From f478898e0aa74a759fcf629a3ee8b040467b8533 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 03:18:14 -0800 Subject: string: Redefine strscpy_pad() as a macro In preparation for making strscpy_pad()'s 3rd argument optional, redefine it as a macro. This also has the benefit of allowing greater FORITFY introspection, as it couldn't see into the strscpy() nor the memset() within strscpy_pad(). Cc: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Reviewed-by: Justin Stitt Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- lib/string_helpers.c | 34 ---------------------------------- 1 file changed, 34 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib/string_helpers.c') diff --git a/lib/string_helpers.c b/lib/string_helpers.c index 7713f73e66b0..606c3099013f 100644 --- a/lib/string_helpers.c +++ b/lib/string_helpers.c @@ -825,40 +825,6 @@ char **devm_kasprintf_strarray(struct device *dev, const char *prefix, size_t n) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(devm_kasprintf_strarray); -/** - * strscpy_pad() - Copy a C-string into a sized buffer - * @dest: Where to copy the string to - * @src: Where to copy the string from - * @count: Size of destination buffer - * - * Copy the string, or as much of it as fits, into the dest buffer. The - * behavior is undefined if the string buffers overlap. The destination - * buffer is always %NUL terminated, unless it's zero-sized. - * - * If the source string is shorter than the destination buffer, zeros - * the tail of the destination buffer. - * - * For full explanation of why you may want to consider using the - * 'strscpy' functions please see the function docstring for strscpy(). - * - * Returns: - * * The number of characters copied (not including the trailing %NUL) - * * -E2BIG if count is 0 or @src was truncated. - */ -ssize_t strscpy_pad(char *dest, const char *src, size_t count) -{ - ssize_t written; - - written = strscpy(dest, src, count); - if (written < 0 || written == count - 1) - return written; - - memset(dest + written + 1, 0, count - written - 1); - - return written; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(strscpy_pad); - /** * skip_spaces - Removes leading whitespace from @str. * @str: The string to be stripped. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 475ddf1fce1ec4826c8dda40ec59f7f83a7aadb8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2023 12:27:13 -0700 Subject: fortify: Split reporting and avoid passing string pointer In preparation for KUnit testing and further improvements in fortify failure reporting, split out the report and encode the function and access failure (read or write overflow) into a single u8 argument. This mainly ends up saving a tiny bit of space in the data segment. For a defconfig with FORTIFY_SOURCE enabled: $ size gcc/vmlinux.before gcc/vmlinux.after text data bss dec hex filename 26132309 9760658 2195460 38088427 2452eeb gcc/vmlinux.before 26132386 9748382 2195460 38076228 244ff44 gcc/vmlinux.after Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c | 2 +- arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.h | 2 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 2 +- include/linux/fortify-string.h | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- lib/string_helpers.c | 23 ++++++++++-- tools/objtool/noreturns.h | 2 +- 6 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib/string_helpers.c') diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c index 6b4baa6a9a50..d93e2e466f6a 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c +++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ decompress_kernel(unsigned long output_start, unsigned long free_mem_ptr_p, putstr(" done, booting the kernel.\n"); } -void fortify_panic(const char *name) +void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason) { error("detected buffer overflow"); } diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.h index 6da00a26ac08..4d59c427253c 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.h +++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.h @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ void __div0(void); void decompress_kernel(unsigned long output_start, unsigned long free_mem_ptr_p, unsigned long free_mem_ptr_end_p, int arch_id); -void fortify_panic(const char *name); +void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason); int atags_to_fdt(void *atag_list, void *fdt, int total_space); uint32_t fdt_check_mem_start(uint32_t mem_start, const void *fdt); int do_decompress(u8 *input, int len, u8 *output, void (*error)(char *x)); diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c index b99e08e6815b..c9971b9dbb09 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c @@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, unsigned char *output) return output + entry_offset; } -void fortify_panic(const char *name) +void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason) { error("detected buffer overflow"); } diff --git a/include/linux/fortify-string.h b/include/linux/fortify-string.h index 06b3aaa63724..4f6767dcd933 100644 --- a/include/linux/fortify-string.h +++ b/include/linux/fortify-string.h @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #ifndef _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_ #define _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_ +#include #include #include #include @@ -9,7 +10,44 @@ #define __FORTIFY_INLINE extern __always_inline __gnu_inline __overloadable #define __RENAME(x) __asm__(#x) -void fortify_panic(const char *name) __noreturn __cold; +#define FORTIFY_REASON_DIR(r) FIELD_GET(BIT(0), r) +#define FORTIFY_REASON_FUNC(r) FIELD_GET(GENMASK(7, 1), r) +#define