From 922dbc5be2186659d2c453a53f2ae569e55b6101 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2017 11:52:13 +0800 Subject: sctp: remove the typedef sctp_chunkhdr_t This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_chunkhdr_t, and replace with struct sctp_chunkhdr in the places where it's using this typedef. It is also to fix some indents and use sizeof(variable) instead of sizeof(type)., especially in sctp_new. Signed-off-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c') diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 8feff96a5bef..2b7c07f19b08 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_4_C(struct net *net, return sctp_sf_violation_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); /* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -368,9 +368,9 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, if (err_chunk) { packet = sctp_abort_pkt_new(net, ep, asoc, arg, (__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) + - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t), + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr), ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)); sctp_chunk_free(err_chunk); @@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, len = 0; if (err_chunk) len = ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t); + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr); repl = sctp_make_init_ack(new_asoc, chunk, GFP_ATOMIC, len); if (!repl) @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, */ unk_param = (sctp_unrecognized_param_t *) ((__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) + - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)); /* Replace the cause code with the "Unrecognized parameter" * parameter type. */ @@ -540,9 +540,9 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net, if (err_chunk) { packet = sctp_abort_pkt_new(net, ep, asoc, arg, (__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) + - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t), + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr), ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)); sctp_chunk_free(err_chunk); @@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net, * chunk header. More detailed verification is done * in sctp_unpack_cookie(). */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); /* If the endpoint is not listening or if the number of associations @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net, chunk->subh.cookie_hdr = (struct sctp_signed_cookie *)chunk->skb->data; if (!pskb_pull(chunk->skb, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) goto nomem; /* 5.1 D) Upon reception of the COOKIE ECHO chunk, Endpoint @@ -770,9 +770,10 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net, auth.skb = chunk->auth_chunk; auth.asoc = chunk->asoc; auth.sctp_hdr = chunk->sctp_hdr; - auth.chunk_hdr = skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk, - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); - skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + auth.chunk_hdr = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *) + skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk, + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)); + skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)); auth.transport = chunk->transport; ret = sctp_sf_authenticate(net, ep, new_asoc, type, &auth); @@ -886,7 +887,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(struct net *net, /* Verify that the chunk length for the COOKIE-ACK is OK. * If we don't do this, any bundled chunks may be junked. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -1099,7 +1100,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_beat_8_3(struct net *net, */ chunk->subh.hb_hdr = (sctp_heartbeathdr_t *) chunk->skb->data; param_hdr = (sctp_paramhdr_t *) chunk->subh.hb_hdr; - paylen = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t); + paylen = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr); if (ntohs(param_hdr->length) > paylen) return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, @@ -1164,7 +1165,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_backbeat_8_3(struct net *net, return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); /* Make sure that the HEARTBEAT-ACK chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) + + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr) + sizeof(sctp_sender_hb_info_t))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -1469,9 +1470,9 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init( if (err_chunk) { packet = sctp_abort_pkt_new(net, ep, asoc, arg, (__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) + - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t), + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr), ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)); if (packet) { sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SEND_PKT, @@ -1535,7 +1536,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init( len = 0; if (err_chunk) { len = ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t); + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr); } repl = sctp_make_init_ack(new_asoc, chunk, GFP_ATOMIC, len); @@ -1556,7 +1557,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init( */ unk_param = (sctp_unrecognized_param_t *) ((__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) + - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)); /* Replace the cause code with the "Unrecognized parameter" * parameter type. */ @@ -2044,7 +2045,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(struct net *net, * enough for the chunk header. Cookie length verification is * done later. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -2053,7 +2054,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(struct net *net, */ chunk->subh.cookie_hdr = (struct sctp_signed_cookie *)chunk->skb->data; if (!pskb_pull(chunk->skb, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) goto nomem; /* In RFC 2960 5.2.4 3, if both Verification Tags in the State Cookie @@ -2806,7 +2807,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, struct sctp_chunk *reply; /* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -3358,7 +3359,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_final(struct net *net, return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); /* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN_ACK chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); /* 10.2 H) SHUTDOWN COMPLETE notification @@ -3435,7 +3436,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, { struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb; - sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch; + struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch; sctp_errhdr_t *err; __u8 *ch_end; int ootb_shut_ack = 0; @@ -3443,10 +3444,10 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES); - ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->chunk_hdr; + ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)chunk->chunk_hdr; do { /* Report violation if the chunk is less then minimal */ - if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)) + if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(*ch)) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -3487,7 +3488,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, } } - ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end; + ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)ch_end; } while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb)); if (ootb_shut_ack) @@ -3560,7 +3561,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(struct net *net, /* If the chunk length is invalid, we don't want to process * the reset of the packet. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); /* We need to discard the rest of the packet to prevent @@ -3591,7 +3592,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_8_5_1_E_sa(struct net *net, struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; /* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN_ACK chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -4256,7 +4257,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_unk_chunk(struct net *net, { struct sctp_chunk *unk_chunk = arg; struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk; - sctp_chunkhdr_t *hdr; + struct sctp_chunkhdr *hdr; pr_debug("%s: processing unknown chunk id:%d\n", __func__, type.chunk); @@ -4267,7 +4268,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_unk_chunk(struct net *net, * Since we don't know the chunk type, we use a general * chunkhdr structure to make a comparison. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(unk_chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(unk_chunk, sizeof(*hdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -4340,7 +4341,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_discard_chunk(struct net *net, * Since we don't know the chunk type, we use a general * chunkhdr structure to make a comparison. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -4405,7 +4406,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violation(struct net *net, struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; /* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); -- cgit v1.2.3