Merge remote-tracking branch 'airlied/drm-next' into drm-misc-next

Picking up drm-next @ 4.12-rc1 in order to apply Michal Hocko's vmalloc patch set

Signed-off-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org>

1 files changed, 12 insertions, 34 deletions

diff --git a/lib/rhashtable.c b/lib/rhashtable.c
index f8635fd57442..d9e7274a04cd 100644
--- a/lib/rhashtable.c
+++ b/lib/rhashtable.c
@@ -86,16 +86,9 @@ static int alloc_bucket_locks(struct rhashtable *ht, struct bucket_table *tbl,
 		size = min(size, 1U << tbl->nest);
 
 	if (sizeof(spinlock_t) != 0) {
-		tbl->locks = NULL;
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
-		if (size * sizeof(spinlock_t) > PAGE_SIZE &&
-		    gfp == GFP_KERNEL)
-			tbl->locks = vmalloc(size * sizeof(spinlock_t));
-#endif
-		if (gfp != GFP_KERNEL)
-			gfp |= __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY;
-
-		if (!tbl->locks)
+		if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(gfp))
+			tbl->locks = kvmalloc(size * sizeof(spinlock_t), gfp);
+		else
 			tbl->locks = kmalloc_array(size, sizeof(spinlock_t),
 						   gfp);
 		if (!tbl->locks)
@@ -535,7 +528,7 @@ static void *rhashtable_lookup_one(struct rhashtable *ht,
 	struct rhash_head *head;
 	int elasticity;
 
-	elasticity = ht->elasticity;
+	elasticity = RHT_ELASTICITY;
 	pprev = rht_bucket_var(tbl, hash);
 	rht_for_each_continue(head, *pprev, tbl, hash) {
 		struct rhlist_head *list;
@@ -958,35 +951,20 @@ int rhashtable_init(struct rhashtable *ht,
 	if (params->min_size)
 		ht->p.min_size = roundup_pow_of_two(params->min_size);
 
-	if (params->max_size)
-		ht->p.max_size = rounddown_pow_of_two(params->max_size);
+	/* Cap total entries at 2^31 to avoid nelems overflow. */
+	ht->max_elems = 1u << 31;
 
-	if (params->insecure_max_entries)
-		ht->p.insecure_max_entries =
-			rounddown_pow_of_two(params->insecure_max_entries);
-	else
-		ht->p.insecure_max_entries = ht->p.max_size * 2;
+	if (params->max_size) {
+		ht->p.max_size = rounddown_pow_of_two(params->max_size);
+		if (ht->p.max_size < ht->max_elems / 2)
+			ht->max_elems = ht->p.max_size * 2;
+	}
 
-	ht->p.min_size = max(ht->p.min_size, HASH_MIN_SIZE);
+	ht->p.min_size = max_t(u16, ht->p.min_size, HASH_MIN_SIZE);
 
 	if (params->nelem_hint)
 		size = rounded_hashtable_size(&ht->p);
 
-	/* The maximum (not average) chain length grows with the
-	 * size of the hash table, at a rate of (log N)/(log log N).
-	 * The value of 16 is selected so that even if the hash
-	 * table grew to 2^32 you would not expect the maximum
-	 * chain length to exceed it unless we are under attack
-	 * (or extremely unlucky).
-	 *
-	 * As this limit is only to detect attacks, we don't need
-	 * to set it to a lower value as you'd need the chain
-	 * length to vastly exceed 16 to have any real effect
-	 * on the system.
-	 */
-	if (!params->insecure_elasticity)
-		ht->elasticity = 16;
-
 	if (params->locks_mul)
 		ht->p.locks_mul = roundup_pow_of_two(params->locks_mul);
 	else