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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-06-26 15:32:39 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-06-26 15:32:39 -0700
commit2c96136a3f8dad6bfe35b003fb8b312f13a107e8 (patch)
treedcc5713059bf56cf70dfc4ec0d53ef7cbc88bcd1 /drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/bitmap.c
parent3e5822e0f99e429fa8b03c956dad890179b5b3b1 (diff)
parent84b9b44b99780d35fe72ac63c4724f158771e898 (diff)
Merge tag 'x86_cc_for_v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 confidential computing update from Borislav Petkov: - Add support for unaccepted memory as specified in the UEFI spec v2.9. The gist of it all is that Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP confidential computing guests define the notion of accepting memory before using it and thus preventing a whole set of attacks against such guests like memory replay and the like. There are a couple of strategies of how memory should be accepted - the current implementation does an on-demand way of accepting. * tag 'x86_cc_for_v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: virt: sevguest: Add CONFIG_CRYPTO dependency x86/efi: Safely enable unaccepted memory in UEFI x86/sev: Add SNP-specific unaccepted memory support x86/sev: Use large PSC requests if applicable x86/sev: Allow for use of the early boot GHCB for PSC requests x86/sev: Put PSC struct on the stack in prep for unaccepted memory support x86/sev: Fix calculation of end address based on number of pages x86/tdx: Add unaccepted memory support x86/tdx: Refactor try_accept_one() x86/tdx: Make _tdx_hypercall() and __tdx_module_call() available in boot stub efi/unaccepted: Avoid load_unaligned_zeropad() stepping into unaccepted memory efi: Add unaccepted memory support x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory efi/libstub: Implement support for unaccepted memory efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820() mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/bitmap.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/bitmap.c41
1 files changed, 41 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/bitmap.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/bitmap.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5c9bba0d549b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/bitmap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+#include <linux/bitmap.h>
+
+void __bitmap_set(unsigned long *map, unsigned int start, int len)
+{
+ unsigned long *p = map + BIT_WORD(start);
+ const unsigned int size = start + len;
+ int bits_to_set = BITS_PER_LONG - (start % BITS_PER_LONG);
+ unsigned long mask_to_set = BITMAP_FIRST_WORD_MASK(start);
+
+ while (len - bits_to_set >= 0) {
+ *p |= mask_to_set;
+ len -= bits_to_set;
+ bits_to_set = BITS_PER_LONG;
+ mask_to_set = ~0UL;
+ p++;
+ }
+ if (len) {
+ mask_to_set &= BITMAP_LAST_WORD_MASK(size);
+ *p |= mask_to_set;
+ }
+}
+
+void __bitmap_clear(unsigned long *map, unsigned int start, int len)
+{
+ unsigned long *p = map + BIT_WORD(start);
+ const unsigned int size = start + len;
+ int bits_to_clear = BITS_PER_LONG - (start % BITS_PER_LONG);
+ unsigned long mask_to_clear = BITMAP_FIRST_WORD_MASK(start);
+
+ while (len - bits_to_clear >= 0) {
+ *p &= ~mask_to_clear;
+ len -= bits_to_clear;
+ bits_to_clear = BITS_PER_LONG;
+ mask_to_clear = ~0UL;
+ p++;
+ }
+ if (len) {
+ mask_to_clear &= BITMAP_LAST_WORD_MASK(size);
+ *p &= ~mask_to_clear;
+ }
+}