From 5f0d5a3ae7cff0d7fa943c199c3a2e44f23e1fac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Paul E. McKenney" Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2017 02:53:44 -0800 Subject: mm: Rename SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU A group of Linux kernel hackers reported chasing a bug that resulted from their assumption that SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU provided an existence guarantee, that is, that no block from such a slab would be reallocated during an RCU read-side critical section. Of course, that is not the case. Instead, SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU only prevents freeing of an entire slab of blocks. However, there is a phrase for this, namely "type safety". This commit therefore renames SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU in order to avoid future instances of this sort of confusion. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: Pekka Enberg Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Joonsoo Kim Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Acked-by: Johannes Weiner Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka [ paulmck: Add comments mentioning the old name, as requested by Eric Dumazet, in order to help people familiar with the old name find the new one. ] Acked-by: David Rientjes --- kernel/fork.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel/fork.c') diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 6c463c80e93d..9330ce24f1bb 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -1313,7 +1313,7 @@ void __cleanup_sighand(struct sighand_struct *sighand) if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sighand->count)) { signalfd_cleanup(sighand); /* - * sighand_cachep is SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU so we can free it + * sighand_cachep is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU so we can free it * without an RCU grace period, see __lock_task_sighand(). */ kmem_cache_free(sighand_cachep, sighand); @@ -2144,7 +2144,7 @@ void __init proc_caches_init(void) { sighand_cachep = kmem_cache_create("sighand_cache", sizeof(struct sighand_struct), 0, - SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU| + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU| SLAB_NOTRACK|SLAB_ACCOUNT, sighand_ctor); signal_cachep = kmem_cache_create("signal_cache", sizeof(struct signal_struct), 0, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Micay Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 09:32:09 -0400 Subject: stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canary's random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms The stack canary is an 'unsigned long' and should be fully initialized to random data rather than only 32 bits of random data. Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven Acked-by: Rik van Riel Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Arjan van Ven Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170504133209.3053-1-danielmicay@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel/fork.c') diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 3a4343cdfe90..d681f8f10d2d 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node) set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk); #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR - tsk->stack_canary = get_random_int(); + tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long(); #endif /* -- cgit v1.2.3