From dda56e134059b840631fdfd034784056b627c2a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jacob Shin Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 19:38:48 -0800 Subject: x86, mm: Fixup code testing if a pfn is direct mapped Update code that previously assumed pfns [ 0 - max_low_pfn_mapped ) and [ 4GB - max_pfn_mapped ) were always direct mapped, to now look up pfn_mapped ranges instead. -v2: change applying sequence to keep git bisecting working. so add dummy pfn_range_is_mapped(). - Yinghai Lu Signed-off-by: Jacob Shin Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1353123563-3103-12-git-send-email-yinghai@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index f7e98a2c0d12..9619ba6528ca 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -676,12 +676,10 @@ static void __cpuinit init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * benefit in doing so. */ if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_K8_TSEG_ADDR, &tseg)) { + unsigned long pfn = tseg >> PAGE_SHIFT; + printk(KERN_DEBUG "tseg: %010llx\n", tseg); - if ((tseg>>PMD_SHIFT) < - (max_low_pfn_mapped>>(PMD_SHIFT-PAGE_SHIFT)) || - ((tseg>>PMD_SHIFT) < - (max_pfn_mapped>>(PMD_SHIFT-PAGE_SHIFT)) && - (tseg>>PMD_SHIFT) >= (1ULL<<(32 - PMD_SHIFT)))) + if (pfn_range_is_mapped(pfn, pfn + 1)) set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(tseg), 1); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From c074eaac2ab264c94520efff7e896b771de885ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yinghai Lu Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 19:39:20 -0800 Subject: x86, mm: kill numa_64.h Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1353123563-3103-44-git-send-email-yinghai@kernel.org Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin --- arch/x86/include/asm/numa.h | 2 -- arch/x86/include/asm/numa_64.h | 4 ---- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 1 - arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 1 - arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 1 - arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 3 --- 6 files changed, 12 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/numa_64.h (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c') diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/numa.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/numa.h index 49119fcea2dc..52560a2038e1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/numa.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/numa.h @@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ static inline int numa_cpu_node(int cpu) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 # include -#else -# include #endif #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/numa_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/numa_64.h deleted file mode 100644 index fe4d2d410ad2..000000000000 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/numa_64.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef _ASM_X86_NUMA_64_H -#define _ASM_X86_NUMA_64_H - -#endif /* _ASM_X86_NUMA_64_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c index e651f7a589ac..4b23aa18518d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c @@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(acpi_disabled); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 # include -# include #endif /* X86 */ #define BAD_MADT_ENTRY(entry, end) ( \ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 9619ba6528ca..913f94f9e8d9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ #include #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -# include # include # include #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c index 198e019a531a..3b547cc4bd03 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #include -#include #endif #include "cpu.h" diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index 85b62f1c8071..6d29d1fcf068 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -108,9 +108,6 @@ #include #include #include -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -#include -#endif #include #include #include -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8b84c8df38d5796da2e8cd051666d203ddabcb62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel J Blueman Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 14:32:10 +0800 Subject: x86, AMD, NB: Use u16 for northbridge IDs in amd_get_nb_id Change amd_get_nb_id to return u16 to support >255 memory controllers, and related consistency fixes. Signed-off-by: Daniel J Blueman Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1353997932-8475-2-git-send-email-daniel@numascale-asia.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 4 ++-- drivers/edac/amd64_edac.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c') diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index 888184b2fc85..cf500543f6ff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ extern void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip, extern int get_tsc_mode(unsigned long adr); extern int set_tsc_mode(unsigned int val); -extern int amd_get_nb_id(int cpu); +extern u16 amd_get_nb_id(int cpu); struct aperfmperf { u64 aperf, mperf; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 15239fffd6fe..782c456eaa01 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -364,9 +364,9 @@ static void __cpuinit amd_detect_cmp(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) #endif } -int amd_get_nb_id(int cpu) +u16 amd_get_nb_id(int cpu) { - int id = 0; + u16 id = 0; #ifdef CONFIG_SMP id = per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu); #endif diff --git a/drivers/edac/amd64_edac.c b/drivers/edac/amd64_edac.c index a3fe39b1f78b..29be39d02076 100644 --- a/drivers/edac/amd64_edac.c +++ b/drivers/edac/amd64_edac.c @@ -939,7 +939,8 @@ static u64 get_error_address(struct mce *m) struct amd64_pvt *pvt; u64 cc6_base, tmp_addr; u32 tmp; - u8 mce_nid, intlv_en; + u16 mce_nid; + u8 intlv_en; if ((addr & GENMASK(24, 47)) >> 24 != 0x00fdf7) return addr; @@ -2181,7 +2182,7 @@ static int init_csrows(struct mem_ctl_info *mci) } /* get all cores on this DCT */ -static void get_cpus_on_this_dct_cpumask(struct cpumask *mask, unsigned nid) +static void get_cpus_on_this_dct_cpumask(struct cpumask *mask, u16 nid) { int cpu; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 373d4d099761cb1f637bed488ab3871945882273 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rusty Russell Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2013 17:17:39 +1030 Subject: taint: add explicit flag to show whether lock dep is still OK. Fix up all callers as they were before, with make one change: an unsigned module taints the kernel, but doesn't turn off lockdep. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell --- arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- arch/arm/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- arch/mips/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- arch/sh/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c | 2 +- arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c | 2 +- arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c | 2 +- arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 3 +-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 2 +- arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c | 2 +- drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 2 +- drivers/acpi/osl.c | 2 +- drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c | 2 +- include/linux/kernel.h | 6 +++++- kernel/module.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- kernel/panic.c | 34 ++++++++++++++-------------------- kernel/sched/core.c | 2 +- kernel/sysctl.c | 2 +- lib/bug.c | 3 ++- mm/memory.c | 2 +- mm/page_alloc.c | 2 +- mm/slab.c | 2 +- mm/slub.c | 2 +- sound/soc/soc-core.c | 2 +- 37 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c') diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c index 272666d006df..4037461a6493 100644 --- a/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ die_if_kernel(char * str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err, unsigned long *r9_15) #endif printk("%s(%d): %s %ld\n", current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), str, err); dik_show_regs(regs, r9_15); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); dik_show_trace((unsigned long *)(regs+1)); dik_show_code((unsigned int *)regs->pc); diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c index b0179b89a04c..1c089119b2d7 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr) bust_spinlocks(0); die_owner = -1; - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); die_nest_count--; if (!die_nest_count) /* Nest count reaches zero, release the lock. */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c index 3883f842434f..b3c5f628bdb4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int err) crash_kexec(regs); bust_spinlocks(0); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); raw_spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock); oops_exit(); diff --git a/arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c b/arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c index 3d760c06f024..682b2478691a 100644 --- a/arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err) show_regs_log_lvl(regs, KERN_EMERG); show_stack_log_lvl(current, regs->sp, regs, KERN_EMERG); bust_spinlocks(0); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock); if (in_interrupt()) diff --git a/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c b/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c index a41eeb8eeaa1..be5e2dd9c9d3 100644 --- a/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ int die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err) do_show_stack(current, ®s->r30, pt_elr(regs)); bust_spinlocks(0); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); spin_unlock_irq(&die.lock); diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c index bd42b76000d1..f7f9f9c6caf0 100644 --- a/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ die (const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err) bust_spinlocks(0); die.lock_owner = -1; - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); spin_unlock_irq(&die.lock); if (!regs) diff --git a/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c b/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c index cbc624af4494..f32ab22e7ed3 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c @@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ void die_if_kernel (char *str, struct pt_regs *fp, int nr) console_verbose(); printk("%s: %08x\n",str,nr); show_registers(fp); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); do_exit(SIGSEGV); } diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c b/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c index cf7ac5483f53..9007966d56d4 100644 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c @@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ void __noreturn die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs) printk("%s[#%d]:\n", str, ++die_counter); show_registers(regs); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); raw_spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock); oops_exit(); diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c index 45ba99f5080b..aeb8f8f2c07a 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err) show_regs(regs); dump_stack(); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); if (in_interrupt()) panic("Fatal exception in interrupt"); diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c index 32518401af68..c579db859388 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void __kprobes oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, { bust_spinlocks(0); die_owner = -1; - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); die_nest_count--; oops_exit(); printk("\n"); diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c