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authorChang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>2023-06-21 05:06:53 -0700
committerHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>2023-07-14 18:23:14 +1000
commit74c6df413f64f349e8ae4166d97324803bf55b58 (patch)
tree9c40c883469f953ecc688a619fa55c3709355e3a /arch/x86/crypto
parentbabb80b3ecc6f40c962e13c654ebcd27f25ee327 (diff)
crypto: x86/aesni - Align the address before aes_set_key_common()
aes_set_key_common() performs runtime alignment to the void *raw_ctx pointer. This facilitates consistent access to the 16byte-aligned address during key extension. However, the alignment is already handlded in the GCM-related setkey functions before invoking the common function. Consequently, the alignment in the common function is unnecessary for those functions. To establish a consistent approach throughout the glue code, remove the aes_ctx() call from its current location. Instead, place it at each call site where the runtime alignment is currently absent. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230605024623.GA4653@quark.localdomain/ Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/crypto')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c12
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
index a5b0cb3efeba..c4eea7e746e7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
@@ -229,10 +229,10 @@ static inline struct crypto_aes_ctx *aes_ctx(void *raw_ctx)
return (struct crypto_aes_ctx *)ALIGN(addr, align);
}
-static int aes_set_key_common(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, void *raw_ctx,
+static int aes_set_key_common(struct crypto_tfm *tfm,
+ struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx,
const u8 *in_key, unsigned int key_len)
{
- struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(raw_ctx);
int err;
if (key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static int aes_set_key_common(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, void *raw_ctx,
static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
- return aes_set_key_common(tfm, crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), in_key, key_len);
+ return aes_set_key_common(tfm, aes_ctx(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm)), in_key, key_len);
}
static void aesni_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static int aesni_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int len)
{
return aes_set_key_common(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm),
- crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm), key, len);
+ aes_ctx(crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm)), key, len);
}
static int ecb_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
@@ -893,13 +893,13 @@ static int xts_aesni_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
keylen /= 2;
/* first half of xts-key is for crypt */
- err = aes_set_key_common(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), ctx->raw_crypt_ctx,
+ err = aes_set_key_common(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), aes_ctx(ctx->raw_crypt_ctx),
key, keylen);
if (err)
return err;
/* second half of xts-key is for tweak */
- return aes_set_key_common(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), ctx->raw_tweak_ctx,
+ return aes_set_key_common(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), aes_ctx(ctx->raw_tweak_ctx),
key + keylen, keylen);
}