FORTIFY_REASON(func, write) (FIELD_PREP(BIT(0), write) | \ + FIELD_PREP(GENMASK(7, 1), func)) + +#define fortify_panic(func, write) \ + __fortify_panic(FORTIFY_REASON(func, write)) + +#define FORTIFY_READ 0 +#define FORTIFY_WRITE 1 + +#define EACH_FORTIFY_FUNC(macro) \ + macro(strncpy), \ + macro(strnlen), \ + macro(strlen), \ + macro(strscpy), \ + macro(strlcat), \ + macro(strcat), \ + macro(strncat), \ + macro(memset), \ + macro(memcpy), \ + macro(memmove), \ + macro(memscan), \ + macro(memcmp), \ + macro(memchr), \ + macro(memchr_inv), \ + macro(kmemdup), \ + macro(strcpy), \ + macro(UNKNOWN), + +#define MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC(func) FORTIFY_FUNC_##func + +enum fortify_func { + EACH_FORTIFY_FUNC(MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC) +}; + +void __fortify_report(const u8 reason); +void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason) __cold __noreturn; void __read_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)"); void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object (2nd parameter)"); void __read_overflow2_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("detected read beyond size of field (2nd parameter); maybe use struct_group()?"); @@ -143,7 +181,7 @@ char *strncpy(char * const POS p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __write_overflow(); if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(__func__); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncpy, FORTIFY_WRITE); return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size); } @@ -174,7 +212,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size /* Do not check characters beyond the end of p. */ ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size); if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret) - fortify_panic(__func__); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strnlen, FORTIFY_READ); return ret; } @@ -210,7 +248,7 @@ __kernel_size_t __fortify_strlen(const char * const POS p) return __underlying_strlen(p); ret = strnlen(p, p_size); if (p_size <= ret) - fortify_panic(__func__); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlen, FORTIFY_READ); return ret; } @@ -261,7 +299,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t sized_strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const PO * p_size. */ if (len > p_size) - fortify_panic(__func__); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strscpy, FORTIFY_WRITE); /* * We can now safely call vanilla strscpy because we are protected from: @@ -319,7 +357,7 @@ size_t strlcat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t avail) /* Give up if string is already overflowed. */ if (p_size <= p_len) - fortify_panic(__func__); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_READ); if (actual >= avail) { copy_len = avail - p_len - 1; @@ -328,7 +366,7 @@ size_t strlcat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t avail) /* Give up if copy will overflow. */ if (p_size <= actual) - fortify_panic(__func__); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_WRITE); __underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len); p[actual] = '\0'; @@ -357,7 +395,7 @@ char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q) const size_t p_size = __member_size(p); if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size) - fortify_panic(__func__); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcat, FORTIFY_WRITE); return p; } @@ -393,7 +431,7 @@ char *strncat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, __kernel_size_t coun p_len = strlen(p); copy_len = strnlen(q, count); if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1) - fortify_panic(__func__); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncat, FORTIFY_WRITE); __underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len); p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0'; return p; @@ -434,7 +472,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size, * lengths are unknown.) */ if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size) - fortify_panic("memset"); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memset, FORTIFY_WRITE); } #define __fortify_memset_chk(p, c, size, p_size, p_size_field) ({ \ @@ -488,7 +526,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size, const size_t q_size, const size_t p_size_field, const size_t q_size_field, - const char *func) + const u8 func) { if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) { /* @@ -532,9 +570,10 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size, * (The SIZE_MAX test is to optimize away checks where the buffer * lengths are unknown.) */ - if ((p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size) || - (q_size != SIZE_MAX && q_size < size)) - fortify_panic(func); + if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size) + fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_WRITE); + else if (q_size != SIZE_MAX && q_size < size) + fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_READ); /* * Warn when writing beyond destination field size. @@ -567,7 +606,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size, const size_t __q_size_field = (q_size_field); \ WARN_ONCE(fortify_memcpy_chk(__fortify_size, __p_size, \ __q_size, __p_size_field, \ - __q_size_field, #op), \ + __q_size_field, FORTIFY_FUNC_ ##op), \ #op ": detected field-spanning write (size %zu) of single %s (size %zu)\n", \ __fortify_size, \ "field \"" #p "\" at " FILE_LINE, \ @@ -634,7 +673,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memscan(void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(__func__); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memscan, FORTIFY_READ); return __real_memscan(p, c, size); } @@ -651,7 +690,7 @@ int memcmp(const void * const POS0 p, const void * const POS0 q, __kernel_size_t __read_overflow2(); } if (p_size < size || q_size < size) - fortify_panic(__func__); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp, FORTIFY_READ); return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size); } @@ -663,7 +702,7 @@ void *memchr(const void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(__func__); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr, FORTIFY_READ); return __underlying_memchr(p, c, size); } @@ -675,7 +714,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void * const POS0 p, int c, size_t size) if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(__func__); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr_inv, FORTIFY_READ); return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size); } @@ -688,7 +727,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void * const POS0 p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(__func__); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_kmemdup, FORTIFY_READ); return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp); } @@ -725,7 +764,7 @@ char *strcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q) __write_overflow(); /* Run-time check for dynamic size overflow. */ if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(__func__); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcpy, FORTIFY_WRITE); __underlying_memcpy(p, q, size); return p; } diff --git a/lib/string_helpers.c b/lib/string_helpers.c index 606c3099013f..9291dc74ae01 100644 --- a/lib/string_helpers.c +++ b/lib/string_helpers.c @@ -1008,10 +1008,27 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__read_overflow2_field); void __write_overflow_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) { } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__write_overflow_field); -void fortify_panic(const char *name) +static const char * const fortify_func_name[] = { +#define MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC_NAME(func) [MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC(func)] = #func + EACH_FORTIFY_FUNC(MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC_NAME) +#undef MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC_NAME +}; + +void __fortify_report(const u8 reason) +{ + const u8 func = FORTIFY_REASON_FUNC(reason); + const bool write = FORTIFY_REASON_DIR(reason); + const char *name; + + name = fortify_func_name[umin(func, FORTIFY_FUNC_UNKNOWN)]; + WARN(1, "%s: detected buffer %s overflow\n", name, str_read_write(!write)); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__fortify_report); + +void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason) { - pr_emerg("detected buffer overflow in %s\n", name); + __fortify_report(reason); BUG(); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(fortify_panic); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__fortify_panic); #endif /* CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE */ diff --git a/tools/objtool/noreturns.h b/tools/objtool/noreturns.h index 1685d7ea6a9f..3a301696f005 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/noreturns.h +++ b/tools/objtool/noreturns.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ * * Yes, this is unfortunate. A better solution is in the works. */ +NORETURN(__fortify_panic) NORETURN(__kunit_abort) NORETURN(__module_put_and_kthread_exit) NORETURN(__reiserfs_panic) @@ -22,7 +23,6 @@ NORETURN(do_exit) NORETURN(do_group_exit) NORETURN(do_task_dead) NORETURN(ex_handler_msr_mce) -NORETURN(fortify_panic) NORETURN(hlt_play_dead) NORETURN(hv_ghcb_terminate) NORETURN(kthread_complete_and_exit) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4ce615e798a752d4431fcc52960478906dec2f0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2023 12:27:14 -0700 Subject: fortify: Provide KUnit counters for failure testing The standard C string APIs were not designed to have a failure mode; they were expected to always succeed without memory safety issues. Normally, CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE will use fortify_panic() to stop processing, as truncating a read or write may provide an even worse system state. However, this creates a problem for testing under things like KUnit, which needs a way to survive failures. When building with CONFIG_KUNIT, provide a failure path for all users of fortify_panic, and track whether the failure was a read overflow or a write overflow, for KUnit tests to examine. Inspired by similar logic in the slab tests. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- include/linux/fortify-string.h | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- lib/fortify_kunit.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/string_helpers.