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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-27 10:17:23 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-27 10:17:23 -0700 |
commit | 7001052160d172f6de06adeffde24dde9935ece8 (patch) | |
tree | 65fbc9c0df5a2989b68882ce1d893a0d78134c6a /arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | |
parent | f022814633e1c600507b3a99691b4d624c2813f0 (diff) | |
parent | 3986f65d4f408ce9d0a361e3226a3246a5fb701c (diff) |
Merge tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 CET-IBT (Control-Flow-Integrity) support from Peter Zijlstra:
"Add support for Intel CET-IBT, available since Tigerlake (11th gen),
which is a coarse grained, hardware based, forward edge
Control-Flow-Integrity mechanism where any indirect CALL/JMP must
target an ENDBR instruction or suffer #CP.
Additionally, since Alderlake (12th gen)/Sapphire-Rapids, speculation
is limited to 2 instructions (and typically fewer) on branch targets
not starting with ENDBR. CET-IBT also limits speculation of the next
sequential instruction after the indirect CALL/JMP [1].
CET-IBT is fundamentally incompatible with retpolines, but provides,
as described above, speculation limits itself"
[1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html
* tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (53 commits)
kvm/emulate: Fix SETcc emulation for ENDBR
x86/Kconfig: Only allow CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT with ld.lld >= 14.0.0
x86/Kconfig: Only enable CONFIG_CC_HAS_IBT for clang >= 14.0.0
kbuild: Fixup the IBT kbuild changes
x86/Kconfig: Do not allow CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y with llvm-objcopy
x86: Remove toolchain check for X32 ABI capability
x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls
objtool: Find unused ENDBR instructions
objtool: Validate IBT assumptions
objtool: Add IBT/ENDBR decoding
objtool: Read the NOENDBR annotation
x86: Annotate idtentry_df()
x86,objtool: Move the ASM_REACHABLE annotation to objtool.h
x86: Annotate call_on_stack()
objtool: Rework ASM_REACHABLE
x86: Mark __invalid_creds() __noreturn
exit: Mark do_group_exit() __noreturn
x86: Mark stop_this_cpu() __noreturn
objtool: Ignore extra-symbol code
objtool: Rename --duplicate to --lto
...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 59 |
1 files changed, 58 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 64deb7727d00..ed4417500700 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #include <asm/uv/uv.h> #include <asm/sigframe.h> +#include <asm/traps.h> #include "cpu.h" @@ -438,7 +439,8 @@ out: /* These bits should not change their value after CPU init is finished. */ static const unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask = - X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_UMIP | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE; + X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_UMIP | + X86_CR4_FSGSBASE | X86_CR4_CET; static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(cr_pinning); static unsigned long cr4_pinned_bits __ro_after_init; @@ -592,6 +594,58 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg) __setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku); #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT + +__noendbr u64 ibt_save(void) +{ + u64 msr = 0; + + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) { + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr); + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr & ~CET_ENDBR_EN); + } + + return msr; +} + +__noendbr void ibt_restore(u64 save) +{ + u64 msr; + + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) { + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr); + msr &= ~CET_ENDBR_EN; + msr |= (save & CET_ENDBR_EN); + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr); + } +} + +#endif + +static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + u64 msr = CET_ENDBR_EN; + + if (!HAS_KERNEL_IBT || + !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) + return; + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr); + cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET); + + if (!ibt_selftest()) { + pr_err("IBT selftest: Failed!\n"); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBT); + return; + } +} + +__noendbr void cet_disable(void) +{ + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, 0); +} + /* * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization @@ -1709,6 +1763,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) x86_init_rdrand(c); setup_pku(c); + setup_cet(c); /* * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it @@ -1777,6 +1832,8 @@ void enable_sep_cpu(void) void __init identify_boot_cpu(void) { identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data); + if (HAS_KERNEL_IBT && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) + pr_info("CET detected: Indirect Branch Tracking enabled\n"); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 sysenter_setup(); enable_sep_cpu(); |