diff options
author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2019-06-17 10:39:56 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2019-06-17 10:39:56 -0700 |
commit | 4fddbf8a99ee5a65bdd31b3ebbf5a84b9395d496 (patch) | |
tree | 671cdce9ff92bdd0a99619f995bbcea9124735ad /net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | |
parent | 6be8e297f9bcea666ea85ac7a6cd9d52d6deaf92 (diff) | |
parent | 967c05aee439e6e5d7d805e195b3a20ef5c433d6 (diff) |
Merge branch 'tcp-fixes'
Eric Dumazet says:
====================
tcp: make sack processing more robust
Jonathan Looney brought to our attention multiple problems
in TCP stack at the sender side.
SACK processing can be abused by malicious peers to either
cause overflows, or increase of memory usage.
First two patches fix the immediate problems.
Since the malicious peers abuse senders by advertizing a very
small MSS in their SYN or SYNACK packet, the last two
patches add a new sysctl so that admins can chose a higher
limit for MSS clamping.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4/tcp_input.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 26 |
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 38dfc308c0fb..d95ee40df6c2 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ static bool tcp_shifted_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *prev, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq += shifted; tcp_skb_pcount_add(prev, pcount); - BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount); + WARN_ON_ONCE(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount); tcp_skb_pcount_add(skb, -pcount); /* When we're adding to gso_segs == 1, gso_size will be zero, @@ -1368,6 +1368,21 @@ static int skb_can_shift(const struct sk_buff *skb) return !skb_headlen(skb) && skb_is_nonlinear(skb); } +int tcp_skb_shift(struct sk_buff *to, struct sk_buff *from, + int pcount, int shiftlen) +{ + /* TCP min gso_size is 8 bytes (TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE) + * Since TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs is 16 bits, we need + * to make sure not storing more than 65535 * 8 bytes per skb, + * even if current MSS is bigger. + */ + if (unlikely(to->len + shiftlen >= 65535 * TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE)) + return 0; + if (unlikely(tcp_skb_pcount(to) + pcount > 65535)) + return 0; + return skb_shift(to, from, shiftlen); +} + /* Try collapsing SACK blocks spanning across multiple skbs to a single * skb. */ @@ -1473,7 +1488,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *tcp_shift_skb_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, if (!after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + len, tp->snd_una)) goto fallback; - if (!skb_shift(prev, skb, len)) + if (!tcp_skb_shift(prev, skb, pcount, len)) goto fallback; if (!tcp_shifted_skb(sk, prev, skb, state, pcount, len, mss, dup_sack)) goto out; @@ -1491,11 +1506,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *tcp_shift_skb_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, goto out; len = skb->len; - if (skb_shift(prev, skb, len)) { - pcount += tcp_skb_pcount(skb); - tcp_shifted_skb(sk, prev, skb, state, tcp_skb_pcount(skb), + pcount = tcp_skb_pcount(skb); + if (tcp_skb_shift(prev, skb, pcount, len)) + tcp_shifted_skb(sk, prev, skb, state, pcount, len, mss, 0); - } out: return prev; |