b/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c index 70ecfc5fe8f0..13dd63fba367 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *str) print_modules(); show_regs(regs); bust_spinlocks(0); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock); if (in_interrupt()) panic("Fatal exception in interrupt"); diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c b/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c index 72246bc06884..dfdad72c61ca 100644 --- a/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err) notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, err, 255, SIGSEGV); bust_spinlocks(0); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock); oops_exit(); diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c index 0eaf0059aaef..88a127b9c69e 100644 --- a/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c +++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static void __init process_switch(char c) break; } cheetah_pcache_forced_on = 1; - add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK); + add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); cheetah_enable_pcache(); break; diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c index a5785ea2a85d..662982946a89 100644 --- a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c +++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs) printk("%s(%d): %s [#%d]\n", current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), str, ++die_counter); show_regs(regs); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c index e7ecf1507d90..8d38ca97aa23 100644 --- a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c +++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c @@ -2383,7 +2383,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs) notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, 0, 255, SIGSEGV); __asm__ __volatile__("flushw"); show_regs(regs); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); if (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) { struct thread_info *tp = current_thread_info(); struct reg_window *rw = (struct reg_window *) diff --git a/arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c b/arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c index 2054f0d4db13..0870b68d2ad9 100644 --- a/arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int err) ret = __die(str, err, thread, regs); bust_spinlocks(0); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock); oops_exit(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 15239fffd6fe..5853e57523e5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -220,8 +220,7 @@ static void __cpuinit amd_k7_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) */ WARN_ONCE(1, "WARNING: This combination of AMD" " processors is not suitable for SMP.\n"); - if (!test_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP)) - add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP); + add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); valid_k7: ; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c index 80dbda84f1c3..6bc15edbc8cd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c @@ -1085,7 +1085,7 @@ void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) /* * Set taint even when machine check was not enabled. */ - add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK); + add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); severity = mce_severity(&m, cfg->tolerant, NULL); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c index 2d5454cd2c4f..1c044b1ccc59 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static void pentium_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) smp_processor_id()); } - add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK); + add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } /* Set up machine check reporting for processors with Intel style MCE: */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c index 2d7998fb628c..e9a701aecaa1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ static void winchip_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) { printk(KERN_EMERG "CPU0: Machine Check Exception.\n"); - add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK); + add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } /* Set up machine check reporting on the Winchip C6 series */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c index e9fe907cd249..fa72a39e5d46 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c @@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ static void generic_get_mtrr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long *base, if (tmp != mask_lo) { printk(KERN_WARNING "mtrr: your BIOS has configured an incorrect mask, fixing it.\n"); - add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND); + add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); mask_lo = tmp; } } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c index ae42418bc50f..c8797d55b245 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ void __kprobes oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr) bust_spinlocks(0); die_owner = -1; - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); die_nest_count--; if (!die_nest_count) /* Nest count reaches zero, release the lock. */ diff --git a/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c b/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c index 01e0111bf787..ded955d45155 100644 --- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c @@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ void die(const char * str, struct pt_regs * regs, long err) if (!user_mode(regs)) show_stack(NULL, (unsigned long*)regs->areg[1]); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock); if (in_interrupt()) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c index 5d42c2414ae5..cd9a68e2fea9 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf, buf = NULL; if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) return -EINVAL; - add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE); + add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } return count; diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c index 3ff267861541..535e888bad78 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c @@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ static void acpi_table_taint(struct acpi_table_header *table) pr_warn(PREFIX "Override [%4.4s-%8.8s], this is unsafe: tainting kernel\n", table->signature, table->oem_table_id); - add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE); + add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } diff --git a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c index 46a213a596e2..f63c830083ec 100644 --- a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c +++ b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c @@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ static ssize_t regmap_map_write_file(struct file *file, return -EINVAL; /* Userspace has been fiddling around behind the kernel's back */ - add_taint(TAINT_USER); + add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); regmap_write(map, reg, value); return buf_size; diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h index c566927efcbd..80d36874689b 100644 --- a/include/linux/kernel.h +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h @@ -398,7 +398,11 @@ extern int panic_on_unrecovered_nmi; extern int panic_on_io_nmi; extern int sysctl_panic_on_stackoverflow; extern const char *print_tainted(void); -extern void add_taint(unsigned flag); +enum lockdep_ok { + LOCKDEP_STILL_OK, + LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE +}; +extern void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok); extern int test_taint(unsigned flag); extern unsigned long get_taint(void); extern int root_mountflags; diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index e69a5a68766f..cc000dd6e4a8 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -197,9 +197,10 @@ static inline int strong_try_module_get(struct module *mod) return -ENOENT; } -static inline void add_taint_module(struct module *mod, unsigned flag) +static inline void add_taint_module(struct module *mod, unsigned flag, + enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok) { - add_taint(flag); + add_taint(flag, lockdep_ok); mod->taints |= (1U << flag); } @@ -727,7 +728,7 @@ static inline int try_force_unload(unsigned int flags) { int ret = (flags & O_TRUNC); if (ret) - add_taint(TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD); + add_taint(TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); return ret; } #else @@ -1138,7 +1139,7 @@ static int try_to_force_load(struct module *mod, const char *reason) if (!test_taint(TAINT_FORCED_MODULE)) printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: %s: kernel tainted.\n", mod->name, reason); - add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE); + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); return 0; #else return -ENOEXEC; @@ -2147,7 +2148,8 @@ static void set_license(struct module *mod, const char *license) if (!test_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE)) printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: module license '%s' taints " "kernel.\n", mod->name, license); - add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE); + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, + LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } } @@ -2700,10 +2702,10 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info, int flags) } if (!get_modinfo(info, "intree")) - add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE); + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) { - add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP); + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: module is from the staging directory," " the quality is unknown, you have been warned.\n", mod->name); @@ -2869,15 +2871,17 @@ static int check_module_license_and_versions(struct module *mod) * using GPL-only symbols it needs. */ if (strcmp(mod->name, "ndiswrapper") == 0) - add_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE); + add_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); /* driverloader was caught wrongly pretending to be under GPL */ if (strcmp(mod->name, "driverloader") == 0) - add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE); + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, + LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); /* lve claims to be GPL but upstream won't provide source */ if (strcmp(mod->name, "lve") == 0) - add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE); + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, + LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); #ifdef CONFIG_MODVERSIONS if ((mod->num_syms && !mod->crcs) @@ -3197,7 +3201,7 @@ again: "%s: module verification failed: signature and/or" " required key missing - tainting kernel\n", mod->name); - add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE); + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); } #endif diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c index e1b2822fff97..7c57cc9eee2c 100644 --- a/kernel/panic.c +++ b/kernel/panic.c @@ -259,26 +259,19 @@ unsigned long get_taint(void) return tainted_mask; } -void add_taint(unsigned flag) +/** + * add_taint: add a taint flag if not already set. + * @flag: one of the TAINT_* constants. + * @lockdep_ok: whether lock debugging is still OK. + * + * If something bad has gone wrong, you'll want @lockdebug_ok = false, but for + * some notewortht-but-not-corrupting cases, it can be set to true. + */ +void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok) { - /* - * Can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore. - * We don't call directly debug_locks_off() because the issue - * is not necessarily serious enough to set oops_in_progress to 1 - * Also we want to keep up