diff options
author | Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> | 2017-05-02 08:25:25 +0200 |
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committer | Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> | 2017-05-02 08:25:25 +0200 |
commit | a5c3b32a1146e44f6b38fdfdfffc27842953420c (patch) | |
tree | eca93f51c8deabe77ed079a3e9190717b6380009 /kernel/bpf/verifier.c | |
parent | d7dc450d5a7162de96edbed6b1792240c2f3a55f (diff) | |
parent | 20d5c84bef067b7e804a163e2abca16c47125bad (diff) |
Merge tag 'asoc-v4.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus
ASoC: Updates for v4.12
A quiet release for the core, but lots of new drivers this time around:
- A new, generalized, API for hooking up jacks which makes it easier to
write generic machine drivers for simple cases.
- Continuing fixes for issues with the x86 CPU drivers.
- New drivers for Cirrus CS35L35, DIO DIO2125, Everest ES7132,
HiSilicon hi6210, Maxim MAX98927, MT2701 systems with WM8960, Nuvoton
NAU8824, Odroid systems, ST STM32 SAI controllers and x86 systems with
DA7213
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 64 |
1 files changed, 42 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 796b68d00119..a834068a400e 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -765,38 +765,56 @@ static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) } } -static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, int size) +static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, + int off, int size) { - if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET && reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) { - if (off % size != 0) { - verbose("misaligned access off %d size %d\n", - off, size); - return -EACCES; - } else { - return 0; - } - } - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) - /* misaligned access to packet is ok on x86,arm,arm64 */ - return 0; - if (reg->id && size != 1) { - verbose("Unknown packet alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed\n"); + verbose("Unknown alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed in packet access.\n"); return -EACCES; } /* skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGN-ed */ - if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && - (NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off + off) % size != 0) { + if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off + off) % size != 0) { verbose("misaligned packet access off %d+%d+%d size %d\n", NET_IP_ALIGN, reg->off, off, size); return -EACCES; } + return 0; } +static int check_val_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, + int size) +{ + if (size != 1) { + verbose("Unknown alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed in value access.\n"); + return -EACCES; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int check_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, + int off, int size) +{ + switch (reg->type) { + case PTR_TO_PACKET: + return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) ? 0 : + check_pkt_ptr_alignment(reg, off, size); + case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ: + return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) ? 0 : + check_val_ptr_alignment(reg, size); + default: + if (off % size != 0) { + verbose("misaligned access off %d size %d\n", + off, size); + return -EACCES; + } + + return 0; + } +} + /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory @@ -818,7 +836,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, if (size < 0) return size; - err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size); + err = check_ptr_alignment(reg, off, size); if (err) return err; @@ -1925,6 +1943,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) * register as unknown. */ if (env->allow_ptr_leaks && + BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 && opcode == BPF_ADD && (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ)) dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ; @@ -1973,14 +1992,15 @@ static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET && regs[i].id == dst_reg->id) - regs[i].range = dst_reg->off; + /* keep the maximum range already checked */ + regs[i].range = max(regs[i].range, dst_reg->off); for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) { if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) continue; reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE]; if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && reg->id == dst_reg->id) - reg->range = dst_reg->off; + reg->range = max(reg->range, dst_reg->off); } } |