diff options
| author | Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> | 2021-10-07 15:56:57 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> | 2021-12-14 10:19:13 -0800 |
| commit | 5e24d5984c805c644de8bf5217a820e22e28318c (patch) | |
| tree | e01bc2279e2be3fc28d0cec6c3cdfa9bdf135b8c /drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c | |
| parent | 5f87ec4861aa1b8458da0dfd730abbd0bdb2f5f9 (diff) | |
ice: Use int for ice_status
To prepare for removal of ice_status, change the variables from
ice_status to int. This eases the transition when values are changed to
return standard int error codes over enum ice_status.
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Tested-by: Gurucharan G <gurucharanx.g@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c | 14 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c index aa11d07793d4..ecc516d4ab1d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ * queue and asynchronously sending message via * ice_sq_send_cmd() function */ -enum ice_status +int ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vfid, u32 v_opcode, u32 v_retval, u8 *msg, u16 msglen, struct ice_sq_cd *cd) { @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ ice_mbx_traverse(struct ice_hw *hw, * sent per VF and marks the VF as malicious if it exceeds * the permissible number of messages to send. */ -static enum ice_status +static int ice_mbx_detect_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_id, enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state, bool *is_malvf) @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static void ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap) * Detect: If pending message count exceeds watermark traverse * the static snapshot and look for a malicious VF. */ -enum ice_status +int ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data, u16 vf_id, bool *is_malvf) @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf; struct ice_ctl_q_info *cq = &hw->mailboxq; enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state new_state; - enum ice_status status = 0; + int status = 0; if (!is_malvf || !mbx_data) return ICE_ERR_BAD_PTR; @@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, * the input vf_id against the bitmap to verify if the VF has been * detected in any previous mailbox iterations. */ -enum ice_status +int ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs, u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id, bool *report_malvf) { @@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs, * that the new VF loaded is not considered malicious before going * through the overflow detection algorithm. */ -enum ice_status +int ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs, u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id) { @@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs, * called to ensure that the vf_count can be compared against the number * of VFs supported as defined in the functional capabilities of the device. */ -enum ice_status ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_count) +int ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_count) { struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; |