lockdep for staging/out-of-tree - * development and post-warning case. - */ - switch (flag) { - case TAINT_CRAP: - case TAINT_OOT_MODULE: - case TAINT_WARN: - case TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND: - break; - - default: - if (__debug_locks_off()) - printk(KERN_WARNING "Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n"); - } + if (lockdep_ok == LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE && __debug_locks_off()) + printk(KERN_WARNING + "Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n"); set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask); } @@ -421,7 +414,8 @@ static void warn_slowpath_common(const char *file, int line, void *caller, print_modules(); dump_stack(); print_oops_end_marker(); - add_taint(taint); + /* Just a warning, don't kill lockdep. */ + add_taint(taint, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); } void warn_slowpath_fmt(const char *file, int line, const char *fmt, ...) diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index 257002c13bb0..662f3d512183 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -2785,7 +2785,7 @@ static noinline void __schedule_bug(struct task_struct *prev) if (irqs_disabled()) print_irqtrace_events(prev); dump_stack(); - add_taint(TAINT_WARN); + add_taint(TAINT_WARN, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); } /* diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index c88878db491e..f97f9d75cde8 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, int i; for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG && tmptaint >> i; i++) { if ((tmptaint >> i) & 1) - add_taint(i); + add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); } } diff --git a/lib/bug.c b/lib/bug.c index d0cdf14c651a..168603477f02 100644 --- a/lib/bug.c +++ b/lib/bug.c @@ -166,7 +166,8 @@ enum bug_trap_type report_bug(unsigned long bugaddr, struct pt_regs *regs) print_modules(); show_regs(regs); print_oops_end_marker(); - add_taint(BUG_GET_TAINT(bug)); + /* Just a warning, don't kill lockdep. */ + add_taint(BUG_GET_TAINT(bug), LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); return BUG_TRAP_TYPE_WARN; } diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c index bb1369f7b9b4..bc8bec762db7 100644 --- a/mm/memory.c +++ b/mm/memory.c @@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ static void print_bad_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, print_symbol(KERN_ALERT "vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap: %s\n", (unsigned long)vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap); dump_stack(); - add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE); + add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } static inline bool is_cow_mapping(vm_flags_t flags) diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index df2022ff0c8a..4c99cb7e276a 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static void bad_page(struct page *page) out: /* Leave bad fields for debug, except PageBuddy could make trouble */ reset_page_mapcount(page); /* remove PageBuddy */ - add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE); + add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } /* diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c index e7667a3584bc..856e4a192d25 100644 --- a/mm/slab.c +++ b/mm/slab.c @@ -812,7 +812,7 @@ static void __slab_error(const char *function, struct kmem_cache *cachep, printk(KERN_ERR "slab error in %s(): cache `%s': %s\n", function, cachep->name, msg); dump_stack(); - add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE); + add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } #endif diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index ba2ca53f6c3a..7ec3041bdd0d 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static void slab_bug(struct kmem_cache *s, char *fmt, ...) printk(KERN_ERR "----------------------------------------" "-------------------------------------\n\n"); - add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE); + add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } static void slab_fix(struct kmem_cache *s, char *fmt, ...) diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-core.c b/sound/soc/soc-core.c index 2370063b5824..4c6526c0db03 100644 --- a/sound/soc/soc-core.c +++ b/sound/soc/soc-core.c @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static ssize_t codec_reg_write_file(struct file *file, return -EINVAL; /* Userspace has been fiddling around behind the kernel's back */ - add_taint(TAINT_USER); + add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); snd_soc_write(codec, reg, value); return buf_size; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6bf08a8dcd1ef13e542f08fc3b1ce6cf64ae63b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Boris Ostrovsky Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2013 16:32:16 -0500 Subject: x86, AMD: Clean up init_amd() Clean up multiple declarations of variable used for rd/wrmsr. Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1359495136-23244-1-git-send-email-ostr@amd64.org Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 29 ++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 15239fffd6fe..dd4a5b685a00 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -518,10 +518,9 @@ static void __cpuinit early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) static void __cpuinit init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u32 dummy; - -#ifdef CONFIG_SMP unsigned long long value; +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP /* * Disable TLB flush filter by setting HWCR.FFDIS on K8 * bit 6 of msr C001_0015 @@ -559,12 +558,10 @@ static void __cpuinit init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * (AMD Erratum #110, docId: 25759). */ if (c->x86_model < 0x14 && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_LAHF_LM)) { - u64 val; - clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_LAHF_LM); - if (!rdmsrl_amd_safe(0xc001100d, &val)) { - val &= ~(1ULL << 32); - wrmsrl_amd_safe(0xc001100d, val); + if (!rdmsrl_amd_safe(0xc001100d, &value)) { + value &= ~(1ULL << 32); + wrmsrl_amd_safe(0xc001100d, value); } } @@ -617,13 +614,12 @@ static void __cpuinit init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if ((c->x86 == 0x15) && (c->x86_model >= 0x10) && (c->x86_model <= 0x1f) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT)) { - u64 val; - if (!rdmsrl_safe(0xc0011005, &val)) { - val |= 1ULL << 54; - wrmsrl_safe(0xc0011005, val); - rdmsrl(0xc0011005, val); - if (val & (1ULL << 54)) { + if (!rdmsrl_safe(0xc0011005, &value)) { + value |= 1ULL << 54; + wrmsrl_safe(0xc0011005, value); + rdmsrl(0xc0011005, value); + if (value & (1ULL << 54)) { set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT); printk(KERN_INFO FW_INFO "CPU: Re-enabling " "disabled Topology Extensions Support\n"); @@ -637,11 +633,10 @@ static void __cpuinit init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) */ if ((c->x86 == 0x15) && (c->x86_model >= 0x02) && (c->x86_model < 0x20)) { - u64 val; - if (!rdmsrl_safe(0xc0011021, &val) && !(val & 0x1E)) { - val |= 0x1E; - wrmsrl_safe(0xc0011021, val); + if (!rdmsrl_safe(0xc0011021, &value) && !(value & 0x1E)) { + value |= 0x1E; + wrmsrl_safe(0xc0011021, value); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From f0322bd341fd63261527bf84afd3272bcc2e8dd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Boris Ostrovsky Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2013 16:32:49 -0500 Subject: x86, AMD: Enable WC+ memory type on family 10 processors In some cases BIOS may not enable WC+ memory type on family 10 processors, instead converting what would be WC+ memory to CD type. On guests using nested pages this could result in performance degradation. This patch enables WC+. Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1359495169-23278-1-git-send-email-ostr@amd64.org Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin --- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c') diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/msr-index.h index 433a59fb1a74..158cde98bbc3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/msr-index.h @@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ #define MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH 0xc0010140 #define MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS 0xc0010141 #define MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG 0xc0011022 +#define MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2 0xc001102a #define MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHCTL 0xc0011030 #define MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHLINAD 0xc0011031 #define MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHPHYSAD 0xc0011032 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index dd4a5b685a00..721ef3208eb5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -698,13 +698,11 @@ static void __cpuinit init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (c->x86 > 0x11) set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ARAT); - /* - * Disable GART TLB Walk Errors on Fam10h. We do this here - * because this is always needed when GART is enabled, even in a - * kernel which has no MCE support built in. - */ if (c->x86 == 0x10) { /* + * Disable GART TLB Walk Errors on Fam10h. We do this here + * because this is always needed when GART is enabled, even in a + * kernel which has no MCE support built in. * BIOS should disable GartTlbWlk Errors themself. If * it doesn't do it here as suggested by the BKDG. * @@ -718,6 +716,19 @@ static void __cpuinit init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) mask |= (1 << 10); wrmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_MCx_MASK(4), mask); } + + /* + * On family 10h BIOS may not have properly enabled WC+ support, + * causing it to be converted to CD memtype. This may result in + * performance degradation for certain nested-paging guests. + * Prevent this conversion by clearing bit 24 in + * MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2. + */ + if (c->x86 == 0x10) { + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2, value); + value &= ~(1ULL << 24); + wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2, value); + } } rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, &c->microcode, &dummy); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 52d3d06e706bdde3d6c5c386deb065c3b4c51618 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Borislav Petkov Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2013 19:33:12 +0100 Subject: x86, cpu, amd: Fix WC+ workaround for older virtual hosts The WC+ workaround for F10h introduces a new MSR and kvm host #GPs on accesses to unknown MSRs if paravirt is not compiled in. Use the exception-handling MSR accessors so as not to break 3.8 and later guests booting on older hosts. Remove a redundant family check while at it. Cc: Gleb Natapov Cc: Boris Ostrovsky Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1361298793-31834-1-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 721ef3208eb5..163af4a91d09 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -723,12 +723,14 @@ static void __cpuinit init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * performance degradation for certain nested-paging guests. * Prevent this conversion by clearing bit 24 in * MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2. + * + * NOTE: we want to use the _safe accessors so as not to #GP kvm + * guests on older kvm hosts. */ - if (c->x86 == 0x10) { - rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2, value); - value &= ~(1ULL << 24); - wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2, value); - } + + rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2, &value); + value &= ~(1ULL << 24); + wrmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2, value); } rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, &c->microcode, &dummy); -- cgit v1.2.3