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib/string_helpers.c') diff --git a/include/linux/fortify-string.h b/include/linux/fortify-string.h index 4f6767dcd933..fbfb90479b8f 100644 --- a/include/linux/fortify-string.h +++ b/include/linux/fortify-string.h @@ -15,8 +15,10 @@ #define FORTIFY_REASON(func, write) (FIELD_PREP(BIT(0), write) | \ FIELD_PREP(GENMASK(7, 1), func)) -#define fortify_panic(func, write) \ - __fortify_panic(FORTIFY_REASON(func, write)) +#ifndef fortify_panic +# define fortify_panic(func, write, retfail) \ + __fortify_panic(FORTIFY_REASON(func, write)) +#endif #define FORTIFY_READ 0 #define FORTIFY_WRITE 1 @@ -181,7 +183,7 @@ char *strncpy(char * const POS p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __write_overflow(); if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncpy, FORTIFY_WRITE); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p); return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size); } @@ -212,7 +214,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size /* Do not check characters beyond the end of p. */ ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size); if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strnlen, FORTIFY_READ); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strnlen, FORTIFY_READ, ret); return ret; } @@ -248,7 +250,7 @@ __kernel_size_t __fortify_strlen(const char * const POS p) return __underlying_strlen(p); ret = strnlen(p, p_size); if (p_size <= ret) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlen, FORTIFY_READ); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlen, FORTIFY_READ, ret); return ret; } @@ -299,7 +301,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t sized_strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const PO * p_size. */ if (len > p_size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strscpy, FORTIFY_WRITE); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strscpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, -E2BIG); /* * We can now safely call vanilla strscpy because we are protected from: @@ -357,7 +359,7 @@ size_t strlcat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t avail) /* Give up if string is already overflowed. */ if (p_size <= p_len) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_READ); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_READ, wanted); if (actual >= avail) { copy_len = avail - p_len - 1; @@ -366,7 +368,7 @@ size_t strlcat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t avail) /* Give up if copy will overflow. */ if (p_size <= actual) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_WRITE); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, wanted); __underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len); p[actual] = '\0'; @@ -395,7 +397,7 @@ char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q) const size_t p_size = __member_size(p); if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcat, FORTIFY_WRITE); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p); return p; } @@ -431,13 +433,13 @@ char *strncat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, __kernel_size_t coun p_len = strlen(p); copy_len = strnlen(q, count); if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncat, FORTIFY_WRITE); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p); __underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len); p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0'; return p; } -__FORTIFY_INLINE void fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size, +__FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size, const size_t p_size, const size_t p_size_field) { @@ -472,7 +474,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size, * lengths are unknown.) */ if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memset, FORTIFY_WRITE); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memset, FORTIFY_WRITE, true); + return false; } #define __fortify_memset_chk(p, c, size, p_size, p_size_field) ({ \ @@ -571,9 +574,9 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size, * lengths are unknown.) */ if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size) - fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_WRITE); + fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_WRITE, true); else if (q_size != SIZE_MAX && q_size < size) - fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_READ); + fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_READ, true); /* * Warn when writing beyond destination field size. @@ -673,7 +676,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memscan(void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memscan, FORTIFY_READ); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memscan, FORTIFY_READ, NULL); return __real_memscan(p, c, size); } @@ -690,7 +693,7 @@ int memcmp(const void * const POS0 p, const void * const POS0 q, __kernel_size_t __read_overflow2(); } if (p_size < size || q_size < size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp, FORTIFY_READ); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp, FORTIFY_READ, INT_MIN); return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size); } @@ -702,7 +705,7 @@ void *memchr(const void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr, FORTIFY_READ); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr, FORTIFY_READ, NULL); return __underlying_memchr(p, c, size); } @@ -714,7 +717,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void * const POS0 p, int c, size_t size) if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr_inv, FORTIFY_READ); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr_inv, FORTIFY_READ, NULL); return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size); } @@ -727,7 +730,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void * const POS0 p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_kmemdup, FORTIFY_READ); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_kmemdup, FORTIFY_READ, NULL); return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp); } @@ -764,7 +767,7 @@ char *strcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q) __write_overflow(); /* Run-time check for dynamic size overflow. */ if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcpy, FORTIFY_WRITE); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p); __underlying_memcpy(p, q, size); return p; } diff --git a/lib/fortify_kunit.c b/lib/fortify_kunit.c index 7a88b5dd3d27..4ba7d02fdd78 100644 --- a/lib/fortify_kunit.c +++ b/lib/fortify_kunit.c @@ -15,8 +15,17 @@ */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt +/* Redefine fortify_panic() to track failures. */ +void fortify_add_kunit_error(int write); +#define fortify_panic(func, write, retfail) do { \ + __fortify_report(FORTIFY_REASON(func, write)); \ + fortify_add_kunit_error(write); \ + return (retfail); \ +} while (0) + #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -27,10 +36,34 @@ # define __compiletime_strlen __builtin_strlen #endif +static struct kunit_resource read_resource; +static struct kunit_resource write_resource; +static int fortify_read_overflows; +static int fortify_write_overflows; + static const char array_of_10[] = "this is 10"; static const char *ptr_of_11 = "this is 11!"; static char array_unknown[] = "compiler thinks I might change"; +void fortify_add_kunit_error(int write) +{ + struct kunit_resource *resource; + struct kunit *current_test; + + current_test = kunit_get_current_test(); + if (!current_test) + return; + + resource = kunit_find_named_resource(current_test, + write ? "fortify_write_overflows" + : "fortify_read_overflows"); + if (!resource) + return; + + (*(int *)resource->data)++; + kunit_put_resource(resource); +} + static void known_sizes_test(struct kunit *test) { KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, __compiletime_strlen("88888888"), 8); @@ -318,6 +351,14 @@ static int fortify_test_init(struct kunit *test) if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE)) kunit_skip(test, "Not built with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y"); + fortify_read_overflows = 0; + kunit_add_named_resource(test, NULL, NULL, &read_resource, + "fortify_read_overflows", + &fortify_read_overflows); + fortify_write_overflows = 0; + kunit_add_named_resource(test, NULL, NULL, &write_resource, + "fortify_write_overflows", + &fortify_write_overflows); return 0; } diff --git a/lib/string_helpers.c b/lib/string_helpers.c index 9291dc74ae01..5e53d42e32bb 100644 --- a/lib/string_helpers.c +++ b/lib/string_helpers.c @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include /** * string_get_size - get the size in the specified units -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3d965b33e40d973b450cb0212913f039476c16f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2023 12:27:16 -0700 Subject: fortify: Improve buffer overflow reporting Improve the reporting of buffer overflows under CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE to help accelerate debugging efforts. The calculations are all just sitting in registers anyway, so pass them along to the function to be reported. For example, before: detected buffer overflow in memcpy and after: memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4096 byte read of buffer size 1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230407192717.636137-10-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c | 2 +- arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.h | 2 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 2 +- include/linux/fortify-string.h | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- lib/fortify_kunit.c | 4 +-- lib/string_helpers.c | 9 ++++--- 6 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib/string_helpers.c') diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c index d93e2e466f6a..6c41b270560e 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c +++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ decompress_kernel(unsigned long output_start, unsigned long free_mem_ptr_p, putstr(" done, booting the kernel.\n"); } -void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason) +void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason, size_t avail, size_t size) { error("detected buffer overflow"); } diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.h index 4d59c427253c..8c73940b5fe4 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.h +++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.h @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ void __div0(void); void decompress_kernel(unsigned long output_start, unsigned long free_mem_ptr_p, unsigned long free_mem_ptr_end_p, int arch_id); -void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason); +void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason, size_t avail, size_t size); int atags_to_fdt(void *atag_list, void *fdt, int total_space); uint32_t fdt_check_mem_start(uint32_t mem_start, const void *fdt); int do_decompress(u8 *input, int len, u8 *output, void (*error)(char *x)); diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c index c9971b9dbb09..1844da203da9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c @@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, unsigned char *output) return output + entry_offset; } -void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason) +void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason, size_t avail, size_t size) { error("detected buffer overflow"); } diff --git a/include/linux/fortify-string.h b/include/linux/fortify-string.h index fbfb90479b8f..6aeebe0a6777 100644 --- a/include/linux/fortify-string.h +++ b/include/linux/fortify-string.h @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ FIELD_PREP(GENMASK(7, 1), func)) #ifndef fortify_panic -# define fortify_panic(func, write, retfail) \ - __fortify_panic(FORTIFY_REASON(func, write)) +# define fortify_panic(func, write, avail, size, retfail) \ + __fortify_panic(FORTIFY_REASON(func, write), avail, size) #endif #define FORTIFY_READ 0 @@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ enum fortify_func { EACH_FORTIFY_FUNC(MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC) }; -void __fortify_report(const u8 reason); -void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason) __cold __noreturn; +void __fortify_report(const u8 reason, const size_t avail, const size_t size); +void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason, const size_t avail, const size_t size) __cold __noreturn; void __read_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)"); void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object (2nd parameter)"); void __read_overflow2_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("detected read beyond size of field (2nd parameter); maybe use struct_group()?"); @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ char *strncpy(char * const POS p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __write_overflow(); if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, size, p); return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size); } @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size /* Do not check characters beyond the end of p. */ ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size); if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strnlen, FORTIFY_READ, ret); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strnlen, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, ret + 1, ret); return ret; } @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ __kernel_size_t __fortify_strlen(const char * const POS p) return __underlying_strlen(p); ret = strnlen(p, p_size); if (p_size <= ret) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlen, FORTIFY_READ, ret); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlen, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, ret + 1, ret); return ret; } @@ -300,8 +300,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t sized_strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const PO * Generate a runtime write overflow error if len is greater than * p_size. */ - if (len > p_size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strscpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, -E2BIG); + if (p_size < len) + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strscpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, len, -E2BIG); /* * We can now safely call vanilla strscpy because we are protected from: @@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ size_t strlcat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t avail) /* Give up if string is already overflowed. */ if (p_size <= p_len) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_READ, wanted); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, p_len + 1, wanted); if (actual >= avail) { copy_len = avail - p_len - 1; @@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ size_t strlcat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t avail) /* Give up if copy will overflow. */ if (p_size <= actual) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, wanted); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strlcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, actual + 1, wanted); __underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len); p[actual] = '\0'; @@ -395,9 +395,10 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcat, 1, 2) char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q) { const size_t p_size = __member_size(p); + const size_t wanted = strlcat(p, q, p_size); - if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p); + if (p_size <= wanted) + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, wanted + 1, p); return p; } @@ -426,14 +427,15 @@ char *strncat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, __kernel_size_t coun { const size_t p_size = __member_size(p); const size_t q_size = __member_size(q); - size_t p_len, copy_len; + size_t p_len, copy_len, total; if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX) return __underlying_strncat(p, q, count); p_len = strlen(p); copy_len = strnlen(q, count); - if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p); + total = p_len + copy_len + 1; + if (p_size < total) + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strncat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, total, p); __underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len); p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0'; return p; @@ -474,7 +476,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size, * lengths are unknown.) */ if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memset, FORTIFY_WRITE, true); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memset, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, size, true); return false; } @@ -574,9 +576,9 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE bool fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size, * lengths are unknown.) */ if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size) - fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_WRITE, true); + fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, size, true); else if (q_size != SIZE_MAX && q_size < size) - fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_READ, true); + fortify_panic(func, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, true); /* * Warn when writing beyond destination field size. @@ -676,7 +678,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memscan(void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memscan, FORTIFY_READ, NULL); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memscan, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, NULL); return __real_memscan(p, c, size); } @@ -692,8 +694,10 @@ int memcmp(const void * const POS0 p, const void * const POS0 q, __kernel_size_t if (__compiletime_lessthan(q_size, size)) __read_overflow2(); } - if (p_size < size || q_size < size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp, FORTIFY_READ, INT_MIN); + if (p_size < size) + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, INT_MIN); + else if (q_size < size) + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memcmp, FORTIFY_READ, q_size, size, INT_MIN); return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size); } @@ -705,7 +709,7 @@ void *memchr(const void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr, FORTIFY_READ, NULL); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, NULL); return __underlying_memchr(p, c, size); } @@ -717,7 +721,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void * const POS0 p, int c, size_t size) if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr_inv, FORTIFY_READ, NULL); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_memchr_inv, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, NULL); return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size); } @@ -730,7 +734,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void * const POS0 p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp if (__compiletime_lessthan(p_size, size)) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_kmemdup, FORTIFY_READ, NULL); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_kmemdup, FORTIFY_READ, p_size, size, NULL); return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp); } @@ -767,7 +771,7 @@ char *strcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q) __write_overflow(); /* Run-time check for dynamic size overflow. */ if (p_size < size) - fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p); + fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcpy, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, size, p); __underlying_memcpy(p, q, size); return p; } diff --git a/lib/fortify_kunit.c b/lib/fortify_kunit.c index f0accebeca02..493ec02dd5b3 100644 --- a/lib/fortify_kunit.c +++ b/lib/fortify_kunit.c @@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ /* Redefine fortify_panic() to track failures. */ void fortify_add_kunit_error(int write); -#define fortify_panic(func, write, retfail) do { \ - __fortify_report(FORTIFY_REASON(func, write)); \ +#define fortify_panic(func, write, avail, size, retfail) do { \ + __fortify_report(FORTIFY_REASON(func, write), avail, size); \ fortify_add_kunit_error(write); \ return (retfail); \ } while (0) diff --git a/lib/string_helpers.c b/lib/string_helpers.c index 5e53d42e32bb..6bbafd6a10d9 100644 --- a/lib/string_helpers.c +++ b/lib/string_helpers.c @@ -1016,20 +1016,21 @@ static const char * const fortify_func_name[] = { #undef MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC_NAME }; -void __fortify_report(const u8 reason) +void __fortify_report(const u8 reason, const size_t avail, const size_t size) { const u8 func = FORTIFY_REASON_FUNC(reason); const bool write = FORTIFY_REASON_DIR(reason); const char *name; name = fortify_func_name[umin(func, FORTIFY_FUNC_UNKNOWN)]; - WARN(1, "%s: detected buffer %s overflow\n", name, str_read_write(!write)); + WARN(1, "%s: detected buffer overflow: %zu byte %s of buffer size %zu\n", + name, size, str_read_write(!write), avail); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__fortify_report); -void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason) +void __fortify_panic(const u8 reason, const size_t avail, const size_t size) { - __fortify_report(reason); + __fortify_report(reason, avail, size); BUG(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__fortify_panic); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f0b7f8ade9d2532a7d7da40eb297570d48dd2147 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Shevchenko Date: Thu, 29 Feb 2024 22:52:30 +0200 Subject: lib/string_helpers: Add flags param to string_get_size() The new flags parameter allows controlling - Whether or not the units suffix is separated by a space, for compatibility with sort -h - Whether or not to append a B suffix - we're not always printing bytes. Co-developed-by: Kent Overstreet Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko Reviewed-by: Kent Overstreet Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240229205345.93902-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- include/linux/string_helpers.h | 10 +++++-- lib/string_helpers.c | 29 ++++++++++--------- lib/test-string_helpers.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib/string_helpers.c') diff --git a/include/linux/string_helpers.h b/include/linux/string_helpers.h index 58fb1f90eda5..e93fbb5b0c01 100644 --- a/include/linux/string_helpers.h +++ b/include/linux/string_helpers.h @@ -17,14 +17,18 @@ static inline bool string_is_terminated(const char *s, int len) return memchr(s, '\0', len) ? true : false; } -/* Descriptions of the types of units to - * print in */ +/* Descriptions of the types of units to print in */ enum string_size_units { STRING_UNITS_10, /* use powers of 10^3 (standard SI) */ STRING_UNITS_2, /* use binary powers of 2^10 */ + STRING_UNITS_MASK = BIT(0), + + /* Modifiers */ + STRING_UNITS_NO_SPACE = BIT(30), + STRING_UNITS_NO_BYTES = BIT(31), }; -int string_get_size(u64 size, u64 blk_size, enum string_size_units units, +int string_get_size(u64 size, u64 blk_size, const enum string_size_units units, char *buf, int len); int parse_int_array_user(const char __user *from, size_t count, int **array); diff --git a/lib/string_helpers.c b/lib/string_helpers.c index 6bbafd6a10d9..69ba49b853c7 100644 --- a/lib/string_helpers.c +++ b/lib/string_helpers.c @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ * string_get_size - get the size in the specified units * @size: The size to be converted in blocks * @blk_size: Size of the block (use 1 for size in bytes) - * @units: units to use (powers of 1000 or 1024) + * @units: Units to use (powers of 1000 or 1024), whether to include space separator * @buf: buffer to format to * @len: length of buffer * @@ -39,11 +39,12 @@ int string_get_size(u64 size, u64 blk_size, const enum string_size_units units, char *buf, int len) { + enum string_size_units units_base = units & STRING_UNITS_MASK; static const char *const units_10[] = { - "B", "kB", "MB", "GB", "TB", "PB", "EB", "ZB", "YB" + "", "k", "M", "G", "T", "P", "E", "Z", "Y", }; static const char *const units_2[] = { - "B", "KiB", "MiB", "GiB", "TiB", "PiB", "EiB", "ZiB", "YiB" + "", "Ki", "Mi", "Gi", "Ti", "Pi", "Ei", "Zi", "Yi", }; static const char *const *const units_str[] = { [STRING_UNITS_10] = units_10, @@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ int string_get_size(u64 size, u64 blk_size, const enum string_size_units units, /* This is Napier's algorithm. Reduce the original block size to * - * coefficient * divisor[units]^i + * coefficient * divisor[units_base]^i * * we do the reduction so both coefficients are just under 32 bits so * that multiplying them together won't overflow 64 bits and we keep @@ -78,12 +79,12 @@ int string_get_size(u64 size, u64 blk_size, const enum string_size_units units, * precision is in the coefficients. */ while (blk_size >> 32) { - do_div(blk_size, divisor[units]); + do_div(blk_size, divisor[units_base]); i++; } while (size >> 32) { - do_div(size, divisor[units]); + do_div(size, divisor[units_base]); i++; } @@ -92,8 +93,8 @@ int string_get_size(u64 size, u64 blk_size, const enum string_size_units units, size *= blk_size; /* and logarithmically reduce it until it's just under the divisor */ - while (size >= divisor[units]) { - remainder = do_div(size, divisor[units]); + while (size >= divisor[units_base]) { + remainder = do_div(size, divisor[units_base]); i++; } @@ -103,10 +104,10 @@ int string_get_size(u64 size, u64 blk_size, const enum string_size_units units, for (j = 0; sf_cap*10 < 1000; j++) sf_cap *= 10; - if (units == STRING_UNITS_2) { + if (units_base == STRING_UNITS_2) { /* express the remainder as a decimal. It's currently the * numerator of a fraction whose denominator is - * divisor[units], which is 1 << 10 for STRING_UNITS_2 */ + * divisor[units_base], which is 1 << 10 for STRING_UNITS_2 */ remainder *= 1000; remainder >>= 10; } @@ -128,10 +129,12 @@ int string_get_size(u64 size, u64 blk_size, const enum string_size_units units, if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(units_2)) unit = "UNK"; else - unit = units_str[units][i]; + unit = units_str[units_base][i]; - return snprintf(buf, len, "%u%s %s", (u32)size, - tmp, unit); + return snprintf(buf, len, "%u%s%s%s%s", (u32)size, tmp, + (units & STRING_UNITS_NO_SPACE) ? "" : " ", + unit, + (units & STRING_UNITS_NO_BYTES) ? "" : "B"); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(string_get_size); diff --git a/lib/test-string_helpers.c b/lib/test-string_helpers.c index 9a68849a5d55..dce67698297b 100644 --- a/lib/test-string_helpers.c +++ b/lib/test-string_helpers.c @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt +#include #include #include #include @@ -500,21 +501,65 @@ static __init void test_string_get_size_check(const char *units, pr_warn("expected: '%s', got '%s'\n", exp, res); } -static __init void __test_string_get_size(const u64 size, const u64 blk_size, - const char *exp_result10, - const char *exp_result2) +static __init void __strchrcut(char *dst, const char *src, const char *cut) +{ + const char *from = src; + size_t len; + + do { + len = strcspn(from, cut); + memcpy(dst, from, len); + dst += len; + from += len; + } while (*from++); + *dst = '\0'; +} + +static __init void __test_string_get_size_one(const u64 size, const u64 blk_size, + const char *exp_result10, + const char *exp_result2, + enum string_size_units units, + const char *cut) { char buf10[string_get_size_maxbuf]; char buf2[string_get_size_maxbuf]; + char exp10[string_get_size_maxbuf]; + char exp2[string_get_size_maxbuf]; + char prefix10[64]; + char prefix2[64]; + + sprintf(prefix10, "STRING_UNITS_10 [%s]", cut); + sprintf(prefix2, "STRING_UNITS_2 [%s]", cut); + + __strchrcut(exp10, exp_result10, cut); + __strchrcut(exp2, exp_result2, cut); - string_get_size(size, blk_size, STRING_UNITS_10, buf10, sizeof(buf10)); - string_get_size(size, blk_size, STRING_UNITS_2, buf2, sizeof(buf2)); + string_get_size(size, blk_size, STRING_UNITS_10 | units, buf10, sizeof(buf10)); + string_get_size(size, blk_size, STRING_UNITS_2 | units, buf2, sizeof(buf2)); - test_string_get_size_check("STRING_UNITS_10", exp_result10, buf10, - size, blk_size); + test_string_get_size_check(prefix10, exp10, buf10, size, blk_size); + test_string_get_size_check(prefix2, exp2, buf2, size, blk_size); +} + +static __init void __test_string_get_size(const u64 size, const u64 blk_size, + const char *exp_result10, + const char *exp_result2) +{ + struct { + enum string_size_units units; + const char *cut; + } get_size_test_cases[] = { + { 0, "" }, + { STRING_UNITS_NO_SPACE, " " }, + { STRING_UNITS_NO_SPACE | STRING_UNITS_NO_BYTES, " B" }, + { STRING_UNITS_NO_BYTES, "B" }, + }; + int i; - test_string_get_size_check("STRING_UNITS_2", exp_result2, buf2, - size, blk_size); + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(get_size_test_cases); i++) + __test_string_get_size_one(size, blk_size, exp_result10, exp_result2, + get_size_test_cases[i].units, + get_size_test_cases[i].cut); } static __init void test_string_get_size(void) -- cgit v1.2.3