +the parser. + +There is currently only a single operation defined by the parser, and it is +mandatory: + + 1) parse(). + + This is called to preparse the key from the key creation and update paths. + In particular, it is called during the key creation _before_ a key is + allocated, and as such, is permitted to provide the key's description in + the case that the caller declines to do so. + + The caller passes a pointer to the following struct with all of the fields + cleared, except for data, datalen and quotalen [see + Documentation/security/keys/core.rst]:: + + struct key_preparsed_payload { + char *description; + void *payload[4]; + const void *data; + size_t datalen; + size_t quotalen; + }; + + The instantiation data is in a blob pointed to by data and is datalen in + size. The parse() function is not permitted to change these two values at + all, and shouldn't change any of the other values _unless_ they are + recognise the blob format and will not return -EBADMSG to indicate it is + not theirs. + + If the parser is happy with the blob, it should propose a description for + the key and attach it to ->description, ->payload[asym_subtype] should be + set to point to the subtype to be used, ->payload[asym_crypto] should be + set to point to the initialised data for that subtype, + ->payload[asym_key_ids] should point to one or more hex fingerprints and + quotalen should be updated to indicate how much quota this key should + account for. + + When clearing up, the data attached to ->payload[asym_key_ids] and + ->description will be kfree()'d and the data attached to + ->payload[asm_crypto] will be passed to the subtype's ->destroy() method + to be disposed of. A module reference for the subtype pointed to by + ->payload[asym_subtype] will be put. + + + If the data format is not recognised, -EBADMSG should be returned. If it + is recognised, but the key cannot for some reason be set up, some other + negative error code should be returned. On success, 0 should be returned. + + The key's fingerprint string may be partially matched upon. For a + public-key algorithm such as RSA and DSA this will likely be a printable + hex version of the key's fingerprint. + +Functions are provided to register and unregister parsers:: + + int register_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *parser); + void unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *subtype); + +Parsers may not have the same name. The names are otherwise only used for +displaying in debugging messages. + + +Keyring Link Restrictions +========================= + +Keyrings created from userspace using add_key can be configured to check the +signature of the key being linked. Keys without a valid signature are not +allowed to link. + +Several restriction methods are available: + + 1) Restrict using the kernel builtin trusted keyring + + - Option string used with KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING: + - "builtin_trusted" + + The kernel builtin trusted keyring will be searched for the signing key. + If the builtin trusted keyring is not configured, all links will be + rejected. The ca_keys kernel parameter also affects which keys are used + for signature verification. + + 2) Restrict using the kernel builtin and secondary trusted keyrings + + - Option string used with KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING: + - "builtin_and_secondary_trusted" + + The kernel builtin and secondary trusted keyrings will be searched for the + signing key. If the secondary trusted keyring is not configured, this + restriction will behave like the "builtin_trusted" option. The ca_keys + kernel parameter also affects which keys are used for signature + verification. + + 3) Restrict using a separate key or keyring + + - Option string used with KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING: + - "key_or_keyring:[:chain]" + + Whenever a key link is requested, the link will only succeed if the key + being linked is signed by one of the designated keys. This key may be + specified directly by providing a serial number for one asymmetric key, or + a group of keys may be searched for the signing key by providing the + serial number for a keyring. + + When the "chain" option is provided at the end of the string, the keys + within the destination keyring will also be searched for signing keys. + This allows for verification of certificate chains by adding each + certificate in order (starting closest to the root) to a keyring. For + instance, one keyring can be populated with links to a set of root + certificates, with a separate, restricted keyring set up for each + certificate chain to be validated:: + + # Create and populate a keyring for root certificates + root_id=`keyctl add keyring root-certs "" @s` + keyctl padd asymmetric "" $root_id < root1.cert + keyctl padd asymmetric "" $root_id < root2.cert + + # Create and restrict a keyring for the certificate chain + chain_id=`keyctl add keyring chain "" @s` + keyctl restrict_keyring $chain_id asymmetric key_or_keyring:$root_id:chain + + # Attempt to add each certificate in the chain, starting with the + # certificate closest to the root. + keyctl padd asymmetric "" $chain_id < intermediateA.cert + keyctl padd asymmetric "" $chain_id < intermediateB.cert + keyctl padd asymmetric "" $chain_id < end-entity.cert + + If the final end-entity certificate is successfully added to the "chain" + keyring, we can be certain that it has a valid signing chain going back to + one of the root certificates. + + A single keyring can be used to verify a chain of signatures by + restricting the keyring after linking the root certificate:: + + # Create a keyring for the certificate chain and add the root + chain2_id=`keyctl add keyring chain2 "" @s` + keyctl padd asymmetric "" $chain2_id < root1.cert + + # Restrict the keyring that already has root1.cert linked. The cert + # will remain linked by the keyring. + keyctl restrict_keyring $chain2_id asymmetric key_or_keyring:0:chain + + # Attempt to add each certificate in the chain, starting with the + # certificate closest to the root. + keyctl padd asymmetric "" $chain2_id < intermediateA.cert + keyctl padd asymmetric "" $chain2_id < intermediateB.cert + keyctl padd asymmetric "" $chain2_id < end-entity.cert + + If the final end-entity certificate is successfully added to the "chain2" + keyring, we can be certain that there is a valid signing chain going back + to the root certificate that was added before the keyring was restricted. + + +In all of these cases, if the signing key is found the signature of the key to +be linked will be verified using the signing key. The requested key is added +to the keyring only if the signature is successfully verified. -ENOKEY is +returned if the parent certificate could not be found, or -EKEYREJECTED is +returned if the signature check fails or the key is blacklisted. Other errors +may be returned if the signature check could not be performed. -- cgit v1.2.3